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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of World Bank’s Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid on Forest Management in 
Cameroon: Policy Hybridity in International Dependence Development  
by 
Asongayi Venard 
 
Many developing countries depend on the World Bank for development assistance, which the 
Bank often provides with policy reform conditions. Resistance to World Bank’s conditionality 
caused the Bank to posit “ownership” as a country’s real assent to its development policies. The 
combination of ownership and conditionality invalidates the neocolonial, false-paradigm and 
dualism theses in explaining the international dependence development model. This study 
explains this model by investigating how the relationship between conditionality and ownership 
in the context of this model impacts forest management in Cameroon.  
 
Integrating theoretical and methodological insights mainly from political science, economics, 
geosciences, and sociology, the study finds that in this model, conditionality and ownership have 
a hybrid relationship that fosters and hinders effective forest management in Cameroon. This 
finding positions policy hybridity within this model. It proposes a nouvelle way to understand 
international development policies’ interactions, and the effects of the interactions on natural 
resource management.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Governments that enter into agreements with the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (also known as World Bank, and likewise referred to herein as the Bank) claim 
that it is for the better, that opposition to the agreements is uninformed or badly intentioned. Yet 
general strikes, riots, and ransacking of supermarkets manifest that World Bank policies such as 
conditionality, which is basically the attachment of policy reforms to multilateral aid, and 
ownership, which is fundamentally a government’s real assent1 to such policies, can mobilize 
popular resistance. Scholarly opinion on the impact of these policies on forest resource 
management is also divided: statistical findings range all over the spectrum of possible 
conclusions. This study is an engagement in this debate on the outcome of the policies of the 
World Bank by examining the complex impact that the relationship between conditionality and 
ownership within the context of the international dependence development model has on forest 
management in Cameroon. 
The new development paradigm proposed by John H. Dunning and Fabienne Fortanier 
envisions development as a “holistic and multi-faceted, yet contextual concept that embraces a 
variety of human needs and objectives, [is concerned] with the dynamics of structural societal 
transformations . . . emphasizes the importance of institutions . . . and regards means and ends as 
                                                          
1. Throughout this thesis, “real assent” is extrapolated into public policy from John Henry Cardinal 
Newmann’s discourse on assent (unconditional acceptance of a proposition) to religious faith. Newmann 
distinguishes between notional and real assent. By notional assent, he means the assent that one gives to statements 
of truth that are general and abstract – it is the mind contemplating its own creations as notions. Acts of notional 
assent include profession, credence, speculation, opinion, and presumption. Real assent is the assent to statements of 
truth that have been apprehended as real objects through mental activities and experience. Real experienced objects 
leave impressions on the imagination to which the intellect assents. Real assent exercises an influence on both 
individual and society; and influence that notional assent does not incite. Notional assent remains at the mental level, 
while real assent stimulates affections and passions, and thereby moves from notion to action. Real assent, therefore, 
involves belief, conviction and certitude. John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), 89, 103, 123-125.  
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interwoven and part of the development process.”2 In this process of transformation, the idea of 
the improvement of human wellbeing in a sound environment remains very important. In regard 
to this holism, the World Bank acknowledges the need to integrate natural resource and 
environmental management into poverty reduction agenda so as to minimize the risk of 
economic growth at the absolute expense of environmental protection.3 The United Nations  
Organization (UNO) appreciates this risk in terms of an “environmental disaster scenario: ” 
living standards in most countries have been rising; however, standards will fall dramatically by 
2050 in less developed countries because of large scale deforestation, continuous land 
degradation, dramatic decline in biodiversity, economic downturn, political instability, and social 
inequalities.4  
The stakes are high, especially as developing nations such as Cameroon continue to 
depend on multilateral aid that is tied by donors such as the Bank to forest management policies 
that risk fostering such a scenario. This implies that forest management in Cameroon cannot be 
separated from such policies. Faced with both these dependence and environmental disaster 
scenarios, it is necessary to identify the cause-and-effect policy dynamics associated with forest 
resource management in the country so as to pave the way for appropriate resource management 
critical in the international dependence development model, which basically asserts that less 
developed countries rely on bilateral and multilateral development assistance from the developed 
world. 
                                                          
2. John H. Dunning and Fabienne Fortanier, “Multinational Enterprises and the New Development 
Paradigm: Consequences for Host Country Development,” Multinational Business Review 15, no.1 (2007): 27. 
3. World Bank, World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (Washington, DC: The 
World Bank, 2007), 2 and 4.  
4. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report (New York: United 
Nations Development Programme, 2011), 31. Accessed March 1, 2014. 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/271/hdr_2011_en_complete.pdf  
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Problematic 
Harry Magdoff documents that at the July 1944 conference that created the World Bank, 
Henry Morgenthau, the conference president, spoke of the ultimate function of this institution in 
terms of the  
creation of a dynamic world economy in which the peoples of every nation will be able to 
realize their potentialities in peace . . . and enjoy, increasingly, the fruits of material 
progress on an earth infinitely blessed with natural riches. This is the indispensable 
cornerstone of freedom and security. All else must be built upon this. For freedom of 
opportunity is the foundation for all other freedoms.5  
 
Just two decades after the World Bank had been in existence, Magdoff documented these words 
of Morgenthau in a book that the former titled The Age of Imperialism. According to Bruce Rich, 
this institution for “freedom and security” could not have so quickly become a propagator of 
imperial world governance unless the Bank “beneath its long, self-proclaimed mission of banker 
to the poor [by transferring] larger and larger amounts of money to developing-country 
government agencies for capital-intensive, export-oriented projects”6 had constructed the sort of 
bureaucratic world that Max Weber would have characterized as “the hardest to destroy.”7 This 
is the world of dependence – the reliance of developing countries on financial resources from the 
Bank because they are poor despite rich natural resource endowment in those countries. To 
borrow Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s image of the “Palace of Crystal,”8 in this world of dependence, 
developing countries have all the development problems, and the Bank has all the answers. 
Björn Hettne iterates that from the 1970s, neo-Marxists such as Henrique Cardoso, 
Osvaldo Sunkel, Theotonio Dos Santos, and Ruy Mauro Marini have used three main theses to 
                                                          
5. Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 124. 
6. Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of 
Development (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 149.   
7. Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. 
Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 228.  
8. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, “Notes from Underground,” in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. and 
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, London, and Scarborough: New American Library, 1975), 71.  
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explain the international dependency development model.9 The first, which Gert Tinggaard 
Svendsen calls the neocolonial dependence thesis, asserts that there is an unequal power 
relationship between rich nations at the center of global governance and poor countries at the 
periphery, and rich nations take advantage of the power they possess to exploit poor ones. In this 
exploitation process, a small group of individuals and capitalist institutions in rich nations, who 
occupy the top position in global governance, ally with an elite faction that constitute the 
governments of poor or peripheral countries at the bottom of the global power structure.10 Geerat 
J. Vermeij explains that in top-down management, those at the power center make all the 
decisions and regulations of resource management, while those at the periphery simply receive 
and implement decisions from the center.11  
Richard W. Stevenson observes that these governments are often weak in resisting the 
capitalist institutions such as the World Bank at the power center because the former rely on 
financial assistance from the latter for the government’s economic and political interests. 
Furthermore, the Bank uses the aid as leverage or as an instrument of control in the top-down 
global power structure. In this structure, therefore, the Bank formulates resource management 
policies and compels peripheral countries to which it lends to adopt the policies as requirement 
or condition for receiving assistance from the Bank. 12  
However, the neocolonial dependence thesis is unable to account for two pertinent 
elements that characterize global governance and resource management. The first of these, as 
                                                          
9. Björn Hettne, “The Development of Development Theory,” Acta Sociologica 26, No. 3/4 (1983): 253. 
Accessed January 3, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4194484  
10. Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, The Political Economy of the European Union: Institutions, Policy and 
Economic Growth (Cheltenham: Edward Edgar Publishing Ltd., 2003), 20. 
11. Richard W. Stevenson, “Security, Unpredictability and Evolution,” in Natural Security: A Darwinian 
Approach to a Dangerous World, ed. Raphael D. Sagarin and Terence Taylor (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2008), 40. 
12 Richard W. Stevensen, “A Chief Banker for Nations at the Bottom of the Heap,” New York Times (September 14, 
1997): section 3, 1. 
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pointed out by Doborah Moore and Leonard Sklar, is the insistence on respect for the 
sovereignty of nations. This emphasis has characterized the refusal of some governments such as 
Zimbabwe to submit to all social, economic, and environmental policies of the Bank without 
contest.13  Secondly, there is an inherent contradiction within the political economy of capitalism 
that ironically defies the neocolonial dependence thesis today. This contradiction has been 
underlined by Immanuel Wallerstein in his analysis of world systems. In the ceaseless 
accumulation of capital, “capitalists need a large market,” writes Wallerstein, “but they also need 
a multiplicity of states, so that they can gain the advantages of working with states but also can 
circumvent states hostile to their interests in favor to states friendly to their interests.”14 This 
implies that the economic production and consumption that characterize capitalism need national 
political power to survive. Consequently, the power relationship between capitalist institutions 
such as the World Bank and the political government of nations in natural resource management 
cannot be simply explained as unequal distribution of power.  
A different theory, therefore, is necessary to account for the international dependence 
development model. One of these theories is the false-paradigm theory. Svendsen affirms that 
the false-paradigm thesis attributes economic stagnation in poor countries to uninformed counsel 
from international development “experts” who, nevertheless, may provide advice without any ill 
intentions.15 Ramagnoli and Mengoni iterate that this theory sees domestic governments as 
robots that merely implement in their countries mainstream economic analysis and policies 
formulated in the developed world without consideration for specific social, political, cultural, 
                                                          
13. Doborah Moore and Leonard Sklar, “Reforming the World Bank’s Lending for Water: The Process and 
Outcome of Developing a Water Resources Management Policy,” in The Struggle for Accountability, ed. Jonathan 
A. Fox and L. Dave Brown (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1998), 358-359. 
14. Immanuel Wallerstein, World Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2004), 24.  
15. Svendsen, The Political Economy of the European Union, 20. 
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religious, or environmental conditions of the country.16 This falsity is the failure of modernity the 
embraced in World Bank’s economics. In the words of Jean Chesnaux, it is “the failure of a 
global techno-economic short-term project, locked into itself because it has become ‘unhinged’ 
from natural and social realities. It works against the local and concrete interest of every human 
society.”17 
One solution to this failure is to polarize within the same development space the 
development ideologies and policies of the Bank and those of a national government that more 
often reflect the reality of the local contexts in developing countries. Nicholas A. Ashford and 
Ralph Hall write about this polarization as the “dualistic thesis” of the international dependency 
development model, which finds no meeting point between the substantive content of 
development policies that fit rich, western societies and those that are appropriate for the 
developed countries.18 This thesis suggests that for effective development, the Bank should 
merely be a listener to national governments that are more versed in their local realities. Thus, 
the Bank must not tie its multilateral aid to any policy reforms in a country.  
There are two problems with this dualism: first, it fails to appreciate the fact that nations 
have become inserted into the global whole in such a way that social, economic, and political 
circumstances in powerful nations tend to determine the state of affairs in other countries. 
Consequently, the formulation and implementation of public policy cannot be limited simply to 
factors that arise from and remain within specific local circumstances.  Second, the World Bank, 
for the sake of its own perpetuity, must prescribe certain development policy requirements for its 
debtors in order to ensure that the loans it disperses can be repaid. However, amidst movements 
                                                          
16. Ramagnoli and Mengoni, The Economic Development Process in the Middle East and North Africa, 18. 
17. Jean Chesneaux, Brave Modern World (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1992), 150. 
18. Nicholas A. Ashford and Ralph Hall,Technology, Globalization and Sustainable Development: 
Transforming the Industrial State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 159. 
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that counter neoliberal economics out of political expediency, the Bank realizes, as Maynard 
Keynes ones insisted, that it needs to have “a certain amount of faith in the development 
prospects of a country – a faith that transcends the expectations that can certainly be associated 
with particular projects.”19 
The Bank demonstrates this faith in its policy of ownership in which it appreciates some 
development policies as formulated by national governments with due consideration for the 
broad political economy, social relationships, cultural, and environmental aspects of their 
countries and calls on national governments to internalize development and resource 
management policies designed by the Bank. This policy implies that the neocolonial thesis of the 
international dependence development model that privileges the neoclassical economics of 
capitalist societies above all other disciplinary insights and arguments in development projects is 
inadequate to explain the top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top natural resource management that the 
Bank proposed to nations after the Earth Summit in Rio. This faith in the development prospects 
of policies formulated by a national government also implies that the dualistic thesis of the 
international dependence development model is inappropriate to explain the Bank’s perception 
of the development knowledge that governments and localities possess. The Bank’s insistence on 
attaching certain policy reforms as a requirement for its development assistance indicates the 
Bank also has confidence in its own development knowledge. The false-paradigm must itself be 
false in cases where this knowledge has yielded some positive results, as in the management of 
forest resources in Cameroon.  
To downplay the validity of the hitherto stated three theses of the international 
dependency development model does not, however, mean that developing countries have 
                                                          
19. Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher, The World Bank Since Bretton Woods (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1973), 250-251. 
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stopped relying on the World Bank for development assistance. Inasmuch as developing 
countries continue to depend on the Bank, and the Bank continues to use conditionality as an 
instrument of power to maximize control of its supported development programs in developing 
countries, A. Gunder Frank as quoted by Hettne, could not have been absolutely right in 1977 to 
claim that “dependence has now completed the cycle of its natural life.”20 As the cycle continues 
in the sphere of forest resource management to which the Bank now devotes a significant amount 
of its attention in its development agenda, the above critique of the three theses implies that the 
dynamics of power relations, knowledge conviction, and shareholder participation associated 
with the Bank-country relationship and the impact of this dynamics on natural resource 
management in countries have to be explained differently.  
The Bank influences this relationship through conditionality understood as policy 
requirements that the Bank attaches to its financial assistance to countries. Countries also 
influence this relationship through the Bank’s policy of ownership in which states grant real 
assent to development and associated resource management policies. Consequently, one can say 
that this explanation involves the dynamic relationship between the Bank with conditionality on 
the one hand and the country with ownership on the other hand. Thus, it is not only the contact 
between the Bank and the government of a country as institutional entities that can impact forest 
resource management but the dialogue between conditionality and ownership as well. 
Ultimately, it is this compound relationship and its impact on resource management that needs to 
be explained differently.  
What is this different explanation, and how and why has this different relational dynamic 
affected forest management in Cameroon? These questions can be reframed into one. The 
                                                          
20. Hettne, “The Development of Development Theory,” 255. 
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relationship between conditionality and ownership policies arises because of international 
dependency development. It is this development model that engages the management of forest 
resources in Cameroon. Therefore, one can simply ask: in what way has the relationship between 
conditionality and ownership within the context of international dependence development 
impacted the management of forest resources in Cameroon? This is the problem of this study.  
To respond to this problematic, it is important first to look at the background of forest 
management in Cameroon. However, it is necessary to point out ab initio that although some 
scholars have analyzed and criticized the policies of the World Bank, none of them have looked 
at forest management in Cameroon in light of the relationship between conditionality and 
ownership. For example, Anna Lawrence, Bianca Ambrose-Oji, Rita Lysinge, and Charles Tako 
have examined biodiversity conservation on Mount Cameroon in the light of local challenges 
from policies of the Cameroon government; Michael K. McCall and Peter A. Minang have 
assessed participatory Geographic Information Systems for community-based natural resource 
management in the country; and Peter Geschiere has criticized the World Bank for blindly 
betting on the community in the 1994 forest management law. Phil René Oyono has analyzed 
several times Cameroon’s strengths and flaws in forest management but has not linked them to 
the relationship between conditionality and ownership.  
History of Forest Resource Management in Cameroon under the Development Timeline 
  Cameroon lies between 8° 30 to 16° 10 E Longitude and 1° 40 to 13° 05 N latitude. It is 
bordered in the north by Lake Chad, in the north-east by Chad, in the south by Gabon and 
Equatorial Guinea, in the south-east by Congo (Brazzaville); the Central African Republic is in 
the east, Nigeria occupies the west, and the waters of the Atlantic Ocean constantly wash the 
southwest coast of the country. According to the most recent United Nations data, the 475,650 
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square kilometers area country had a human population of 20,030,000 in 2011. Figure 1 shows 
that the triangular nation is rich in vegetation with abundant dense forest in the south and 
cropland in the north of the country respectively.  
 
Figure 1. Map of Cameroon and the country’s diverse vegetation 
Source: Interactive Forest Atlas of Cameroon in the form of Geographic Information System 
Data (World Resource Institute, August 2013). Accessed September 4, 2013. 
http://www.wri.org/our-work/project/congo-basin-forests/cameroon#project-tabs  
 
Mosaic forest, close deciduous forest, and savanna are also present. In 2010, forest land 
occupied 42.0% of the land area of this middle-income country of more than 240 tribes and 
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languages.21 The World Bank documents that forest resources are second only to oil in the 
sectorial contribution of natural resources to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country.22 
The forest accounts for 9.6% of the nation’s GDP. Forest resources not only contribute 
significantly to the economic growth of the country and its trading partners but also to tourism, 
energy supply in the form of fuel-wood, and the infrastructural (building materials), recreational, 
educational, medicinal, and cultural wellbeing of the country. Since the last century, the 
utilitarian value of these forest resources has made forest management a critical element of the 
nation’s political economy. The features of this management have paralleled historically the 
development timeline proposed by McMichael: a journey from the development project (late 
1940s to early 1970s) through the globalization project (1980s to 2000s) to millennial reckonings 
(2000s to present).  
The development project has its roots in colonialism, in which European colonizers 
envisioned their culture and political economy as superior to those of the colonized. To develop 
the colonized, therefore, meant progressively assimilating the colonized to be like the colonizers.  
McMichael notes that this metamorphosis involved a pattern of colonizers establishing in 
colonies an economy of specialized extraction and production of raw materials and primary 
products to provide for the insufficiency of such materials in Europe. This production involved 
setting up plantations. The extraction process made use of European industrial technology.23 The 
colonial era was truly a time of Africa’s resource bondage to Europe. Richard A. Goodridge 
observes that in this epoch of subjugation, Germany, which colonized Cameroon, promulgated 
                                                          
22. United Nations, “Cameroon.” United Nations. Accessed March 1, 2014. 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Cameroon  
22. World Bank, Cameroon’s Development Prospects (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), 2. 
23. McMichael, Philip McMichael, Development and Social Change, 5th edn. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2012), 
118.  
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the All-Highest Decree of 10 June 1896 in which the “Germans classified all lands in the 
Protectorate of Cameroon as ‘unoccupied’ and, therefore, ‘ownerless,’ and these became ‘Crown 
Lands’ to be disposed of by the Protectorate Government as they deemed fit.”24 Mike Rudin 
notes that following this doctrine of terra nullus, German plantations increased in Cameroon 
from seven in 1891 to 182 in 1913. Goodridge documents that by 1914, the Germans had 
converted 264,000 acres of forest land in the southwest Cameroon into plantations.25  
The conversion of virgin forests into plantations in Cameroon created an economic 
system that contradicted the perception of forest land as a property of the commons. Ambe J. 
Njoh points to German companies such as West Kamerun Gesellschaft, Afrikanishe Fucht 
Kompagnie, and Thormählen, which held the above-mentioned 264,000 acres of plantation land, 
as economic institutions that set up this plantation system.26 The system was also in disaccord 
with the cyclical logic of land use that had been present in the country before colonialism. Oyono 
iterates that under this logic, virgin forest transformed into farmlands for subsistence purposes 
was allowed to fallow naturally and eventually regain its forest status.27 Under the plantation 
agriculture and the export of logs to Germany and other European countries for shipbuilding and 
canal piling, land was valued according to its economic utilitarian capacity. This capitalistic and 
accumulative system, which Oyono terms “Eldorado,”28 became the ingredient of the 
development project in the early two decades of the independence of Cameroon. Table 1 shows 
forest management features in Cameroon in this development project era.  
                                                          
24. Richard A. Goodridge, “In the Most Effective Manner?”: Britain and the Disposal of Cameroon’s 
Plantations, 1914 -1924,” The International Journal of American Historical Studies 29 (1996): 252-253. 
25. Ibid., 253. 
26. Ambe Njoh, “Development Implications of Colonial Land and Human Settlement Schemes in 
Cameroon,” Habitat International 26 (2002): 405-406. 
27. Oyono, “The Foundations of the Conflict de Langage over Land and Forests in Southern Cameroon,” 
African Study Monographs 26, no.3 (2005): 119. 
28. Oyono, “The Foundations of the Conflict de Langage,” 121. 
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Table 1. Cameroon’s Forest Management under France, Britain, and Ahidjo’s Planned 
Liberalism29 in the Colonial and Development Project Era, late 1940s to early 1970s 
Features of the Development 
Project 
Forest Management in Cameroon under France, Britain, 
and First Two Decades of Independence (1960-19782) 
Development makes claims 
such as economic progress, 
and use of scientific tools.  
The forest was viewed by France, Britain, and Ahidjo’s 
government as a source of material for raising living 
standards. Mandated masters used European technology to 
foster forest exploitation in Cameroon.30 
National framework for 
economic growth 
The British Ordinance No. 38 of 1946 gave the British 
government absolute rights to control all lands and forests in 
Cameroon. Ordinance No. 74/01 of 6 July 1974 made 
Ahidjo’s government the guardian of all lands.31 
Use of aid to bind developing 
countries to the developed 
world, and exploit natural 
resources for societal 
development 
France and Britain constructed roads in Cameroon under the 
guise of development aid. France declared all lands in East 
Cameroon terres vacantes et sans maître, and began vast 
exploitation of forest resources in Cameroon. Britain and 
France exploited Cameroon’s forests vastly, and they 
exported the forest resources to Europe. Thus, the aid 
dependencia development was really drainage 
development.32 
Development via 
industrialization, especially 
agro-industrialization 
The French and the British upheld plantation development, 
and continued administration of German plantations that 
became property of the colonial state.33  
Industrial investments are 
managed by multi-class 
alliances in development-
states  
Through the policy of assimilation, the French trained a class 
of Cameroonian elites who were incorporated into the 
management of logging companies in east Cameroon.34 
Ahidjo put tribal elites at the head of national industries to 
create a socio-political bond between different tribes and the 
state. 
Development through 
regional, class, gender, 
racial, and ethnic inequalities 
in states and markets 
The French in 1946 introduced legislation to train ethnic 
groups in forest management skills. However, natives who 
received the training were elites assimilated into French 
culture – les assimilés, and not les indigenes.35 
                                                          
29. Planned liberalism was a political economy of programmatic development in Cameroon under 
President Ahidjo. In this political economy that combined socialism and capitalism, the Cameroon government led 
the economic development of the country while encouraging the growth of the private sector. See Mark Dike 
DeLancey, Rebecca Mbuh, and Mark W. DeLancey, “Planned Liberalism,” Historical Dictionary of the Republic of 
Cameroon (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 308. 
30. F.C. Fisiy, Power and Privilege in the Administration of Law: Land Law Reforms and Social 
Differentiation in Cameroon (Leiden: African Studies Center, 1992), 53. 
31. Ambe J. Njoh, “Continuity and Change in Cameroonian Land Policy,” Planning Perspectives 15 
(2000), 253.  
32. J.M. Mengang, “Evolution of Natural Resource Policy in Cameroon,” Yale Forest and Environmental 
Studies Bulletin 102 (1998): 241-243. 
33. J. Acworth et al., “Towards Participatory Biodiversity Conservation,” 76.  
34. S.K. Adeyoju, A Study of Forest Administration Problems in Six African Countries: Cameroon, Ghana, 
Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Tanzania (Geneva: FAO, 1976), 57-58.   
35. Mengang, “Evolution of Natural Resource Policy in Cameroon,” 244.  
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 The development project as described by McMichael was organized at the 
international level by Western centers of power such as the United States of America and Great 
Britain to foster national economic growth. It involved the U.S. bilateral Marshall Plan and 
multilateralism under the Bretton Woods System.36  In McMichael’s development periodization, 
the period from the 1980s to the 2000s was the era of the globalization project characterized by 
seven elements. First, a Washington consensus arose from global managers and policy makers 
who favored market-based and rejected development strategies led by the state. Second, Britain, 
USA, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan grouped themselves into the G-7. Third, this group 
sought to implement global management capitalist policies through multilateral agencies such as the 
World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Fourth, in this capitalist political 
economy, market powers are concentrated in the hands of transnational corporations (TNCs) and financial 
powers in the hands of transnational banks (TNBs). Fifth, with this concentration of powers, states found 
themselves subjected to economic discipline that varied in intensity by geopolitical position, global 
currency hierarchy, debt load, and resource endowment. Sixth, under this political economy, the 
development of the world was conceived as realizable through class, gender, race, and ethnic inequalities 
that result from the prioritization of private property and self-interest in the capitalism. Lastly, from these 
inequalities arose resistance from less developed countries and from movements that contested unbridled 
market rule promulgated by capitalist multilateral institutions.37 
However, nowadays, not the features of the development project but those of the 
globalization project characterize the international dependence development model. There are 
the features of an era, precisely of the post Rio Earth Summit convention on Sustainable 
                                                          
36. The Marshall Plan involved transfer of billions of dollars from the USA to Europe and Japan to serve 
the geopolitical interest of the USA during the Cold War, expand trade, stabilize prices, increase production, destroy 
socialism and eliminate labor militancy. The Bretton Woods System involved the creation of the IMF and the World 
Bank to stabilize national finances, provide money for Third World to import First World infrastructural 
technologies for national economic growth, and encourage Third World primary exports to earn foreign currency. 
37. McMichael, Development and Social Change, 147. 
 
 
24 
 
Development in 1992, when the collaboration and resistance of the Cameroon government to the 
global environmental management policies of the World Bank, in a system of interactions 
between the two stakeholders, created forest management policies from both the government and 
the Bank. The nature of this interaction and its impact on forest management in Cameroon 
constitute the concern of this work. To speak of this relationship between the stakeholders and 
their policies as interactive insinuates that interactionism will be a significant element in the 
theoretical framework of this study. 
Theoretical Framework and Thesis Statement 
 One needs a framework in order to formulate a response to the above-stated problematic. 
In the framing of the problematic, one thing that was insinuated was that there is interaction 
between the Bank and national governments with respect to forest management. The Bank, and 
the country that receives financial assistance from the Bank, reciprocate through conditionality 
and ownership. In this reciprocity, the Bank and its policies influence the government and its 
policies, and vice-versa. As a result, this influence affects forest management in Cameroon. 
Issues related to answering the question, therefore, are the interaction between conditionality and 
ownership, specification of the nature of this interaction, and identification of the effect that the 
result of this interaction has on forest management in the country. 
 In pointing out the difference between sociology-focused interactionist theory and ethics-
based consensus theory, N. H. Groenman, O D’a Sleven, and M. A. Buckenham underline that 
interaction does not seek the acceptance of fundamental values as consensus does. At the social 
level, interactionist theory as posited by modernist thought simply looks at how individuals, 
understood as persons, institutions or groups, influence each other by their actions. Interaction, 
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therefore, implies that the actions of actors are linked – not independent.38 Postmodernists are 
wary of this very positivist approach to interactionism. Making use of an “interpretive 
interactionist” approach that is informed by post-structuralism, feminism, neo-Marxism, and 
cultural studies, post-modernism extends interaction to different metaphysical spheres such as 
systems of discourse. That is, as Kent L. Sandstrom, Daniel D. Martin, and Gary Alan Fine 
explain, post-modernism insists that as self and institutional identities have become fragmented 
because of ideological exchanges between multiple systems, one must admit that ideological and 
conceptual interactions are also part of the scope of interactionism.39   
 When different institutions (actors) and varied ideological formulations (instruments of 
action) are combined, the result is a hybrid. This is a standpoint that has been affirmed by 
scholars of religious fundamentalism and linguists. In his study of current trends in Islam, 
Thomas Hegghammer found that changes in the political contexts in which jihadist groups 
function in the Middle East (especially Western troops in the Muslim world), changes in the 
media environment that allows groups with different world views to interact online, structural 
and ideological cleavages between groups of different ethnic and geographical origins, and 
increased subjugation of jihadists to marginalization in a world in which the majority of people 
are anti-Islamic fundamentalists have led to a new jihadist identity. The interaction between 
different jihadist structures and ideas has given rise to “the ideological hybridization of Jihadi 
groups.”40 Linguist scholars such as A. Suresh Canagarajah have also noted that a language is 
actually a hybrid of multiple languages, especially when examined from the perspective of 
                                                          
38. N. H. Groenman, O D’a Sleven, and M. A. Buckenham, Social Behavioral Sciences for Nurses: 
Psychology, Sociology and Communication for Project 2000 (Edinburg: Campion Press Ltd, 1992), 264. 
39. Kent L. Sandstrom, Daniel D. Martin, and Gary Alan Fine, “Symbolic Interactionism at the End of the 
Century,” in Handbook of Social Theory, ed. George Ritzer and Barry Smart (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 
2001), 227. 
40. Thomas Hegghammer, “The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups,” Current Trends in Islamist 
Ideology 9 (November 2009), 59.   
 
 
26 
 
etymology and word migration or the adoption of words from one language into another 
language without changes in spelling, pronunciation, and meaning by non-traditional speakers. 
As institutions, individuals from different lingua backgrounds, and world views of these different 
actors interact, words move across languages as a medium of communication. What results is a 
process of word adoption that gives languages a hybrid identity.41  
Thus, when there is institutional negotiation, interaction between different bodies of 
power, and exchange of world views in various forms such as ideologies and policies, and 
through different media such as language, the result is not a formula that is universally 
applicable, but a hybrid. “Hybridity,” writes Ilan Kapoor in the Postcolonial Politics of 
Development, “is not made into formula or ontology but into rule. A rule has no meaningful 
content by itself and must be applied and implemented according to specific context.”42   
The impact that hybrids have on any phenomenon is really a synergy of the individual 
components from which the hybrid is composed. A mule, for example, is a hybrid animal from 
the cross breeding of a male horse and a female donkey. When a mule acts, it acts as a whole 
organism in its own right. One cannot say that when it acts with the sensitivity of a horse, it 
becomes a horse, and when it lives long, it becomes a donkey. Rather, although the acts posited 
by a mule may result from its composite material essence, the mule posits its own acts as one, 
whole substance. In order words, it acts as a system, not as isolated parts. 
 Systems theory within the fields of engineering and thermodynamics sees elements 
within a system as not only having strong functional relationships with each other but at times 
exerting synergized influence on other assemblages. Even if a stimulus is applied to one part of 
                                                          
41. A. Suresh Canagarajah, “Negotiating Ideologies through English: Strategies from the Periphery,” 
Ideology, Politics, and Language Policies (Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V, 2000), 127.  
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the system, the functional relationship affects the assemblage as a whole. This effect may be 
weak, strong, positive, or negative. Often, considering that energy in systems is a conserved 
factor, increased effect in one area is accompanied by a decreased effect in another. Therefore, 
the effect can be positive in one area and negative in the other.43  
Katrina Brown and Francois Ekoko apply this systems thinking to human-environment 
interactions and human-ecosystem relationships in Cameroon. Having considered that forest 
management in Cameroon involves the maintenance, the exploitation of forest resources, the 
control, and the monitoring of forest centered activities, they avow that forest management in 
parts of the country such as Southern Cameroon should be understood in terms of synergy: “the 
combined or coordinated action or working-together of two or more elements . . . . This 
combined action may produce an increased or enhanced effect.”44 This synergy is present in the 
maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forests in the country. Thus, the thesis statement of 
this study is that the hybrid relationship between conditionality and ownership within the 
international dependency development model has a synergized impact on the dimensions of 
maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forest management in Cameroon.45  
                                                          
43. J.M. Mendel and R.W. McLaren, “Reinforcement-Learning Control and Pattern Recognition Systems,” 
in Adaptive, Learning and Pattern Recognition Systems, 66, ed. J.M. Mendel and K.F. Fu (New York: Academic 
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44. Katrina Brown and Francois Ekoko, “Forest Encounters: Synergy among Agents of Forest Change in 
Southern Cameroon,” Society and Natural Resources 14, no.269 (2001): 270. 
45. The interactions that make policies hybridization possible are based on institutional dependency and not 
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Hypothesis 
 Conditionality and ownership may be absolutely unrelated. In this case, one cannot say 
that the relationship between the two policies within the context of the international dependency 
development model has any effect on forest management in Cameroon. If the absence of a 
relationship affects forest management in the country, then, logically, it is this absence of link, 
and not the relationship, that affects forest management in Cameroon. This no-relationship will 
fall outside of the realm of the above stated status questionis of this study. The question assumes 
that there is a relationship between the two policies. The relationship, however, may have no 
effect on forest management in Cameroon. This constitutes the null hypothesis (H0) of this study, 
and it can be briefly stated: 
H0: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international dependence 
development model does not affect forest management in Cameroon. 
 Alternatively, the relationship of conditionality and ownership may impact forest 
management in Cameroon. This is the alternative hypothesis (HA). HA can involve three 
possibilities: positive impact (HA1), negative impact (HA2), and positive and negative impact 
(HA3). Therefore, the different strands of the alternative hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
HA1: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international 
dependence development model fosters the maintenance, exploitation or use, control, and 
monitoring of forest management in Cameroon. 
HA2: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international 
dependence development model hinders the maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forest 
management in Cameroon. 
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HA3: The relationship between conditionality and ownership within the international 
dependence development model impacts forest management in Cameroon both fosters and 
hinders the maintenance, exploitation or use, control, and monitoring of forest management in 
Cameroon. Different research methods will aid in deciphering which of these hypotheses is true.   
Research Design 
Data Sources 
Three data sources were used in this research. The first is qualitative. It involved data 
collection from primary and secondary relevant sources associated with the policies of 
conditionality and ownership, the relationship between these two policies, and the effect of this 
relationship on forest management in Cameroon. Primary sources refer to archived documents 
and publications authored by the World Bank and by the government of Cameroon from the 
1980s to 2013. Analysis of documents was not simply in terms of their stated contentions; it also 
considered the history behind the contentions in the documents in order to access them as both a 
locus of knowledge and a symbol of power expression. Secondary sources were the 
commentaries of other scholars and researchers with respect to the object of this study. Other 
literatures that do not strictly focus on conditionality, ownership, and forest management in 
Cameroon were also employed in this study to illuminate the response to the problematic. 
 Geographical Information Systems (GIS) data on Cameroon forest lands published by the 
World Resource Institute in vector, raster, and image were also collected. These data were freely 
available electronically in the institute’s website. The different GIS data sets used herein are 
those the institute published in 2004 and 2013.  Data from the different years enabled the 
tracking of changes resulting from the impact of policies on forest resource management.  
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Data Analysis Methods 
 Qualitative theoretical analysis and quantitative analysis of the sort in this research 
requires an interdisciplinary approach to unravel the complexities in the conditionality-
ownership relationship impact on forest management in Cameroon. Some conditionality 
measures are based on economic rationalizations, some on ethics, and others on political 
economy; ownership requires political will; and logging management within the context of the 
international dependence development model is tailored to strengthen public and private efforts 
to achieve socially, economically, and ecologically sustainable use of national forest. Thus, four 
disciplines broadly used in this research are geosciences, sociology, political science, and 
economics. Other disciplines used to a lesser extent are law, psychology, anthropology, and 
gender and diversity studies because logging management likewise involves a mindset, 
controlling illegal logging, examining how different genders relate with the forest because of the 
influence of the conditionality-ownership policies relationship, and performing geospatial 
analysis to determine the extent of to which stakeholders abide by the law governing forest 
management and the degree of deforestation resulting from this relationship.  
As varied as the above mentioned disciplines are, the methods for this interdisciplinary 
research are from the natural sciences, the humanities, and the social sciences. The 
methodological approach from the geosciences discipline of the natural sciences used in this 
study is GIS analysis. This involves quarrelling GIS data, performing spatial analysis, examining 
existing maps at magnified levels for detail, creating maps, and inserting coordinate points into 
GIS maps.  
Synthesizing discourses in different texts as a qualitative research method of the 
humanities provides the theoretical insight to conceptualize the distinct natures of conditionality 
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and ownership, to establish the relationship between the two policies, and analytically to 
articulate the impact of this relationship on forest management in Cameroon. The concept of 
infrapololitics from the political sciences also provides a methodological framework for 
understanding the behavior of different actor vis-à-vis forest management in Cameroon. 
James C. Scott’s notion of infrapolitics calls for the juxtaposition of hidden and public 
transcripts to provide the cultural and structural underpinning of actions in the scope of politics 
and political economy.46 In 1990, Scott suggested in this vein that the absence of openly declared 
contests by individuals and groups to hegemonic powers does not indicate acquiescence.47 Open 
contests fall into the scope of public transcripts that are verbal and non-verbal acts by which 
dominant elites portray themselves.48 However, there is also everyday resistance that consists of 
what subordinates say and do beyond the public realm.  This is the hidden transcript; or what 
sociologists call the ontological narratives of the conduct of individuals and groups. Hidden 
transcripts may, therefore, take such forms as delay tactics, subtle approaches to assert one’s 
possession of power to control a circumstance, and immaterial cultural attitudes such as apathy 
towards issues that may be proposed by others in the power structure. Public records in this study 
were accessed through written works (for example, Bank’s evaluation of its assistance and 
attitudes and actions of actors commented upon by researchers). Hidden transcripts were 
discerned in the daily lifestyle of Cameroonian society. This study juxtaposes both the public and 
hidden transcripts associated with the relationship between conditionality and ownership and its 
impact on Cameroon’s forest resource management within the international development 
dependence model. 
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Sociological analysis of power structure in relations among institutions and analysis of 
behavioral patterns illuminate the impact of the hybrid on forest management in the nation in the 
course of time. Statistical analysis underlines any disparities in forest management that may 
result from differences in areas of emphasize in the COH and paints the picture of forest 
management in Cameroon in the form of figure representations such as charts. Economic based 
calculations such as cost-benefit analysis reveal the operative mindsets of entities that use forest 
resources. 
In the impact analysis, features of the conditionality-ownership hybrid were treated as the 
independent variables, while the dimensions of forest resource management, namely 
maintenance, use, control, and monitoring, were the dependent variables. For example, the 
interaction between conditionality and ownership led to confidential and competitive auction as 
the method of procuring forest concessions in Cameroon. Cost-benefit analysis and firm theory 
enabled the establishment of the impact relationship between this method and increased 
deforestation measured by changes in volume of timber harvested.  
An appropriate layout is necessary to answer coherently the four sub-questions involved 
in the status questionis and elaborate all the findings in this study. In this regard, the second 
chapter of this work focuses on detailing the nature of conditionality and ownership as distinct 
policies. Without a clear understanding of these two key concepts, one cannot identify the 
relationship between them in the context of the international dependence development model. 
The third chapter establishes the nature of the relationship between the two policies based on 
their very nature. The fourth chapter situates this relationship in the management of Cameroon’s 
forest. The fifth chapter is an analysis of the impact of this situation on forest management in 
Cameroon. The sixth chapter, which is the conclusion, briefly recaps the arguments in the 
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previous chapters, states which of the hypothesis is acceptable, and mentions the path to further 
research that this study leads one. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE NATURE OF CONDITIONALITY AND COUNTRY OWNERSHIP 
 In discussing legal aspects of the operations of the World Bank, the institution’s Legal 
Vice Presidency office notes that conditionality, which is basically the staking of Bank loans on 
certain policy reforms in recipient countries, was an uncommon phenomenon before the 1980s.1 
In 1997, Jacques Polak asserted that the Bank had used the term “conditionality” in 1970 not to 
refer to its own policy, but to describe conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) on the Fund’s loans.2 This corroborates Joseph Gold’s earlier (1970) contention that the 
historical roots of the term “conditionality” are in the IMF, and not the World Bank.3  
This brief history of policy conditionality indicates that Thaddeus Malesa and Peter 
Silarsky may be right in affirming that the term “conditionality” was a relatively unused word in 
the Bank’s operations before the institution introduced structural adjustment programs in the last 
three decades. After the Bank introduced these programs in multiple developing countries, the 
institution became famous for its practice of conditionality. Countries approaching this 
international developer for aid and loans have become aware that the disbursements will most 
certainly be made on condition that the country fulfills certain policy requirements issued by the 
donor or lender, namely, the Bank.4 Irrespective of the precise purpose, content, and way that the 
conditions associated with financial assistance are eventually implemented in a country, the 
                                                          
1. World Bank, Review of World Bank Conditionality: Legal Aspects of Conditionality in Policy Based 
Lending (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2005), 2. 
2. Jacques Polak , “The World Bank and the IMF: A Changing Relationship,” The World Bank: Its First 
Half Century vol.2, ed. Devesh Kapur, John P. Lewis, and Richard Webb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 1997), 486.   
3. Joseph Gold, “Use of the International Monetary Fund’s Resources: ‘Conditionality’ and 
‘Unconditionality’ as Legal Categories” Journal of International Law and Economics 6 (1970): 18.   
4. Thaddeus Malesa and Peter Silarsky, “Does World Bank Effort Matter for Success of Adjustment 
Lending?” Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences and Lessons, ed. Stefan Koeberle et al. (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2005), 127. 
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Bank is aware that the effective application of development policies and the realization of policy 
objectives is impossible if a country does not internalize and treat the policies as its own. That is, 
aid conditions are not enough effectively to develop a society with World Bank aid and loans; 
countries also have to value and treat development policies as though they were desired, 
formulated, and fully implemented by the countries without any external influence from the 
Bank. This is the fundamental affirmation of the Bank’s policy of ownership. 
In the dynamics of the Bank’s development assistance, therefore, there are two poles: the 
Bank with conditionality at one end, and the country with ownership at the other. This chapter 
focuses on these two terminals. It frames the meaning of conditionality, illuminates the rationale 
and types of conditionality, and examines the essential and multidimensional nature of country 
ownership. 
Framing a Definition of Conditionality 
Etymologically, the English word “condition” originates from two Latin words: con and 
dicere. Con translates into English as “with,” and dicere is the Latin word for the English verb, 
“to say”. This etymology suggests that “condition” implies that something is said with some 
other thing attached to it. This implication is present in Livy’s assertion that the “condicere is 
used of two parties who come into an agreement about something.” 5 In Aristotle’s philosophical 
logic, to state that “B” can be done only with the implementation of “A” is to stipulate that the 
realization of “A” is conditioned by “B”. This is the logic of the World Bank’s conditionality, 
where “A” refers to specific policies, processes, and intended outcomes, and “B” to loans and 
aid. This is the logic that leads Sarah L. Babb and Bruce G. Carruthers to define conditionality as 
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“the placement of policy conditions on the disbursement of financial resources to national 
governments.”6 
The above definition is akin to what the Bank postulates in its operational policy (OP) on 
what conditionality is:  
the specific set of conditions attached to the disbursement of policy-based lending or 
budget support – which of course can take different forms, ranging from explicit 
agreements to implicit understandings and from traditional ex ante conditions based on 
promises to ex post conditions based on actual implemented measures.7  
 
These ranges are the formal, not the material, content of loan conditions. In Paragraph 13 
of OP 8.60, the Bank asserts its right and prerogative to determine the material content or matter 
of loan conditions. This threefold matter includes the “maintenance of an adequate 
macroeconomic policy framework, implementation of the overall program in a manner 
satisfactory to the Bank, and compliance with these critical program conditions.”8 The Bank 
pursues this triad through the use of prior actions, regular tranche, floating, and effectiveness 
conditions. In single tranche operations with which prior actions conditions are attached, the 
country takes action to meet all conditions before the Bank approves a loan to the nation. The 
Bank applies regular and floating tranche conditions to multitranche operations. Regular tranche 
conditions refer to policy actions for which the Bank can foresee their time of implementation 
with certainty and that are critical to attain program objectives. In floating tranche, the timing is 
indeterminate. Effectiveness conditions delay policy implementation by demanding that certain 
conditions be implemented from the time the Bank approves a loan to the time the loan becomes 
                                                          
6. Sarah L. Babb and Bruce G. Carruthers, “Conditionality: Forms, Function, and History,” The Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science 4 (2008): 15. 
7. World Bank, “Overview,” in Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons, ed.Stefan 
Koeberle et al. (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), 6. 
8. World Bank, “OP 8.60 – Development Policy Lending” (August 2004). 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:2
0240031~pagePK:64141683~piPK:64141620~theSitePK:502184,00.html  
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effective. These different conditions are present in almost all World Bank sponsored 
development activities in developing countries, 9 such as forest sector reforms in Cameroon as 
will be shown in the fourth chapter herein. 
In the attempt to define conditionality by appeal to the form and matter of loan 
conditions, the Bank falls into a problem that is common within the field of public policy, 
namely, technicality. “The precision which seems to be gained through a highly technical 
definition,” P. Stuart Robinson writes, “may prove spurious as it mixes awkwardly and 
misleadingly with the ordinary language one must to some extent use in discussing it.”10 Here, 
such crisis of technicality is in the tautological use of the word “conditions” as common words to 
define conditionality. To resolve this problem, one may take recourse in Thomas Aquinas’s 
philosophy of language. Aquinas asserts that in the definiens (that which symbolizes or gives the 
same meaning as the word or words being defined), one can use classificatory words instead of 
the definiendum or word(s) in the thing being defined11 so as to avoid circular reasoning. In this 
regard, one can appeal to Benedicte Bull, Alf Morten Jerve, and Erlend Sigvaldsen’s definition 
of conditionality as “the application of specific, predetermined requirements that directly or 
indirectly enter into a donor’s decision to approve or continue to finance a loan or grant.”12 Here, 
specific requirements are classifications that stand in the place of the Bank’s use of the word 
“conditions” in defining conditionality. However, limiting aid and loan conditions to 
“predetermined requirements” excludes ex-post conditions. That is, ex-post conditions are based 
                                                          
9. World Bank, Review of World Bank Conditionality: Modalities of Conditionality (Washington, DC: 
World Bank 2005), 7-8. 
10. P. Stuart Robinson, The Politics of International Crisis Escalation: Decision Making Under Pressure 
(London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 13. 
11. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae I, q.29, a.1, ad.3. 
12. Benedicte Bull, Alf Morten Jerve, and Erlend Sigvaldsen, The World Bank and the IMF Use of 
Conditionality to Encourage Privatization and Liberalization: Current Issues and Practices. A Report Prepared for 
the Nowergian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a Background for the Oslo Conditionality Conference (November 
2006), 4. www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/rap/2006/0164/ddd/pdfv/300495-7final_conditionality_report.pdf  
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on project outcome; they are not stipulated by the Bank before a development project begins, as 
is the case with ex-ante conditions. Thus, ex-post conditions are not “predetermined.” This 
limitation compels one to extend the search for a more comprehensive definition of 
conditionality. To do this, one has to go beyond the scope of public policy into other disciplines. 
One can describe this phenomenon of attaching specific requirements to loans and aid as 
an interdisciplinary metaphor in the relationship between international financial institutions (IFI) 
as lenders and nation-states as borrowers. In other words, conditionality can symbolize the 
integration of different disciplinary insights in the development of human society. According to 
the Legal Vice Presidency of the World Bank, the Bank’s Articles of Agreement provide the 
legal framework and power to the Bank to use conditionality in its lending process associated 
with development projects.13 Economic development is central in the Bank’s development 
policy, and economics involves the combination of factors of production (land, labor, capital, 
and entrepreneur) in ways that can yield maximum profit. This means that economic 
development, by its nature, demands that certain conditions such as the availability of land, the 
minimization of labor cost, and the maximization of capital exist. An institution that is concerned 
with economic development, therefore, needs the power to control the mix of these conditions in 
human society. It is in this vein that Susan Schadler et al. assert that in the use of the power that 
the Bank and the IMF have from their Articles of Agreement – the power to use policy 
requirements in the provision of development aid and loans – both institutions simply intend to 
                                                          
13. Legal Vice Presidency, Review of World Bank Conditionality: Legal Aspects of Conditionality in 
Policy-Based Lending (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), Nos. 2 and 3. 
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foster economic growth in the country that receives development assistance from these 
institutions.14  
In criticizing this assertion of Schadler et al. from the perspective of political economy, 
Graham Birg argues that the economics-centered claim of Schadler et al. is too narrow in 
understanding World Bank’s attachment of policy reforms to development assistance. He 
contends an earlier mentioned point – the Bank knows that the effectiveness of this attachment 
depends on both the political will of governments to comply with stipulated conditions, and the 
prevailing country circumstances that caused a national government to turn to the IFIs. This 
contention is based on the fact that the political will of governments and the existing country 
circumstances determine the extent to which governments implement development assistance 
reforms required by the World Bank. Consequently, conditionality should be understood not only 
from an economic perspective but more from the angle of political economy.15  
In positing a theory of international institutional influence, Rachel E. Epstein subjects 
conditionality to a sociopolitical analysis, in which she refers to such country-specific 
circumstances as the “social context.” This theory states that the mechanical terrain in which IFIs 
such as the World Bank and the IMF can enforce compliance to conditionality is the social 
context wherein nations are embedded in a hierarchy of powers with respect to the IFIs.16 In fact, 
reflective of this idea of social context, Stefan Koeberle and Thaddeus Malesa point out that the 
                                                          
14. Susan Schadler et al. IMF Conditionality: Experience under Stand-By and Extended Arrangements, Pt. 
I: Key Issues and Findings, and Part II: Background Papers, Occasional Papers (Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund, 1995), nos. 128 and 129.  
15. Graham Bird, “The Effectiveness of Conditionality and the Political Economy of Policy Reform: Is it 
Simply a Matter of Political Will?” Policy Reform 2, no.1 (1998): 91.  
16. Rachel A. Epstein, “The Social Context in conditionality: Internationalizing Finance in Postcommunist 
Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no.6 (September 2008): 883. 
On page 883 of this article, Epstein affirms that the social context is characterized by the alienation of regime and 
sector in the country that turns to the IFI for loans, the perception of the status of domestic actors as subordinated to 
that of the IFI, and the consistency of the conditionality norms. 
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focus of conditionality has moved from macroeconomic and reforms associated with trade to 
“more complex social sector and public sector management issues.”17  
From the foregoing discussion, conditionality has dimensions of legal empowerment, 
economic objectives, political will, and social context. Therefore, one can define World Bank as 
the policy phenomenon by which the Bank, being legally empowered by its Articles of 
Agreement, attaches, in varied forms, certain specific, social-context-sensitive policy 
requirements to the economic assistance that it provides to countries and demands that 
governments have the political will to implement the requirements. With the economic collapse 
that plagued developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, the Bank has insisted that this 
phenomenon is a necessary measure in its “due diligence obligation to ensure that its resources 
are used effectively and responsibly by the borrowing country.”18 
Rationale of Conditionality 
In favor of conditionality, Christopher L Gilbert and David Vines suggest that the Bank is 
not a private lender that is simply interested in making profit. Rather, it is a developer; it is the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in a politically, socially, ethically, and 
economically complex world. This means that based on the Bank’s development knowledge and 
survival instinct, it has a moral and institutional responsibility to ensure that the loans it gives to 
countries are used for the development of human society. The Bank must be able to trust that its 
financial assistance will be used to this end. As a public institution, it also has the financial and 
                                                          
17. Stefan Koeberle and Thaddeus Malesa, “Experience with World Bank Conditionality,” in 
Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiecnes, and Lessons, ed.Stefan Koeberle, Harold Bedoya, Peter Silarsky, 
and Gero Verheyen (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), 52. 
18. World Bank, Review of World Bank Conditionality: Modalities of Conditionality (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 2005), iii. 
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fiduciary responsibility to see to it that there is transparency and liability with respect to 
development priorities and economic efficiency associated with the use of its funds.19  
 According to those on the left who are critical, conditionality is an instrument of power. 
The global social context referred to by Epstein in the theory of international institutional 
influence is pyramidal. The Washington consensus created a global hierarchical structure in 
which a few developed nations in the West use financial resources, through multilateral 
institutions such as the World Bank, to control the political economy of less-developed nations in 
the self-interest of the Western political elites and financial giants. This perception implies that 
conditionality is an instrument of control of the political economy of less-developed nations. 
Conditionality gives the Bank the means to “induce reform in very poor policy environments,” 
Paul Collier and David Dollar say, by “ignor[ing] domestic politics.”20 
Despite such a position against conditionality, the Bank still sees the policy in its various 
types as a way to safeguard trust and foster both transparency and accountability in Bank’s 
financial assistance to countries. An elaboration on each of these types of policies is necessary to 
understand fully how conditionality and ownership relate and how conditions attached to 
development assistance can shape resource management. 
Types of Conditionality 
Daniel Cabello, Filka Sekulova, and Douwe Schmidt list four types of World Bank 
conditionality: fiduciary, process, policy or economic policy, and outcome.21 The content of and 
distinctions between these forms of conditionality provide the framework for donor or lender and 
                                                          
19. Christopher L. Gilbert and David Vines, The World Bank: Structure and Policies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 55-56. 
20. Paul Collier and David Dollar, Development Effectiveness: What have we Learnt? (Washington DC: 
World Bank, 1999), 325-326. 
21. Daniel Cabello, Filka Sekulova and Douwe Schmidt, World Bank Conditionality: Poor Deal for Poor 
Countries, ed. Joshua Craze (Amsterdam: A SEED Europe, 2008), 8. 
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beneficiary or borrower expectations in the application of requirements associated with financial 
resources. These four forms of conditionality deserve expanded discussion. 
Fiduciary Conditionality: Safeguarding Trust 
According to David Shand, fiduciary conditionality is based on a trilogy of risk: the risk 
that the funds disbursed by the Bank will be diverted and used for unknown and unauthorized 
uses by the financial resources recipient nation, the risk that there may be no timely report given 
to the Bank on the use of aid or loans, and the risk that although the funds reach the budget, the 
expenditure is not in conformity with the approved budget.22  By use of ex ante fiduciary 
conditionality, the Bank mitigates these risks and safeguards its trust in the realization of the 
terms of funds disbursement. Trust is a subject that has attracted significant discourse based on 
different disciplinary assumptions, especially in psychology, economics, and sociology. 
Psychologists often center on attributes of a trusting party (trustor) and a party to be 
trusted (trustee). They also focus on internal cognitions that result from personal attributes. 
Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman contend that trust is not risk but the 
willingness of a trustor to be vulnerable to the actions of a trustee, knowing that such actions 
may be impossible to monitor or control.23 This distinction between trust and risk is very 
important to an understanding of the Bank’s operations with respect to development through 
conditionality. Whenever the Bank makes financial disbursements to a country, the trilogy of 
risks mentioned above is involved. Yet, this risk does not stop the Bank from providing 
development assistance. The arguments of liberalists earlier stated cannot fully explain why the 
                                                          
22. David Shand, Managing Fiduciary Issues in Budget Support Operations (Cape Town: World Bank, 
2005), 5-6. 
23. Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of Organizational 
Trust,” The Academy of Management 20, no.3 (July 1995): 712. http://www.jstor.org/stable/258792 (accessed April 
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Bank, despite the risks, still proceeds to provide financial aid. Nations may receive the aid and 
yet refuse to be controlled by the Bank, as the case of Zimbabwe shows.  
On page 390 of Jane Kanchense’s Zimbabwe’s Child Brides: Using Participatory Action 
to Unleash Human Potential (published in 2008 by Trafford Publishing, Victoria), Kanchense 
documents how Zimbabwe, after receiving financial assistance from the Bank for many years, 
has refused to be controlled by the World Bank by resisting the Bank’s structural adjustment 
programs. Following economic sanctions from the Bank and the IMF, Zimbabwe retaliated by 
refusing to pay its debt to the Bank. Therefore, how can the Bank, conscious of the risky 
possibility that there can be this resistance from countries, still provide development aid and 
loans? The answer is trust: trust that the assistance will be used for the intended purpose; the 
finances will reach the budget of the development program approved by the Bank; or trust in the 
Bank itself – that if a nation resists as Zimbabwe did, the Bank will have the power to sanction 
the country on the international scene. The Bank’s development assistance, therefore, involves a 
mix of risk and trust. Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, and F. David Schoorman have discussed 
this mix from a psychological perspective in their dyadic model of trust. 
  The World Bank’s propensity or general willingness to trust its financial resources 
recipient varies. This variation depends on the trustworthiness of the country that receives a loan 
or assistance from the Bank. In psychological terms, the Bank perceives a country as trustworthy 
before it provides development loans to the nation.  At one end, therefore, there is the Bank as a 
“trustor,” and at the other end there is the country as the trustee. Hence, the psychology-based 
model of trust can be said to be dyadic. Such a model of dyadic trust reproduced in Figure 2 is 
useful to analyze the psychological dimension of fiduciary conditionality. 
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Factors of Trustee  
Trustworthiness 
 
Ability                                           Perceived Risk       
                       Competence 
Benevolence                              Trust              Risk Taking                  Outcomes 
                         Willingness                              in Relation   
         
                            Values 
Integrity 
                      Trustor’s  
                     Propensity 
 
 
Figure 2. A dyadic model of trust based on attributes of trustors and trustees. 
Source: Drawn with analytical data from Roger C. Mayer, James H. Davis, and F. David 
Schoorman, “An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,” The Academy of Management 20, 
no.3 (July 1995), figure 1. 
 
Trustee trustworthiness is determined by three factors: ability, benevolence, and integrity.  
Ability is the competence that the recipient nation has in the area, project, or program for which 
the Bank makes financial disbursement to be used. Benevolence refers to the willingness of the 
trustee to show good behavior to the trustor. With respect to fiduciary conditionality, 
benevolence is the willingness of the trustee to be good to the Bank by duly complying with the 
conditions of the financial resource disbursement. Integrity depends on the values of the trustee 
that may cause it to either collaborate with or resist a trustor in this trust relationship.  
The extent to which a country is receptive to Bank’s policies provides a perspective for 
understanding this matrix. The Bank, as Robert H. Wade observes, upholds capitalism as a core 
value in economic progress.24 Thus, if the political economy of a country favors capitalism, then 
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the Bank perceives the country as a low-risk nation. Considering that trust is inversely 
proportional to risk, the Bank will likely take the risk to disburse funds with fewer and less 
intense conditions to the country that upholds capitalism. If the country resists the Bank’s 
capitalist political economy, then the lending risk is high and the level of trust is low. 
Consequently, the Bank will present more radical conditions before disbursing funds.25 It seems 
that it is in the nature of humankind to act in this way, for as Thomas Hobbes contends in his 
behaviorist philosophy of trust: 
Trust is a Passion proceeding from the Belief of him from whom we expect or hope for 
Good, so free from Doubt that upon the same we pursue no other Way to attain the same 
Good: as Distrust or Diffidence is Doubt that maketh him endeavour to provide himself 
by other Means. And that this is the Meaning of the Words Trust and Distrust, is 
manifest from this, that a Man never provideth himself by a second Way, but when he 
mistrusteth that the first will not hold.26 
                                                          
25. First generation conditionality in Cameroon provides a good historical example of this dynamic matrix 
of trust relationship between the country and the Bank. In a spirit of trust in Cameroon, the World Bank on June 2, 
1986, noted that there were “no gross or obvious problems which threaten Cameroon’s financial or economic stability, 
its creditworthiness, or the stability of its financial system to perform adequately on a day to day basis” (World Bank 
1986). Nevertheless, after 1987, the Bank distrusted the economic stakes in the nation because of a global oil-price 
crisis that presented Cameroon with a challenge to embrace “more rapid and more radical” adjustment of the nation’s 
economy, and structural changes that will create jobs for the country’s rising population (World Bank 1987).  
The government of Cameroon refused to trust the Bank in these demands by preferring to hang unto the 
prebendalism. Rciahrd A. Joseph defines prebendalism as “patterns of political behavior which rest on the justifying 
principle that offices should be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of office holders as well as their 
reference or support group. The official public purpose of the office becomes a secondary concern, however much 
that purpose might have been originally cited in its creation or during the periodic competition to fill it.” Richard A. 
Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 68. 
Piet Konings narrates that in the 1970s and 1980s, prebendalism was the principal political sociology of the 
government of President Paul Biya in Cameroon. In this phenomenon, the nation was under a neopatrimonial state of 
hegemonic alliances of elite groups who had access to state resources, and used this access to cement themselves to 
the existing government power structure. The structural reforms that the Bank called for implied that these elites would 
lose control of the state economic and political apparatus. Therefore, the elites sought to preserve their interest in the 
status quo by fiercely contesting economic and political liberalization. Consequently, the government initially 
preferred to initiate its own reforms in such a way that the self-interest of the elites would not be affected.  It was only 
when Cameroon’s economy continued to decline that the government was forced to succumb to structural changes as 
conditions for receiving World Bank loans. Piet Konings, Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms in Africa: Civil Society and 
Agro-Industry in Anglophone Cameroon’s Plantation Economy (Bamenda: Langaa, 2011), 133-135. 
26. Thomas Hobbes, “Human Nature,” The Moral and Political Works of Thomas Hobbes of Matmesbury 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1750), 19. 
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The rational and “belief of him” perspectives of trust indicate that trust is not an irrational 
act; rather, it involves rational calculations that consider the probability of trustee openness to the 
values of a trustor. According to Oliver E. Williamson, this view of trust is based on a common 
assumption in economics, namely, that rational choice is the principa maxima of human 
behavior.27  Mar Zey notes that the reason for this assumption is that human beings are 
intentional and purposive individuals who always make logical decisions that give them the 
greatest satisfaction and fulfill their self-interest.28 The sociologists Ivan Marková, Per Linell, 
and Alex Gillespie, however, deny that the essence of trust can be “probabilistic calculus.”29 
Rather, from a sociological perspective, they view trust as a relational concept because attempts 
to subject trust to purely quantifiable probability empty trust of the context without trust cannot 
exist. To replace the elements of dynamism and relation in trust with calculated control reduces 
trust to a “static abstract category and it turns it into a statistical entity.”30  
The above stated understandings of trust in the disciplines of psychology, economics, and 
sociology are not totally at odds with each other. Satisfactory outcome at the end of the dyadic 
model of trust proposed by Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman represents utility. Zey observes that 
“expected utility theory” is simply the label that psychologists give to what economists term 
“rational choice theory.” Nor are social context and rational choice absolutely at daggers drawn 
with one another. Victor Nee argues that although methodological holism in sociology has 
attempted to alienate choice-theoretic approach from relational concepts in institutional 
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paradigms, historians have insinuated that Max Weber was right in contending that both 
rationality and tradition play significant roles in institutional change. Tradition is not simply the 
conservation of values and a modus operandi of institutions but the transmission of the values 
and modes from one group to another in time. This transmission is not indifferent to the 
prevailing circumstances in which institutions exist. Consequently, in the relationship between 
past and present generations of people, the present generation calculates the applicability and 
workability of the values and modes of past generations in their present context. Therefore, in 
institutional change, there is a combination of tradition in which a new generation socially relates 
with past generations through the transmission of values and modes, and rationality in which the 
new generation calculates the trustworthiness of these elements and adapts them to present 
circumstances. Thus, Nee suggests that instead of pitting rational choice against social relations 
that may not involve self-interest rationalizations, “a more constructive approach is to model the 
reciprocal interaction between purposive action and social structure.”31  
One finds this approach in Denise M. Rousseau, Sim B. Sitkin, and Ronald S. Burt who 
define trust as “a psychological state comprising intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.”32 The state is psychological; the 
positive expectations are economics-based; and sociology stresses the interactive context in 
which the behavior of others manifests. In fiduciary conditionality, the Bank is in a mental state 
of reservation as to how the funds it gives to a country will be used. Nevertheless, it proceeds to 
disburse the funds because it has a positive expectation of how the funds will be applied to 
                                                          
31. Victor Nee, “Sources of the New Institutionalism,” in The New Institutionalism in Sociology, ed. Mary 
C. Brinton and Victor Nee (New York: Russell Sage Foundation), 4-5. 
32. In this definition of trust, “intention to accept vulnerability” is a contribution made by psychology to the 
understanding of trust. Economists insists on “positive expectations of the intentions,” while sociologists demand 
that the “behavior of another” be included in the comprehension of trust.  
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Discipline View of Trust,” The Academy of Management Review 23, no.3 (July 1998): 395. 
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development programs. In disbursing the funds, the Bank enters into social interaction with the 
recipient country. Having provided financial assistance, the Bank becomes vulnerable to how the 
country will actually use the funds in the process of policy implementation. In order not to 
become a victim in this vulnerability, the Bank uses process conditionality to direct the process 
of policy implementation. 
Process Conditionality 
The material constitution of process conditionality is the management of funds under the 
umbrella of good governance. According to Cabello, Sekulova, and Scmidt, process 
conditionality assures that necessary institutions that build national capacity to ensure proper 
financial management exist in a country before the Bank lends or gives money to the nation 33 or 
that there be good governance in a country as prerequisite to receive financial aid from the Bank. 
According to the Bank’s staff, P. Landell-Mills and I. Serageldin, governance denotes 
“how people are ruled and how the affairs of a state are administered and regulated. It refers to a 
nation’s system of politics and how this functions in relation to public administration and law. 
Thus, the concept of governance goes beyond that of government to include a political 
dimension.”34 This definition, however, does not address what it means to speak of governance 
as “good”. Ved P. Nanda avows that “good governance” is a phenomenon with an imprecise 
meaning, yet it is a determinant in the selective process of the Bank’s provision of aids.35 Nanda 
attempts to resolve this crisis of meaning by the via negativa: he enumerates elements the Bank 
thinks must be absent for there to be good governance. These are corruption, nepotism, 
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bureaucracy, and mismanagement. Willem H. Buiter appeals to the principles of governance 
devoid of these elements to explain what process conditionality stands for, or is aimed at. These 
principles are accountability, transparency, and democratic participation.36  
The Bank defines accountability as “the ability of citizens, civil society, and the private 
sector to scrutinize public institutions and governments and to hold them to account. This 
includes, ultimately, the opportunity to change leaders by democratic means.”37 Joseph Basset 
sheds light on this rather redundant definition38 by speaking of accountability with respect to 
process conditionality. He says that accountability is “the principle that government decision-
makers in a democracy ought to be more answerable to the people for their actions . . . . [It 
involves] more than merely the tacit concern of the governed. It implies both mechanisms for the 
active monitoring of public officials and the means for enforcing public expectations.”39 In 
accountability, citizens attain voice: they interrogate the management of public goods in the 
hands of their government, and they take democratic actions such as political elections to declare 
judgment on the way the government manages public affairs. Deepa Narayan avows that through 
such actions, citizens and stakeholders influence and control public life.40   
The Bank adopts an interdisciplinary perspective in looking at accountability as a 
principle of good governance. Accountability as an act of citizens’ empowerment is not only 
political. Inasmuch as there is politics because human beings are rational and social beings, 
accountability is also social. Social accountability involves association, resources, voice, 
                                                          
36. Willem Buiter, “'Country Ownership': A Term Whose Time Has Gone,” Development in Practice 17, 
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information, and negotiation. Association is ethical – precisely, it involves the freedom of 
citizens to come together and function as groups. The availability of resources is an economic 
concern in the function of associations. Groups must mobilize resources in order to attain their 
objectives of holding government accountable through voice. Voice is power! For there to be 
accountability in governance, there has to be a two-way communication between governors and 
the governed, each being able to formulate and express opinions. To exercise voice, people need 
access to information that they can use in the process of negotiation. Negotiation is not only a 
socio-political act in the sense that it entertains spaces of debate and dialogue but also a legal 
one; it likewise involves the rules of the game that must be formulated to ensure orderly 
participation of stakeholders.41  Bank staffers Ana Bellver, Marcos Mediburu, and Maria Poli 
observe that transparency is necessary to hold government accountable for its operations.42 
The Bank speaks of transparency in terms of progress reviews and assurance that there is 
conformity between the reviews and country conditions and capacities.43 For ActionAid 
International, to speak of transparency simply in terms of project reviews and the correctness of 
the reviews is to limit the scope of transparency.”44  Therefore, one must have recourse to other 
sources to understand more broadly what the Bank perceives in terms of transparency as a 
function of process conditionality. One such source is the works of World Bank staff member 
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Lorenzo Bertolini who underlines clarity, autonomy, participation, and open access to 
information as the key attributes of transparency as understood by the Bank.45  
To the Bank, clarity means plainly stating the rules or laws, roles, and institutional 
objectives in unambiguous terms. It involves providing a legislative framework and 
straightforward guidelines for public resource management.46 Bertolini notes that autonomy 
implies that regulators should be insulated and protected from interference from policy makers 
and special interest groups. Participation emphasizes that stakeholders should be part of the 
development decision-making process.47 Shah observes that external stakeholders (such as the 
Bank) often chose to enhance national government transparency by amplifying the voice of 
citizens in order to reduce corruption.48 
Open access to information is a way of promoting voice. In fact, in physics a transparent 
object is that which light can pass through and one can see through. In the philosophy of 
knowledge, to “see a point” is to be enlightened or to possess knowledge about a thing. In 
discussing Del McWhorter’s assertion that the power of identity recognition arises from 
knowledge about bodies and pleasures, Charles E. Scott agrees with McWhorter that information 
as the data of knowledge gives voice.49 Francis Trix and Andrea Sankar forcefully hold the same 
view as Charles, namely, that both the absence of information and the presence of incorrect 
information deny voice.50 These assertions highlight the importance of the availability and access 
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to information in giving voice to a people.  Thus, Cohen insists that transparency ensures that 
government shares with citizens the information that citizens deserve to know and that citizens 
can organize themselves to pry information from government in the struggle to let their voices be 
heard. Voice is an expression of power. Cohen also avows that transparency is not just about 
information among government, stakeholders, and civil society; it also extends to the exercise of 
voice in acts of power such as free and fair political elections. With respect to economics, 
transparency demands that citizens should voice their rational choices in budgetary processes, 
and their voices should count.51 However, it is worth giving a note of caution here: as it will be 
shown later, to the Bank, the voice of citizens does not always mean the voice of “all” citizens.  
The Bank uses different process conditionality measures to achieve transparency. Bruni 
notes the Bank’s demand that there exist a legal framework and institutions necessary to enable 
access to information between government and citizens in a country.52 Peters highlights the 
presence of performance data as part of this information. These data provide the material for 
scrutinizing government bureaucracy.53 John K. Johnson and F. Rick Stapenhurst iterate the role 
of independent observers (IO) that are often commissions and international not-for profit 
organizations that act as anticorruption bodies. From an institutional perspective, the Bank opts 
for the decentralization of government so as to deprive bureaucrats the monopoly of power over 
the civil society.54 
                                                          
51. David Cohen, “The Power of Organized Citizens: Fighting Public Integrity,” Governance Reform under 
Real-World Conditions, ed. Sina Odugbemi and Thomas Jacobson (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008), 299-
300. 
52. Michele Bruni, “Participation, Transparency, and Consensus Building in Support of Public Sector 
Reform: The Case of Nicaragua,” in Governance Reform under Real-World Conditions, 343. 
53. B. Guy Peters, “Performance-Based Accountabiltiy,” in Performance Accountability and Combating 
Corruption, 15. 
54. John K. Johnson and F. Rick Stapenhurst, “The Growth of Parliamentary Budget Offices,” in 
Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption, 296.  
 
 
53 
 
Speaking of decentralization, Purohit notes that when local governments have real power, 
the authenticity and confidence with which they treat local interest issues and the checks that 
they place on higher levels of governance give room for the reign of transparency. For gains to 
outweigh costs in decentralization, local government must have the authority to generate and use 
revenue (at least some) at the local level, and it must also be answerable to higher levels of 
government. Electronic or E-government is one of the ways of reducing costs because it reduces 
delays in the transmission of papers. It does not only reduce documents processing cost but 
makes more available information that the public can access easily.55 Shah highlights the 
economic tool for transparency: trade liberalization reduces circumstances in which government 
officials can indiscriminately exercise unaccountable discretionary powers.56  Trade 
liberalization is the heart of economic policy conditionality. 
Economic Policy Conditionality: The Reign of Neoliberalism 
  Economic policy conditionality involves the World Bank’s prescription of conditions 
that will favor economic “progress” in countries that turn to the Bank for financial aid and loans. 
It hinges on “the Warren thesis”: the view, as Hettne explains, that economic progress is the 
essence of the development of human society.57 The human being as homo oeconomicus is at the 
center of this world. Ward Edwards iterates that such an “economic man” is assumed in the 
rational choice theory to be completely informed, infinitely sensitive, and rational.58 Being 
completely informed, homo oeconomicus knows both causes and outcome (predictable and real). 
Being infinitely sensitive, economic man pays full attention to a continuous chain of alternatives 
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that lie before him or her in the decision-making process. Being rational, homo oeconomicus 
orders everything towards the maximization of utility.59 
  Robert A. Nisbet suggests that this conception of the human being in a society that 
progresses because of the dynamic interaction of the forces of demand and supply is both the 
foundation and visio summa of classical economics. In such a society, change is cumulative, 
purposeful, marginalist, and directional.60 As classical economics suffers from what Ben Fine 
describes as “esoteric and intellectually bankrupt technicism,”61 that has the risk of being out of 
touch with the pace of necessary changes in the history of political economy, the World Bank 
from the middle of the twentieth century endorsed the modernization theory that is attuned, as 
Susan Engel notes, with the development ideology of the institution’s founders.62  The theory 
presents societal development as evolutionary. This concept of evolution, Anthony D. Smith 
notes, implies that the growth of human society is a concrete historical process that involves the 
formulation and implementation of certain policies.63 In the provisions of the operational statutes 
of the World Bank, decisions associated with such policies (precisely economic) must be 
dissociated from all other spheres of a country’s life – “Only economic considerations shall be 
relevant to their [Bank’s directors] decisions.”64   
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Tony Killick – from a global overview65 – and Festus Ugboaja Ohaegbulum – with 
specific focus on Africa66 – observe that from the 1980s to the 1990s, neoliberalism became the 
theoretical framework that has guided the Bank in prioritizing economics in its development 
works. Economic policy conditionality, therefore, has aimed at fostering the reign of 
neoliberalism. John William, however, suggests that to the Bank neoliberalism was simply a re-
branding of neoclassical progressive or modern evolutionary development with greater emphasis 
on the virtues of the market and the vices of the state in economic growth.  
As a theory of political and economic practices, “neoliberalism,” writes David Harvey, 
“proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial 
freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual 
liberty, free markets and free trade.”67  Practically, the Bank has used Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) to enforce this theory, which thrives on the self-interest psychology, social 
individualism, legal deregulation, and political cooperation with financial institutions in order to 
realize economic “growth.” Caroline A. Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Molly Bauer enumerate 
the elements of SAPs: upholding privatization as a way of rolling back the state from steering the 
national economy and enforcing the rapid removal of barriers to trade, capital flows, and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) as a means of encouraging the reign of the global free market. It also 
involves tight monetary policies such as increased interest rates, fiscal austerity measures like 
currency devaluation and higher taxes, and economic contraction policies such as reduction in 
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government services and subsidies. These measures are intended to correct disequilibrium in 
balance of payments and to promote liberal economies, which Hartzell, Hoddie, and Bauer 
define as “those in which governments play a very limited role in both the internal workings of 
the economy (for example, setting wage rates) as well as in international economic activity (for 
example, setting import quotas).”68 John Pender notes that the relationship between SAPs and 
economic policy conditionality is in the fact that nations have to accept and implement these 
neoliberal economic standards as requirements to receive loans or financial assistance from the 
Bank.69 However, if the Bank is not satisfied that these measures have actually led to the 
liberalization of a country’s economy, the Bank does not ipso facto withdraw its assistance. At 
times, it proceeds with provision of aid within the context of outcome conditionality. 
Outcome Conditionality: Focusing on Results 
 The nature of outcome conditionality can be understood via distinctions between it and 
other types of conditionalities. As discussed above, fiduciary conditionality is based on variables 
before the beginning of financial assistance for development projects. Economic conditionality is 
concerned with input variables at the beginning of a development program. Both fiduciary 
conditionality and economic conditionality are at the terminus ad quo part of a development 
program or project. Process conditionality is concerned with the qualities such as transparency, 
accountability, decentralization, and democracy in the course of program or project 
implementation. Distinct from these three types of conditionality, outcome conditionality is at 
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the terminus ad quem. It focuses on the results of policy implementation; in this regard, Angelina 
Fisher also calls it “performance-based conditionality.”70 
 While the variables in fiduciary conditionality are discretionary (either the Bank takes the 
risk to loan or avoids the risk), the variables in process conditionality are functional (the 
government, for instance, should decentralized). While the variables in economic conditionality 
are prescriptive (for example, the Bank tells a government either to privatize state parastatals or 
forfeit financial aid from the Bank), those of outcome conditionality are inferential. That is, in 
outcome conditionality, the assessment of outcome determines what conditions the borrowing 
country needs to fulfill in order to proceed with the possibility of realizing ultimate policy 
objectives. In outcome conditionality, the Bank infers the content and nature of financial 
assistance conditions from the fate of previous policy implementation. Thus, fiduciary and 
economic conditionalities look forward; process conditionality looks at the present; and outcome 
conditionality looks backward. Figure 3 shows the ideal conditionality continuum.  
 
       Fiduciary                                                                Process 
    Conditionality                                                      Conditionality 
  
               
 
 
 
                                Economic Conditionality                                           Outcome Conditionality 
  
Broken line indicates that the donor/lender may take or not take the risk to give funds. 
 
The fill nature of this line indicates that donor/lender has disbursed funds, the     
development program/project has been initiated, and it is in progress.  
 
Figure 3. A time-based representation of the ideal conditionality continuum 
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Outcome conditionality occurs at the terminus ad quem. Following this position, Andrew 
Mold picks up a succinct definition of outcome conditionality from the European Commission’s 
EC Budget Support: An Innovative Approach to Conditionality, wherein outcome conditionality 
is defined as providing aid on the basis of “progress attained for a number of indicators, mainly 
of results in the reduction of aspects of poverty directly linked to service delivery and of public 
financial management.”71  
The rationale of this conditionality is multifold. Firstly, it covers the prediction gaps 
associated with the imperfections of economic equations. The flexibility of human behavior in 
the marketplace makes it difficult to predict with absolute certainty that specific inputs will 
always yield particular results. A combination of structural adjustment measures, for example, 
does not imply that balance of payments will be corrected exactly as predicted by Bank 
economists. The economic outlook of a society is always influenced by non-economic forces – 
geographical, political, cultural, and sociological - which do not occur and influence economics 
in ways that can be determined by calculus. For example, following the application of structural 
adjustment programs, the Global South has had disastrous economic results because of what 
John Gatar terms “exogenous factors” that include natural disasters and political unrest, just to 
name a few.72 Outcome conditionality serves should-in-case purpose against the presence and 
influence of these non-economic factors. For example: in case natural disasters disorient the 
progress of a program from desired outcome, then outcome conditionality reorients the current 
results towards ultimate desired goals. 
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Secondly, outcome conditionality enhances another policy of the World Bank (and IMF), 
namely, country ownership. Quoting the IMF, Anna Ivanova writes that  
outcome-based conditionality is viewed as “reducing the perception of micro-
management of countries’ economic policies and helping foster and build on country 
ownership, by giving the authorities greater flexibility to design their own economic 
policies. Drawing on the risk-sharing result of the standard principal-agent model with 
unobservable action . . . making financing conditional on outcome would strengthen the 
incentives of the authorities to achieve a better outcome.73 
Ivanova’s words suggest that there are psychological, political, and moral dimensions to 
outcome conditionality. Theodore Panayotou observes that developing countries perceive 
conditionality with disdain because they consider it an infringement on their national 
sovereignty.74 Outcome conditionality plays a game with the mind: it assuages such perception 
by according to national governments the opportunity not to stick absolutely unto donor-
prescribed policy conditions but also to determine what policies they can pursue as a 
consequence of the results of prior implementation of the Bank’s conditioned-development 
programs. This determination is an act of political empowerment in which governments envision 
themselves as being in control of the fate of their countries. Being in control likewise puts 
governments in positions of moral responsibility for the chain of outcomes. Therefore, the 
government as agent of policy implementation and collaborator with aid donor in the process of 
policy design, enters into “risk-sharing” with the Bank as donor or principal policy-maker. To 
grasp clearly this moral culpability and political empowerment of government in relation to 
conditionality, one needs to pay closer attention to what country ownership is. 
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Country Ownership: “A Term Whose Time has Gone?” 
 
In discussing the implications of country ownership of reform programs for 
conditionality, Omotunde E.G. Johnson claims: 
‘Ownership’ from the perspective of the typical citizen, we believe, is more about (1) the 
right of the country representatives to be heard in the process of diagnosis and program 
design, and (2) the freedom and ability of the country to choose the program to be 
implemented, without coercion, than about (3) who designs the program. Of course, 
many among the educated elites in civil societies in “aid” recipient countries would 
prefer that their nationals design the programs, if they have the requisite technical skills; 
they would also want, over time, their own nationals to be fully equipped to design every 
program. In the short term to medium term, however, these same elites will not typically 
insist on a program being designed by local persons for the program to be deemed locally 
owned. Hence, there is no necessary correlation between the degree of active country 
participation in the program design (relative to participation of outsiders) and the extent 
or degree of country ownership. In brief, the line of causation runs from country 
ownership (ex ante) to participation in design and finally to implementation.75 
 
Following the above dismissal of the designer of programs as an issue of concern in 
country ownership, Omotunde thinks that there is country ownership when both citizens and 
non-citizens believe that the representative of a country freely choose whatever program they 
implement, and as such the full responsibility of the outcome of the program rests with the 
country.76 The question that this definition does not answer is: who designs the program that the 
country representatives chose? From the above claim, Omotunde may think that this question is 
unimportant. However, the serious problem with his position is a belief in the power of 
epistemology that obliterates the historical and political affirmation of sovereignty that has 
characterized nations’ critique of conditionality vis-à-vis ownership. That is, Omotunde insists 
on the value of expert knowledge to the point where he dismisses the fact that one reason that 
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governments have insisted on “owning” their development programs is that they perceive World 
Bank’s conditionality as a thread to their sovereignty.  
Omotunde’s conception of ownership reflects a problem of clearly and completely stating 
the essence of ownership that has plagued many scholars and policy analysts – a crisis that led 
Buiter to assert that country ownership of Bank policies is a term “Whose time has gone” 
because “it has been used and abused in so many ways to gloss over realities deemed uncomfortable 
and to create a pleasant buzz to distract the uninformed and unwary, that it now needs to be put out of 
its misery.”77  To redeem country ownership from “misery,” one will certainly need to look more 
broadly at the different dimensions of ownership. To resolve the problem of incomplete expression 
of “what constitutes adequate ownership,” 78 John H. Johnson and Sulaiman S. Wasty formulate 
four dimensions of ownership that display the interdisciplinary richness of the term. These 
dimensions include “locus of initiative,” intellectual conviction, political support, and 
stakeholder involvement. It is necessary to expand on each of these dimensions because they 
interact with the different types of conditionality.  
Dimensions of Ownership 
On page two of Borrower Ownership, Johnson and Wasty vividly enumerate the four 
dimensions of ownership. The first dimension actualized in the Bank’s operations touches on the 
political economy of planning: the “locus of initiative,” which focuses on who designs a 
program, the extent of collaboration in the formulation and implementation of programs, and 
whether reluctance based on arguments such as the demands of conditionality cause the Bank to 
withhold the disbursement of funds to a country. The second dimension is psycho-
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epistemological: the “level of intellectual conviction among key policymakers,” which involves 
the degree to which policy makers were in consensus about the nature and causes of problems, 
the alternatives to resolve problems and the methodology to adopt in the problems solving 
process. The third dimension is ethico-political: the “expression of political will by top 
leadership” as evident in different political and moral statements and actions. Lastly, there is the 
socio-political dimension: the “efforts toward consensus-building among constituencies” that is 
often expressed in broad based citizen participation in campaigns to stimulate support, 
participation, or resistance to certain programs.79 
Johnson and Wasty’s articulation of the dimensions of ownership is preferable to that of 
Omotunde because it expresses more expansively the ontological and functional complexities of 
ownership. Furthermore, the Bank adopts Johnson and Wasty’s understanding of ownership as 
the four criteria that one has to use to assess country ownership.80 
However, as Janet Entwistle and Filippo Cavassini insinuate in assessing country 
ownership of Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs), Johnson and Wasty’s dimensional 
elaboration of country ownership is difficult to operationalize because it fails to consider an 
important external dimension, namely, ownership as a function of aid assistance from donors and 
lenders such as the Bank.81 While one can conceptualize ownership as independent of aid 
conditions, such is not the case in the real world of application. To use the words of Omotunde – 
this is the “‘ultimate defining quality’ of country ownership”82 – that countries hardly ever act as 
                                                          
79. Sulaiman S. Wasty, “Borrower Ownership,” 2. 
80. World Bank, Annual Review of Evaluation Results 1994 (Washington DC: World, 1995), 64.  
Bank. 
81. Janet Entwistle and Filippo Cavassini, “An Operational Approach to Assessing Country Ownership of 
PRSs with a Focus on the Role of Government Institutions,” PRS Implementation Series (June 15, 2005): Slides 5 
and 6. World Bank. Accessed January 15, 2014. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Attacking-
Poverty-Course/CountryOwnership_061405.pdf  
82. Johnson, “Country Ownership of Reform Programs and the Implications for Conditionality,” 5. 
 
 
63 
 
they would “ideally” do under unrestricted liberty because they are affected by their own interest 
and the behavior of other stakeholders in the enjoyment of their sovereign rights and in the 
design and implementation of their own development policies.83 The Bank’s behavior, for 
example, is visible in the prescriptions of conditions to financial aid and loans. Therefore, 
ownership is not purely ownership in the practical world. Rather, it is modified by conditionality. 
Also, because the Bank acknowledges its limitations in interfering in the sovereignty of nation 
states, conditions attached to loans are not always fully implemented without the final decisions 
resting with the country. In this regard, conditionality is also modified by ownership. 
Consequently, what occurs in the real world is a combination of conditionality and ownership,84 
wherein there is neither pure conditionality nor ideal ownership; rather, a heterozygous 
phenomenon occurs in which there is both conditionality and ownership. 
John Pander iterates the Bank’s claims in its Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP), 
wherein the Bank posits that its CDP is not based on conditionality, “but on a relationship of 
partnership between itself playing the re-positioned institutional role of ‘Knowledge Bank,’ and 
the borrowing government, which has full ‘ownership’ of policies it chooses to pursue.”85 
However, he also contends that conditionality still “constrains genuine ownership of 
development policy.”86  Nevertheless, the prevailing Bank’s view of the relationship between 
conditionality and ownership is neither in terms of conditionality as a constrain on ownership, 
nor as a substitute for it. Rather conditionality is a policy that enhances countries’ ownership of 
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agreements that they enter into with the Bank in order to receive financial assistance from the 
Bank. Therefore, there is a sort of policy conduciveness in which conditionality and ownership 
create space for their co-existence. 
 I contend theoretically in the next chapter that this space is one of interaction between 
the two policies in development programs. In this interaction, each policy undergoes a 
modification, and the result is a hybrid of the two. As will be evident in the discussion in the 
chapter, the basic ontological and functional foundation of this hybridization is that the hybrid is 
neither conditionality nor ownership – it has an identity of its own even if it resulted from 
conditionality and ownership – and it does not advocate what conditionality and ownership 
distintively advocate. Rather, this hybrid embodies certain elements of conditionality and 
excludes others, and it embraces certain features of ownership and excludes others. I call this 
hybrid the Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid (COH), and I label the process by which it is 
formed as Conditionality-Ownership Hybridization (COHZN).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CONDITIONALITY-OWNERSHIP HYBRIDIZATION 
 
 As evident from the discussion in chapter one, conditionality and ownership are 
conceptually distinct. However, in their application to real life issues, there is an interaction 
between the two policies in order to attain some degree of stability in the process of policy 
implementation – as opposed to total conflict and tension – for the purpose of resource 
management and societal development. This state of stability involves both win-win and loss-
loss: the Bank and the financial aid recipient country both retain some of what they desire 
through conditionality and ownership respectively; at the same time, they lose some of their 
contentions in the process of interactions between these two policies. This is what I refer to as 
the hybrid state.  
Therefore, I define the Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid (COH) as the real-world 
combined actualization of conditionality and ownership in which the nature and contentions of 
one is modified interactively and pragmatically by the other in the transition from policy 
conceptualization to policy outcome. The result of this policy fusion is not distinct, multiple 
policies, but one phenomenon with its own unique aspects. These aspects, following the 
dimensions of ownership, also involve the locus of policy formulation, intellectual conviction, 
public or political support from leaders, and consensus among stakeholder constituencies, 
structures, or institutions. The aspects can be viewed as distinct; however, in the life of the COH, 
they are integrated into one species – the COH. The COH may have different accidental features 
– as genes combine differently in different individual hybrid animals – but the COH remains a 
hybrid in its own species identity. A discussion of these four aspects or tetradium is necessary to 
unveil the identity of the COH. 
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Locus of Policy Formulation 
 
 As earlier discussed, providers of funds are the agencies such as the World Bank that 
formulate financial disbursement conditions, and they insist on the fiduciary necessity to posit 
these conditions based on the need for trust, accountability, and transparency in the use of public 
funds by borrower countries to implement a variety of policies and programs, and to carry out 
development projects. According to ActionAid International, country ownership means that these 
“policies are home grown, developed by countries themselves . . . .”1 This conception of 
ownership is to some extent theoretically akin to that of the IMF, which places in the hands of 
the country the responsibility to formulate and carry out policies.2 The position finds theoretical 
support in the “Harmon Doctrine” or the absolute sovereignty theory, which says that a state or 
country has absolute rights to do as it pleases within its territory.3 Johan G. Lammers insists that 
this theory is subject to significant criticisms.4 Today’s globalized world is characterized, as 
Betrand de la Chapelle observes, by a complex, inclusive, and dynamic transnational network 
necessary to govern the “global polity.” 5 In this regard, the view that the locus of initiative in 
country ownership is exclusively country-centered does not receive practical support from the 
World Bank.6  
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Linking ownership to conditionality, the Bank posits a limited concept of ownership in 
which there is country ownership when a nation has a sound track record of implementing Bank 
designed policies. Koeberle and Walliser iterate that the Bank unequivocally asserts that where 
government designed policies are insufficient or weak, the Bank, instead of substituting 
conditionality for ownership, prefers not to disburse development loans.7 The Bank, therefore, 
acts as an economic institution that relies on information and social capital to determine adverse 
selection (the kind of risk that an intent-borrower constitutes) and to avoid moral hazard. 
Gleaning from Maitreesh Ghatak and Timothy W. Guinnanne, one can say that the reason why 
the issue of moral hazard arises in the conditionality-ownership hybrid is that “the lender cannot 
stipulate perfectly how the borrower should run the project.”8 Conscious of such limitation, the 
Bank engages in what Judith Teichman terms “social learning:” “a deliberate attempt to adjust 
goals and techniques of policy in response to past experiences and new information.”9 For this 
end, the World Bank’s technical experts assist the borrower country in designing reform policies 
and safeguarding the interest of the Bank. Paul Collier suggests that the implications of 
conditionality put governments in positions in which they have to pay heed to the epistemic 
insights provided by these technical experts so as to receive future assistance from the Bank. In 
effect, there is a dépassement of the theory of absolute sovereignty to the community of interests 
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theory that makes joint management the means of attaining the best possible administration.10 
Thus, while the locus of the design of aid conditions is the Bank and the place where 
development policies are designed in the light of ownership is theoretically the sovereign 
country, the locus of initiative in the COH is both the World Bank and the finance recipient 
country. 
There is a point that is worth mentioning here, namely the place of power in this locus of 
initiative of the COH. One of the mating animals from which a hybrid is produced may be more 
powerful than the other, but that does not mean that they do not come together in the 
reproductive process. The social context of conditionality admits power differential; however, it 
is necessary to note different types of power. The anthropologist Eric R. Wolf, on page five of 
his Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Governance (that was published in 1999 by the University 
of California Press, Berkeley, California) identifies four different types of power. The first is 
power in the sense that Friedrich Nietzsche used it. It refers to potency or capability that inheres 
in individuals. The second is the ego power, or the ability of an ego to impose itself on others in 
social action. This is the sort of power that Epstein talked about in terms of the “social context”. 
The third power is exhibitive, that is, it involves individuals actually using the power they 
possesses to control the context of interactions. The last power that Wolf talks about is tactical 
power, by which institutions and groups circumscribe the actions of other individuals and groups 
within determinate settings. From these four different modes of power, what is present in the 
locus of initiative is the first mode – power as potency. There is power that inheres in the Bank 
as an institution and in the government as a body polity. The power may differ in degree, but this 
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difference is insignificant in determining whether the Bank or government participates in policy 
formulation. In this participation, both the Bank and the government are simultaneously powerful 
and weak; they have potency, but they cannot do without the other. The Bank cannot force the 
government to sign a document else be extinct. The earlier cited case of Zimbabwe is an example 
of this weakness of the Bank. The government also cannot force the Bank to sign a document. It 
is at the level of the other three aspects of the COH such as intellectual conviction, canvassing 
for political support, and stakeholders participation that the ability of an ego to impose its will on 
the other sets; that one party begins to control the context of interaction; and that institutions and 
bodies tactically organize and circumscribe the actions of others. In the aspect of the locus of 
initiative, power is simply substantive – it inheres in the institution and body polity, but it is not 
functional as is the case with other dimensions such as intellectual conviction.  
Intellectual Conviction 
 
To speak of country ownership in terms of intellectual conviction is to adopt an 
anthropomorphic approach in the sense that intellectual conviction looks at a country as a human 
being with an intellect, and therefore as one who can have mental attitudes such as conviction. 
Katherine Marshall observes that for many years, the Bank sorely relied on development aid 
conditionality as it perceived it without realizing that in the absence of conviction and 
determination on the part of a country to act, development programs cannot be realized. The 
main reason being that the Bank cannot go into a country and take over its control as a 
government does. For example, the Bank can exert pressure on a government to privatize state 
parastatals, but the Bank cannot put the parastatal on bid in the market. Only the government can 
do that. The Bank can insist that IOs exist in the management of a sector in a country, but the 
government can control the management terrain in such a way that the IOs are incapacitated to 
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work. Without the determination of a country to act, the Bank can act and sanction, but its 
development agenda will not be realized if a country absolutely resists. Consequently, in the last 
two decades, the Bank has realized that there cannot be country ownership unless the country 
believes that development policies and programs that it proposes together with the Bank will lead 
to the realization of objectives.11 In his discourse on religious experience, William James posits 
that belief is the intellectual function of cognizing, of being certain and convicted of a reality or 
an idea.12 This understanding of belief seems to limit conviction to the mental sphere. 
However, “intellectual conviction” is not restricted to mental attitude. As Alan R. White 
notes, it is also a “disposition to behave”13 that entails a sense of moral commitment to both 
ideology and practice. Gilbert Ryle lists five elements that are associated with this commitment: 
the unhesitating utterance of what one is convinced of; other things that one says regularly, 
relevantly and without hesitation presuppose what one is convinced of; one is ready to persuade 
others to accept one’s conviction; where relevant, one behaves in accordance with one’s 
conviction; and when one acts inconsistently with the object of one’s conviction, one feels a 
certain lack of satisfaction, and thus seeks reforms.14 
 The above theoretical insight on intellectual conviction provides a framework for 
understanding the Bank’s affirmation that country ownership is necessary to realize both policy 
and institutional change in a nation.15 Through intellectual conviction, the country becomes 
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committed to the change – propounds it in its utterances; where relevant, basis other national 
actions on the change; convinces other stakeholders in the country to accept reforms;  and takes 
action to realize the change and to reverse the state of affairs where such action is inconsistent 
with the commitments of the country. This same attitude of adequate understanding and support 
of a program also applies to the Bank in the pursuance of conditionality. In this regard, the Bank 
unequivocally insists that although country ownership is necessary for development, it is not 
sufficient in order for a country to receive assistance from the Bank. “Due diligence,” the Bank 
tells its staff, “requires that the Bank be satisfied that any program, project or policy for which it 
provides support will, in the Bank’s experience and judgment, contribute in a sustainable way to 
the country’s development.”16 Although the Bank, as a general rule, defers to the knowledge 
based intellectual conviction of a country, the Bank calls upon its staff to withhold such 
deference where “Bank’s formal policies, technical knowledge, or international experience 
strongly indicate otherwise.”17 Therefore, country ownership is never absolute; it is not a 
guarantee that a country will have its way with the Bank with respect to policies that the nation is 
intellectually convicted of. Rather, the Bank’s intellectual conviction associated with 
conditionality, as a formal policy, sets opposing restrictions to the totality of ownership.  
 However, the fact that a country may be intellectually convicted of its ideologies, policies 
and programs appropriate to its national context that may be in opposition to the content of Bank 
assistance conditions does not imply that there cannot be agreement in the intellectual 
convictions of the aid donor and recipient. Intellectual conviction vis-à-vis country ownership is 
not a negation of flexibility on the part of a state’s commitment to country ownership. From a 
political perspective, Charles Lockhart says that  
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[t]hese two stances, flexibility and commitment, do not always create conflicting 
demands on the statesman; they may be complementary as well. An exceptionally clever 
statesman may manage to appear committed to his adversary but achieve this appearance 
in a subtle fashion which allows him to maintain options without the danger of losing 
face . . . . A more common complementary relationship between flexibility and 
commitment arises when the statesman is committed but wishes for the purpose of 
furthering his commitment to appear flexible to the adversary. Creating doubt in the 
adversary's mind about the time, place, and nature of a general's plans is an important 
element of surprise attacks, for instance.18 
 
 The World Bank also admits of the union of commitment and flexibility in the 
conditionality-ownership relationship. The Bank affirms “country dialogue and joint analytic 
work” as the modus operandi in bridging the gap between intellectual conviction and 
implementation of policies as Bank and nation desire within country contexts.19 Paul Nystrom 
and William Starbuck avow that dialogue involves a hermeneutical process of unlearning what 
one holds onto in a way that overcomes blindness and rigidity, without eliminating one’s core 
values.20 Therefore, what really results from the dialogue-interaction between the country that is 
intellectually convicted of its policies and programs and the Bank that is likewise intellectually 
convicted of conditionality is a sort of what Donald Schon labels, “dynamic conservatism.”  
Dynamic conservatism is both the tendency and the actuality of hanging onto what one is 
convinced of, yet being open to reform in some areas.21  
David Laskin beautifully explains the dynamic conservatism by reference to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s 1939 radio address: if one must speak of a conservative as the man with two legs on 
the ground who has never learnt how to walk, then one must also talk of the radical (progressive) 
                                                          
18. Charles Lockhart, “Flexibility and Commitment in International Conflicts,” International Studies 
Quarterly 22, no. 4 (Dec., 1978): 547. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600166   Accessed June 24, 2013. 
19. World Bank, Supporting Development Programs Effectively, 9. 
20. Paul Nystrom and William Starbuck, “To Avoid Organizational Crisis, Unlearn” Organizational 
Dynamics (Spring 1984): 60-61. 
21. Donald Schon, Beyond the Stable State (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1973), 32. 
 
 
73 
 
as the man whose both feet are walking “in the air.”22 Dynamic conservatism bridges these 
extremes. It is dynamic because it avoids well-conceived and planned schemes of resistance, so 
as to give room for connections among special interests. It is conservative because it retains the 
inertial or the core issues of a social system.  Historically, it was America’s President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s economic philosophy, which purported to continue chief New Deal programs 
combined with the attempt to reform certain aspects of the federal government.23 Les Metcalfe is 
of the opinion that reforms must cope with this policy philosophy through a process of beliefs 
and attitudes transformation within a unit such as a political body. 24  
 At the heart of this transformation in beliefs and attitudes is the ability of the Bank to 
trust the development knowledge of the financial assistance recipient government, and the 
potency of the country to trust the knowledge that the Bank possesses. Truly, fiduciary 
conditionality raises questions of whether the Bank trusts the country to work with it in 
implementing policies and programs. However, the fact that the same Bank propounds 
ownership puts on the Bank the onus to trust the borrowing government’s conviction of 
development policies that can work in the country. That is, the fact that the Bank supports the 
policy of ownership indicates the Bank’s acceptance of its own limitation in knowledge and 
power to implement development programs in a country based only on conditionality measures; 
the Bank, therefore, must have some trust in the knowledge and power that a government 
possesses in order to foster country ownership. This trust does not mean that the Bank forfeits all 
rationalizations that determine whether it can trust a borrower, but that in dynamic conservatism, 
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trust is transformed: it is a transformation from a self-centered, individualistic psychological 
factor that favors exclusive reliance on one’s self-interest and intellectual conviction, to what 
John Dunn envisions as “a modality of action” that gives room for people to “cope with 
uncertainty over time.”25  
If one labels the stakeholders’ knowledge as light and the uncertainty they have to deal 
with as darkness, then dynamic conservatism means that the Bank and the country stand in the 
zone between light and darkness in which they each have some power, but are not absolutely in 
control of the policy-making process. In a beautiful figurative imagery, Guido Möllering 
captures this paradox of light and darkness or known and unknown with respect to trust in his 
review of Piotr Sztompka’s book, titled Trust: A Sociological Theory:  
Finally, consider once more the sculpture of the ‘Illuminated Crowd’ shown on the cover 
of the book. One interpretation was that the light guides the crowd away from darkness; 
and Sztompka’s theory suggests that trust can be part of the classic source enlightenment 
– human reason. Related to this is the notion of human control: if trust is functionally and 
instrumentally rational, then it is also controlling and controlled. However, is there not 
another view that conceptualizes trust as a response to the impossibility of control? In the 
words of Lewis and Weigert (1985:976): ‘Trust begins where prediction ends’. This is 
not the place to begin an alternative theory of trust, so let me just hint at what it might 
entail by referring to another interpretation of Mason’s sculpture (one close to the artist’s 
own interpretation). The illuminated crowd does not move towards the light, but 
undulates between light and darkness along ‘degrees of emotion’: illumination, hope, 
interest, hilarity, irritation, fear, sickness, hunger, violence, murder, and death (Edwards 
1994:163). Trust is a phenomenon that embodies this human condition: the availability of 
some knowledge (light) on the one hand, and ‘the power of the unknown [shadows] in 
everyday reality’ (Edwards 1994:164) on the other.26  
 
 In this zone of light and darkness, of courage to act and fear of the other’s control of 
policy implementation circumstances, of hope that things can be done in one’s interest and 
irritation at the other’s different priorities, and of the opposition between one’s intellectual 
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conviction and the other’s beliefs, the paradoxical nature of trust transforms conditionality and 
ownership. For the sake of action, the Bank journeys from the lack of trust that characterizes 
fiduciary conditionality to the readiness to trust the borrowing country without losing these two 
values: there should be transparency and liability in the use of financial aid provided by the Bank 
for the development course that the disbursement was made. It is a journey into the hybridization 
of conditionality in the provision of loans and a country’s intellectual conviction of the national 
context that should configure the use of funds. The knowledge associated with intellectual 
conviction as a dimension of country ownership also undergoes a transformation. As the light of 
a country’s knowledge comes in contact with some other knowledge from the Bank, the country 
finds that it both knows and does not know – the country enters the moment of dusk and dawn 
where daylight and darkness mix. This is the moment of trust – where the intellectual conviction 
associated with country ownership causes the nation to hang onto the country’s values, and, yet, 
pushes the nation to open up to technical development knowledge from the Bank (knowledge 
that the Bank enforces through conditionality).  It is the moment of conditionality-ownership 
hybridization. When this hybrid occurs under trust, national political leaders can support policies 
that the country proposes together with the Bank. 
Political Leadership and Support 
 The most salient meaning of country ownership posited by the World Bank is this: 
“[c]ountry ownership means that there is sufficient political support within a country to 
implement its development strategy, including the projects, programs, and policies for which 
external partners provide assistance”27 When Tony Killick talks of country ownership as 
“government ownership,” he is really speaking of this one dimension of country ownership, 
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namely, political support.28 The Bank does not provide an explicit definition of what it means by 
“political support.” This is not an unfamiliar phenomenon. David Easton observes that often, the 
expression “political support” is used very loosely without a technical meaning. However, he 
formulates political support as a politics-based attitude by which persons favorably, unfavorably, 
positively, or negatively orient themselves to an object.29   
Political support is necessary based on an argument that has been made by 
anthropologists such as David Mosse. Although most international institutions are creations of 
sovereign states, people so easily question the authority that these institutions without sovereign 
territorial boundaries (such as the Bank) have over them because human beings do not naturally 
devolve from such institutions.30 Amidst this legitimacy crisis,31 Samuel P. Huntington observes 
that in world politics, “every international organization at some points finds itself  
limited by the very principle which gives it being.”32  Conscious of this problem, the Bank has to 
rely on political support from within sovereign nations in order to realize development policies 
and programs.  
 Anna Ivanova et al. in an econometric study of variables that affect the implementation 
of IMF-supported programs found that political support is negatively affected by “strong vested 
interests” in the legislative organs of countries (parliament, for example) with respect to 
development policies, by lack of political cohesion around development programs, by weak 
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bureaucracy, and by ethnic divisions.33 Conditionality serves to overcome these negativities. 
Transparency and accountability enforced in process conditionality, for example, combats vested 
interests. Also, it is hard to deny totally Joseph Stiglitz’s note that through economic 
conditionality, the Bank address not only market failures but also the ability of political 
institutions to reverse the path of economic downtown.34 One can read in this Stiglitz’s 
observation that although the World Bank’s Article of Agreement demands that the Bank should 
function without consideration for country politics, the combination of political support 
dimension of ownership and economic conditionality indicates that economics and politics 
cannot be separated in the implementation of policies at country level.35 Ironically, the Bank is 
aware of this fact as evident in this statement from its report team: “Macroeconomic reforms, for 
example, can increase pressure and support for SOE [State-Owned Enterprise] reform, thus 
making it politically more desirable.”36  
This inalienability of economics from politics at the level of policy implementation is 
supported by public choice theory and a government’s fiduciary responsibility to its citizens. 
Michan Andrew Connor iterates that this theory emphasizes that despite people’s rational 
choices to maximize economic efficiency and productivity (as Frederick Taylor affirmed in 
scientific management theory), people also bond and act together according to shared 
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preferences (the position advanced by political sociology).37 With respect to the responsibility 
that governments have to the citizens, M. Stephen Weatherford argues that one central element is 
often the national macroeconomic outlook.  A government as a political unit that fails to take 
seriously economic issues is at the risk of being disempowered by the citizens.38 Thus, the 
economic conditionality of the Bank has currency value to a government: it can either purchase 
favor or defeat from the citizens. Consequently, the application of economic conditionality will 
be out of touch with human sociopolitical behavior if the Bank fails to appreciate country politics 
as a determinant in the support given to development programs.  
It can, therefore, be said that while country ownership seeks political support as means 
for policy implementation and conditionality aims at transparency, accountability, efficiency and 
productivity as ends, the COH embraces political support as means to realize the four-fold ends. 
Political support, nevertheless, is not limited to the political leaders of a country. Politics is 
primarily the life of the polis – the city. Citizens are part of this life, and they hold the power to 
sanction their political leaders through ballot boxes and serious political strikes. Thus, the civil 
society is also part of the body that needs to grant political support to development policies and 
programs. Multiple institutions and representatives of the civil society such as common initiative 
groups (NGOs) need to become part of the process of policy formulation and implementation. In 
this regard, the COH embodies stakeholder consensus.   
Stakeholders Consensus 
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 In 1999, the World Bank’s president, James Wolfensohn (1995-2005), called for the 
inclusion and active involvement of not only borrowing governments, but also their civil 
societies and other international agencies in the Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) of the 
Bank. To the Bank, this represented a “major shift” – a shift from ownership confused as 
government ownership to country ownership.39 There is country ownership when governments 
receive sufficient support for strategies among stakeholders such as ministries, parliament, 
subnational governments, civil society organizations, and private sector groups.40 A people are 
psychologically more comfortable with reforms and they feel morally responsible for the reforms 
when their participation matters in the design and implementation of programs. Paul Victor 
Obeng, speaking of the benefits of the involvement of all parties in the implementation of SAPS 
in Ghana, supports this contention: “as a people,” he writes, “we achieved a sense of ownership 
of the economic program, a greater acceptance of the consequences of the program, and a 
stronger commitment to implement.”41 
  This advocacy for the involvement of multiple civil society stakeholders in the private 
and public sectors indicates the Bank’s embrace of an idea that historians have held for many 
years. This idea, as Rick Szostak summarizes it, is that institutional changes have not resulted 
from a single innovator working in isolation.42 Rather, it has involved multiple groups working 
together. In this regard, a common recommendation within the Bank has been that such entities 
as corporations should work in partnership with not-for-profit organizations, governments, and 
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local communities so as to promote ownership.43 However, differences in perception of policy 
outcome have often provoked resentment and discontent among stakeholders. 
Buiter observes that the main factor that often influences stakeholders’ attitudes with 
respect to country ownership is the outcome of the implementation of ideas, policies, and 
programs within the context of the prevailing circumstances of a country.44 As James A. 
Sheppherd and James K. McNulty posit in the decision affect theory of psychology, differences 
in outcome perception can disband stakeholders because people feel displeasure when outcome 
is not consistent with their intentions and contributions and elated when outcome is in accord 
with their desires.45 Conditionality can resolve this risk of stakeholders falling apart by creating 
common ground between them from two perspectives: one advanced by the public policies 
enhancement-incentive theory, and the other proposed by the dialogue network theory.  
The enhancement-incentive theory proposed by Buiter touches on the role of process and 
outcome conditionalities in enhancing ownership. Conditionality, especially process 
conditionality through its emphasis on transparency, representativeness, and democratic 
participation does not oppose ownership; rather, conditionality fosters ownership. Furthermore, 
stakeholders can jointly participate in policy formulation and development programs 
implementation when they are motivated by common incentive. Conditionality, therefore, can 
serve as “a means of enhancing the incentive compatibility and thus the credibility of 
programs.”46 Program incentives are the concerns in outcome conditionality. This implies that 
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outcome conditionality can be the impetus pushing stakeholders to find common ground in their 
incentives, and it can make stakeholders look at development programs as credible. When there 
is a sense of commonality in incentives and the belief that programs are worthy of 
implementation, stakeholders will likely continue to work together.  
How can working together possibly result from what people believe? Marily Motz in 
pointing out the usefulness of folklore scholarship asserts that folklore is not useful simply 
because it collects and categorizes what people believe, but it explores what people do with what 
they believe. She speaks of the link between the mental category of belief and the action 
category of belief in words that can be simply put: if one wants to know what people really 
believe, one simply needs to see what they do in their daily life of interpersonal and intergroup 
interaction.47  This means that there is a link between belief and action. Motz suggests that belief 
provides the framework for creating the point of interaction between individuals, groups, and 
ideas – in the context of this work, different development stakeholders.  
Interaction does not imply homogenization. Stakeholders do not have to homogenize 
their beliefs before development policy common ground can be possible among them. In fact, as 
theologians and philosophers have long posited, unity neither implies sameness nor denies 
diversity. In a religious analysis of Keith Dixon’s sociology of belief, Robert W. Friedrichs 
makes it clear that the ultimate product at the point of intersection between participants in a 
belief system is reasonable paradox48 - in which though there is disagreement, there is also 
                                                          
47. Marilyn Motz, “The Practice of Belief,” Journal of American Folklore 111, no.441 (1998): 339. 
48. Robert W. Friedrichs, “The Sociology of Belief by Keith Dixon,” Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion 20, no. 3 (September 1981): 286. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1385551  Accessed January 14, 2014.  
In refuting the crisis of relativism and reductionism that knowledge often suffers in social relations, Keith Dixon 
claims that the point of intersection in a belief system is characterized by rational consensus devoid of paradox 
because causal accounts of beliefs or intellectual convictions eliminate contradictions, one needs to stress that 
intersection is not homogenization. See Keith Dixon, The Sociology of Belief (London and Boston: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 19800, 128-129. 
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common ground that allows the parties to work together. In this regard, although a country’s 
intellectual conviction in the objectives of a program (ownership) may not fully fall in line with 
what it thinks the Bank believes in and prescribes as policy conditions to arrive at certain 
outcome (conditionality), the objectives of the program can provide a unifying point in this 
belief-system paradox that gives room for policies to be implemented. 
According to the dialogue network postulated by Christopher Gilbert, Andrew Powell, 
and David Vines, development epistemic insights from the Bank create an understanding of 
“good policies” outcome between stakeholders, thereby bridging them.49 There is what Herbert 
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow call, “system of relations”50 when interested parties approach 
outcome with a sense of dynamic conservatism in a process of dialogue and joint work that is 
characterized by fidelity to core values and learning and unlearning.  
From the foregoing discussion, country ownership involves stakeholder involvement and 
collaboration in the implementation of ideologies, policies, and programs. Conditionality 
measures can bond stakeholders and cause them to work together – after all, failure to do so will 
be grounds for the stakeholders not to benefit from financial aid from the Bank. This reasoning, 
nevertheless, must be made with some reservations.  
 In a contention that brings conditionality into stakeholders’ involvement in country 
ownership, the Bank holds that to consult with different stakeholders in the design of 
development strategies does not mean that they all have to be of one mind before policies and 
                                                          
An extrapolation from Dixon’s view will imply that country and Bank’s conviction and certainty in the 
objectives of a program, even if associated with conditionality, will lead to the elimination of all contradictions 
between the country and the Bank. However, such is not often the case. Friedrichs’ rebuttal to Dixon provides the 
insight for understanding how in real life, despite conflicts between the Bank and the country over what they are 
intellectually convinced of, both parties come to agreement.    
49. Christopher Gilbert, Andrew Powell and David Vines, “Positioning the World Bank,” The Economic 
Journal 109, no. 459 (November 1999): F609.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2566065  Accessed January 28, 2014. 
50. Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), 65. 
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programs are adopted and implemented. According to the World Bank, in the presence of 
opposition from some stakeholder in the midst of “sufficient support” from other stakeholders 
within and outside the government, governments can proceed with major policy reforms. In fact, 
in moments where different factions arise within the government itself because of World Bank’s 
development policies, branches of government that support the Bank can proceed with the 
reforms. 51 
This position of the Bank is the way Bank controls the context of the abilities of people to 
exhibit their own capabilities. To employ Wolf’s types of power, this position is the Bank’s 
tactical power at work; it is the institution’s acknowledgement that the common public sphere is 
not always common. The implication behind this standpoint is that despite the need for 
collaboration between stakeholders to realize development programs, the Bank does not want 
subaltern counterpublics. Nancy Fraser posits this concept of subaltern counterpublics, which 
affirms that in a system of social inequality, it is common for subordinated members to group 
themselves, circulate discourses against the dominant group, and formulate interpretations that 
will defend their own interests, identities, and needs and enable them to achieve voice.52  This is 
akin to the contention that Chester Bernard makes in his inducements-contribution theory of 
organizational systems. Temkins notes that in this theory, Bernard posits that when 
organizational members and institutions do not make gains from what they contribute to a system 
(such as a body polity), they are most likely to withdraw their participation in, and consent to 
issues, of the system.53  
                                                          
51. World Bank, Supporting Development Programs Effectively, 8. 
52. Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy,” Social Text no. 25/26 (1990): 67. Accessed April 3, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/466240   
53. Tompkins, Organization Theory and Public Management, 192-193. 
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Newton’s second law of thermodynamics provides insight on how to proceed amidst such 
discontent. According to this law, energy is continuously dissipated in a system, generating 
randomness or disorder (entropy) until the system attains equilibrium. In order to get work done, 
entropy has to be kept constantly low; otherwise, as Erwin Schrödinger notes, there will arise 
“the dangerous state of maximum entropy, which is death”54 of the system. To prevent this state 
of disintegration in social systems, conflicts, and strains that generate entropy must be reduced to 
a minimum or eliminated. How to do this can be extrapolated from the relative entropy function 
of a multinomial system involving different entities or stakeholders (N), which Robert K. 
Niven55 defines as 
Ƞ = − ∑ 𝑃𝑖ln
𝑃𝑖
𝑞𝑖
s
𝑖=1
 
where s is the equiprobable to which an entity is allocated, the most probable position in the 
asymptotic limit ( N→ ∞), where Pi is the probability of an entity in the ith  category, qi is the 
source or ‘prior’ probability of category i, and ln is the natural logarithm. From the above 
equation, one way to control the magnitude or amount of entropy is to limit N. Therefore, 
dissatisfied groups or individuals whose actions generate entropy need to be minimized or kept 
out of the system in order for the system to functional steadily or for work to be done.  
However, if N becomes zero, the system will cease to function. For perpetual existence, 
Bernard advises that organization structures and systems (such as a system of government and 
national stakeholders constructed to formulate and implement development programs) should 
                                                          
54. Erwin Schrödinger, 1944 What is life (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1944), 71. 
55. Robert K. Niven, “Maximum Entropy Production in Ecological and Environmental Systems: 
Applications and Implications,” Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 365, no. 1545 (12 May 2010): 
1324. Accessed January 11, 2014  http://www.jstor.org/stable/20789137 . 
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turn to the world outside of the system for resources.56  This solution is reflected in the Bank’s 
assertion that where there is sufficient support from international agencies such as the Bank itself 
for the government to proceed with a development plan, the latter can do so.  
To proceed as such really means that the government becomes a subaltern that embraces 
the Bank’s conditionality measures and forsakes certain voices of contest arising from within the 
country, so as to receive assistance from the Bank. In this vein, “ownership” seems to be a term 
that masks the Bank’s control of the public sphere in which the Bank interacts with national 
governments. As a subaltern, the Cameroonian governmnet formulates a counterpublic discourse 
in terms such as “majorité Presidentielle.” Oben Timothy Mbuagbo and Robert Mbe Akoko 
iterate that this term is “equally designed to forestall any alternative political discourse on the 
future of Cameroon.”57 Through national media outlets such as the national daily newspaper, 
namely the Cameroon Tribune, and the national radio and television, namely the Cameroon 
Radio and Television (CRTV), which are owned and controlled by the government, the 
government defines itself in the public sphere as the “majority” that has the voice and power to 
shape the national political economy irrespective of conditionality measures. In cases where the 
Bank calls for the democratization of resource management in the country, for example, such 
democratization has to favor the interest of the majority – the presidential majority.  
Considering that some of the opposition that the government might face can, and easily 
arises from some citizens disgruntled over the functioning of the government, the Bank calls on 
governments to “link participatory processes to permanent institutions, i.e., to favor 
                                                          
56. Tompkins, Organization Theory and Public Management, 191. 
57. Oben Timithy Mbuagbo and Robert Mbe Ekoko, “Roll-Back: Democratization and Social 
Fragmentation in Cameroon,” Nordic Journal of African-Studies 13, no. 1 (2004): 6. Accessed April 3, 2014. 
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institutionalized rather than ad hoc processes that might undermine such institutions.”58 As a 
function of prior action conditionality, the Bank often requires that governments put in place 
such institutions before it can receive financial assistance from the international lender.59Under 
the banner of country ownership, this demand from the Bank does not stop the country from 
adding other institutions to what the Bank deems most essential. The resultant of this addition 
cannot be in contradiction with what the Bank desires. Stakeholders who find it difficult to cope 
with the Bank’s procedures and therefore prefer to function in a way at odds with the Bank, for 
example, will be eliminated from the pool of stakeholders in the COH. It is worth noting that the 
Bank and other international donors with which it cooperates in funding development projects 
are also categorized as stakeholders. Conditionality, therefore, is a policy that selects bona fide 
(with respect to Bank’s ideas and procedures) stakeholders from the total pull of n stakeholders 
included under the policy of ownership.  
 From the above discussion, the COH with respect to stakeholders’ inclusion in the 
country-Bank formulation and implementation of development policies and programs can be 
mathematically represented in the following equations: 
Ownership (𝑥1) = 𝑥1
1 + 𝑥1
1*+ 𝑥1
2 + 𝑥1
3 + 𝑥1
3* + 𝑥1
4+ 𝑥1
5+ 𝑥1
5* + 𝑥1
6 + 𝑥1
7 ----------------------------(1)    
Conditionality (𝑥2) = 𝑥1
1 + 𝑥1
3* + 𝑥1
5* -------------------------------------------------------------------(2) 
Conditionality-Ownership Hybrid or COH (x) = 𝑥1
1  + 𝑥1
2+ 𝑥1
3* + 𝑥1
4+ 𝑥1
5* + 𝑥1
6 + 𝑥1
7+ E ------(3) 
 
Now, COH involves changes in 𝑥1 (𝑑𝑥1) because of the influence of 𝑥2 on 𝑥1 
                                                          
58. World Bank, Supporting Development Programs Effectively,10. 
59. The mainly agriculture-based Women-in-Development (WID) project in the Gambia is an example of 
this requirement. In 1987, the World Bank began the design of this project, and it insisted on the participation of 
non-governmental organizations in the government led process to realize the project. One of the conditions that the 
Bank attached to the project loan was that the government must have a "statement of government policy” that is 
satisfactory to the Bank with respect to the participation of institutions as NGOs. See Deborah A. Bräutigam and 
Monique Segarra, “Difficult Partnerships: The World Bank, States, and NGOs,” Latin American Politics and 
Society, 49, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 159. Accessed January 1, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30130827   
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Also, COH involves changes in 𝑥2 (𝑑𝑥2) because of the influence of 𝑥1 on 𝑥2 
 
The interaction between 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 is also influenced by the special interests of groups (E), and 
the presence and interests of groups in the interaction can neither be strictly attributed to the 
Bank nor the financial aid recipient country.   
∴ COH → f (𝑑𝑥1 + 𝑑𝑥2 + E) 
i.e x = 𝑑𝑥1 + 𝑑𝑥2 + E---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(4) 
Where 𝑥1
1, 𝑥1
1 *, 𝑥1
2, 𝑥1
3, 𝑥1
3*, 𝑥1
4, 𝑥1
5, 𝑥1
5*, 𝑥1
6  and 𝑥1
7  are different stakeholders; 
           𝑑𝑥1 and 𝑑𝑥2 are changes in country ownership and conditionality respectively; and 
           𝑥1
1 and 𝑥1
1* conflict and are mutually exclusive, just as 𝑥1
3 and 𝑥1
3*, and 𝑥1
5 and 𝑥1
5* 
 From the discussion in the second chapter of this work, conditionality and country 
ownership can be theoretically conceived and analyzed as distinct and alienable from each other. 
The present chapter shows that they are also theoretically related as hybrids. Inasmuch as these 
are policies that affect international development in practice, this hybrid cannot be restricted to 
the sphere of intellectual conceptualization. It has to be part of the practical reality or actions that 
are part of the Bank’s development function. One such action is forest management as in the case 
of Cameroon. In other words, in the management of forest in Cameroon, the modified forms of 
conditionality and ownership are operationalized together as conditionality-ownership hybrid. 
The next chapter focuses on this implementation, presence, or practical operationalization of the 
COH in the management of forests in Cameroon. 
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CHAPTER 4 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONDITIONALITY-OWNERSHIP HYBRID IN 
CAMEROON’S FOREST SECTOR 
 
While conditionality and country ownership are two distinct and theoretically alienable 
Bank development policies, chapter three contended that these policies are related as COH. 
Table 2 displays these differences and hybridization. 
Table 2. Differences between conditionality and ownership and their hybridization. 
Feature Conditionality Ownership COH 
Policies designer World Bank Country World Bank and 
country 
Intellectual 
conviction 
The Bank possesses 
the technical 
knowledge and 
experience to manage 
resources and 
develop human 
society  
Governments are 
most knowledgeable 
about their national 
contexts, and can best 
determine what 
managerial and 
development policies 
suit their countries 
Through dynamic 
conservatism and social 
learning, both the Bank 
and national 
governments have 
some trust in each 
other’s knowledge of 
policies appropriate to 
manage resources and 
develop a country.  
Political Support  Political support is 
aimed at causing 
country to support 
Bank’s motion to 
ensure transparency, 
accountability, and 
neoliberal efficiency 
and productivity in 
resource management 
Political support is 
aimed at causing 
political factions to 
unite over specific 
managerial laws and 
policies 
Political support aimed 
at uniting political 
factions over laws and 
policies to ensure 
transparency, 
accountability, and 
neoliberal efficiency 
and productivity in 
resource management 
Stakeholders 
Consensus 
Policies’ design and 
implementation 
proceeds with 
consensus among 
stakeholders in 
accord with the 
Bank’s vision and 
interest 
Policies’ design and 
implementation 
proceeds with 
consensus among 
stakeholders in 
accord with the 
country government’s 
vision and interest 
Policies’ design and 
implementation 
proceeds with selective 
inclusion of 
stakeholders who are in 
consensus with country 
governments’ vision 
and interest and 
without hindrance to 
the interest and vision 
of the Bank 
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In the last three decades, the management of forest resources in Cameroon has involved 
the application of each of these features of the COH. First, both the World Bank and the 
government of Cameroon designed the laws and policies that direct the management of forest in 
the country. Second, in the design and implementation of forest management laws and policies, 
the Bank and the Cameroonian government embraced dynamic conservatism and social learning. 
Third, in the process of designing and applying the laws and policies, political support remained 
and remains very necessary to foster transparency, accountability, the neoliberal model of 
efficiency (absolute freedom of the market) and the neoliberal paradigm of productivity 
(ceaseless accumulation of capital) in the forest sector. Lastly, both the design and 
implementation of the laws and policies governing forest management in Cameroon involved, 
and continue to involve, selective inclusion of stakeholders. Forest management in Cameroon 
involves the application of the COH in all its four dimensions.  
Designers of Forest Management Laws and Policies 
 The principles, regulations, and course of action that govern the management of forest in 
Cameroon today are explicitly enshrined in, and one can infer them from the Cameroon Forest 
Policy of 1993 and Law no. 94/01 of 20 January 1994.1 The enactment of this law goes beyond 
absolute country sovereignty, and it shows the Bank’s limitation in policy stipulation. Rather, it 
involves both the Bank’s and the Cameroonian government’s jointly making policies and laws in 
accordance with the locus of policy formulation dimension of the COH. Speaking of the parties 
involved in the formulation of the articles of this law, the political anthropologist Peter Geschiere 
says, “it is clear that this law carries the signature of the World Bank . . . . The Cameroon 
                                                          
1. The forest policy designed by the Cameroon government and published in 1993 served as the foundation 
for drafting the 1994 Forest Law of the country. The 1993 policy was a revision of the 1981 forest management law 
with the intention of aligning forest management in the country to Agenda 21 of the 1992 Rio Summit.  
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legislative institutions – notably the parliament – only accepted the law after prolonged 
resistance and under heavy pressure of the World Bank with financial sanctions.”2    
 Geschiere’s observation indicates that the Bank used conditionality as a policy leverage 
to influence the design of this law. However, what does it mean to say that Cameroon only 
“accepted” the law after conditionality threats from the Bank? Does it mean the Cameroonian 
government was simply a passive recipient of the law that played no role in the design of the 
forest management regulations and policies? One must be skeptical about responding to this 
second question in the affirmative, because Forest Monitor refers to the role of the Bank in 
designing the forest management regulations and policies as “assistance”.3 Assistance places the 
primary responsibility of policy formulation in the hands of the Cameroon government and puts 
the Bank and the government on the platform of collaboration. Assistance suggests that the 
government of Cameroon was actively involved in formulating the law and polices. Therefore, to 
respond to what “acceptance” means in the context of the formulation of the 1994 Forest Law 
and associated forest management policies, one must resort to the history of the enactment of the 
law. This reference is important because, as Frederick A Olafson asserts, historical life or past 
events provide a significant framework for a proper understanding of the content of 
promulgations.4  
 In over one and a half decade prior to 1994, forest management in Cameroon was guided 
by Forest Law No. 81-13 of 27 November, 1981. According to Eavan O’Halloran and Ferrer 
Vicente, this law opened channels for government officials to practice corruption in forest 
                                                          
2. Peter Geschiere, “The 1994 Forest Law in Cameroon: Neoliberals Betting on “the” Community,” (2011): 
478. Universitat van Amsterdam. Accessed October 2, 2013. http://dare.uva.nl/document/459421  
3. Forests Monitor, “Part II: Country Profiles – Cameroon: Political, Social and Economic Framework.” 
Forests Monitor. Accessed January 13, 2014. www.forestsmonitor.org/fr/reports/540539/549935   
4. Frederick A. Olafson, “Hermeneutics: ‘Analytical’ and ‘Dialectical,’” History and Theory 25, no. 4 
(December 1986): 30-31. Accessed January 10, 2014.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505130. 
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management by failing to treat issues of conflict of interest in personnel who approved forest 
exploitation licenses. It encouraged “quick-cut-and-run” as companies were only awarded 
logging licenses for five years, and the government lost significant revenue from forest resources 
because of low tax collection from the forest sector. In fact, the net effects of the law were waste 
of resources, fast deforestation, low revenue to government from forest exploitation, and deep 
inefficiencies and corruption in forest management.5 In 1994, the World Bank stepped in to 
arrest this crisis as part of the SAPs package. 
 Cameroonian government’s protest of the conditions of first generation structural 
adjustment programs at the end of the 1980s and in the early years of the 1990s (as explained in 
footnote 73 herein) caused the Bank to distrust the government. With fiduciary conditionality at 
stake, the Bank resorted to process conditionality – as Guiseppe Topa et al. note, by tying the 
disbursement of the Economic Recovery Credit of 1994 and the third structural adjustment credit 
(SAC-III) to the government’s reform of the management of the nations’ forest resources.6 
Herwig Cleuren observes that the Bank soon found itself limited in using conditionality to 
enforce reforms because “MPs [members of parliament] and other powerful people earning 
money from the logging industry were not impressed by the World Bank’s threats to cancel 
credit lines and pushed through their own will on crucial issues.”7  
                                                          
5. Eavan O’Halloran and  Ferrer Vicente, The Evolution of Cameroon’s New Forestry Legal, Regulatory 
and Taxation System (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), 1. 
6. Guiseppe Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon: Experience and Evidence from a Decade of Reform 
(Washington, DC, World Bank, 2009), 23. 
SAC-III was a credit of US$180 million from the Bank to Cameroon. One of the six tranches in which this credit 
was disbursed was tied to reforms in the country’s forest sector. See World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural 
Adjustment Credit Project (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), no.12. Accessed February 1, 2014. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/04/693591/cameroon-third-structural-adjustment-credit-project  
7. Herwig Cleuren, Paving the Road for Forest Destruction: Key Actors and Driving Forces of Tropical 
Deforestation in Brazil, Ecuador and Cameroon (Leiden: Research School of Asian, African, and Amerindian 
Studies, 2001), 143.  Universiteit Leiden. Accessed December 31, 2013. 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/8389  
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 This initial phase of the reforms process underlined the difference between conditionality 
and ownership. Cameroon government’s ownership of the reforms was further strengthened by 
the vested interests of a foreign stakeholder, namely, the French government. For instance, 
Frances Seymour and Navroz Dubash take note of the indications that in November 1993, the 
French government lobbied the Cameroon parliament against the Bank’s reform agenda so as to 
protect the interest of French logging companies against the Bank’s suggested log export ban.8 
The MPs waged a media war against the Bank. In rebuttal, the Bank also engaged in a media 
campaign to explain to Cameroonians the benefits of the law.9  
 The way out of this tense situation was negotiation. While the Bank’s forest and 
environment team engaged in dialogue with the Cameroon government, another team in 
Washington, DC began working on a new forest law. In the meantime, frustrated by the inability 
of the Cameroon’s executive branch to persuade the nation’s parliament to formulate forest 
management policies that were totally in line with the Bank’s draft, the Bank engaged in an 
alternating-offer game with the government. Seymour and Dubash capture this game and its 
raison d'être in these words: 
The National Assembly’s [of Cameroon] amendments to the draft law were inconsistent 
with what the World Bank considered to be sound forest policy. . . . The World Bank 
realized that any effort to persuade the government to challenge the Assembly and 
reverse the most serious changes in the law would be futile. It therefore asked MINEF 
[Ministry of Environment and Forestry] to draft an Implementation Decree that would 
interpret the law in line with the draft that the World Bank had originally agreed to. The 
Ministry submitted a draft version of the decree to the World Bank in July 1994. The 
World Bank rejected this version and several staff spent over a year revising the decree 
line by line. A final version, acceptable to the Bank, was issued in August 1995.10  
 
                                                          
8. Frances Seymour and Navroz Dubash, The Right Conditions: The World Bank, Structural Adjustment, 
and Forest Policy Reform, eds. Jake Brunner et al. (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2000), 66. 
Accessed October 23, 2013. http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/iffeforest.pdf  
9. Ibid., 62-64. 
10. Ibid., 67-68. 
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 This vivid description of the negotiations between the Bank and the government indicates 
that the laws and policies that govern forest management in Cameroon have the design hand of 
the Bank and the Cameroon government in it. Furthermore, it shows that the law is not only 
acceptable to the government but also to the Bank. Acceptance by the government implies 
country ownership of the forest management policies and laws, and acceptance by the Bank 
highlights that the Bank, through conditionality, was actively involved in the design of the forest 
management policies and laws. In this application of the locus of policy formulation dimension 
of the COH, both the government and Bank staff embraced dynamic conservatism and social 
learning in designing the forest management laws and policies.  
Dynamic Conservatism and Social Learning in Forest Management Policies and Laws 
Formulation 
 
 In the era after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED)  held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 3 to 14 June 1992, both the government of 
Cameroon and the World Bank embraced dynamic conservatism and social learning in the 
formulation of the policies and laws that govern the management of forest resources in 
Cameroon. This is evident from two perspectives. Firstly, the 1993 forest management policies 
propounded by the Cameroon government were intended to align forest management in the 
country to Agenda 21 of the Conference.11 It is necessary to note that whoever accepted or 
rejected Agenda 21 indirectly embraced or shunned respectively the World Bank because the 
Bank’s 1991 forest paper and associated Operational Policy 4.36 of 1993 squared with the 
principles of Agenda 21.  The 1994 Forest Law was necessary because this alignment of policies 
to Agenda 21 was not absolute: the government embraced certain tenets of the Agenda but failed 
                                                          
11. Agenda 21 is the product of the said conference that spells out the principles and course of action for 
environmental sustainability. It was so called because it purported to be a global agenda for the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. 
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to include others. This represents dynamic conservatism and social learning in country 
ownership. Secondly, while some Articles of the 1994 Forest Law are in conformity with the 
values and knowledge of the Bank and the government alike, others are in conformity with the 
mind of the government but at variance with the original mind of the Bank, or in line with the 
mind of the Bank but at odds with that of the government. This also represents dynamic 
conservatism and social learning in the COH. Each of these perspectives deserves close 
examination. 
The 1993 Forest Policy 
 The World Development Report 1992 published by the World Bank focused on the link 
between development and the environment. In this report, the Bank pushed for sustainable 
development by adopting the definition of “sustainability” in the Brundtland Commission’s 
report of 1987. The Commission conceived sustainability as “[m]eeting the needs of the present 
generation without compromising the needs of future generations.”12 Richard F. Kosobud notes 
that as an essential aspect of this definition, the Bank added meeting the needs of the poor. 
Having called attention to the needs of the poor, the Bank resorted to economic models to 
environmental management such as  pricing social costs, top-to-bottom command and control 
technologies or regulations, and leaving control decisions to enterprises, communities, and 
households on condition that governments levy Pigouvian taxes or issue effluent permits.13 The 
same ideas of sustainability and cost-benefit approach to environmental management are present 
in Agenda 21. Bruce Rich observes that as the Bank had the dominant knowledge and experience 
                                                          
12. World Bank, World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 8. 
13. Richard F. Kosobud, review of World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment, 
by International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Economic Development and Cultural Change 43, no. 2 
(January 1995): 437-438.Accessed February 2, 2014.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/1154507   
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in global environmental governance through its Global Environment Facility (GEF) in the one to 
two years prior to Rio, the agreements of the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro were key “in 
strengthening the Bank’s role as money manager for the global environment.”14 Thus, it is 
logical for the Bank to say that it ties its non-lending activities such as promotion of global 
partnerships and initiatives, technical support, capacity building, and analytical and advisory 
work across sectors and counties to support for the principles of Agenda 21.15 
 Although Cameroon was present at the UNCED and agreed to the principles of Agenda 
21,16 it partially abandoned this Agenda by basing its 1993 forestry policy on the forest 
management principles in the Guidelines on the Conservation of Biological Diversity in Tropical 
Production Forests produced by the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) in 
1993.17 Some of the policies that the government adopted from the Guidelines were also in 
Agenda 21. Therefore, in this forest policy, the government essentially “owned” its forest policy 
by adopting only some of the forest management values in Agenda 21.  In this regard, Cameroon 
partially aligned itself with the mind or values of the Bank in global environmental management. 
As evident in Table 3, which displays the comparison between the conditions for Bank’s 
financing with respect to its clients’ forest sector management and the tenets of the 1993 forest 
policy in Cameroon, this partial alignment did not totally fulfil the conditions that the Bank 
prescribed for receiving financial support from the Bank. 
                                                          
14. Bruce Rich, Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of 
Development (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), 245 and 257-258.  
15. World Bank, The World Bank and Agenda 21 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002), 12. 
16. United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development,” A/CONF.151/26 (vol.IV) (September 26, 1992): Chapter II (C3). Accessed January 9, 2014. 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-4.htm  
17. Bernard Foahom, “Integrating Biodiversity into the Forestry Sector: Cameroon Case Study,” Paper 
Prepared for an International Workshop on Integration of Biodiversity in National Forestry Planning Programme, 
CIFOR Headquarters, Bogor, Indonesia (13-16 August, 2001): 9-10.  
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Table 3. A comparison between the conditions for Bank’s financing with respect to its clients’ 
forest sector management and the tenets of the 1993 forest policy in Cameroon18 
 
World Bank’s forest policy 
conditions for Bank’s financed 
activities 
Tenets of Cameroon’s 1993 forest 
policy 
Comparison 
between Bank’s  
No Bank Group financing for 
commercial logging in primary 
tropical moist forests 
Policy failed to check the 
continuous logging in Cameroon’s 
tropical rain forests 
Mismatch 
The adoption of policies and an 
institutional framework consistent 
with sustainability 
Revitalize the forest sector by 
setting up efficient institutional 
framework. No specific policy to 
enforcement strongly sustainability 
Partial match 
A participatory approach to the 
management of natural forests 
Improve the participation of local 
populations in forest conservation 
and management 
Match 
The adoption of comprehensive 
and environmentally sound 
conservation and development 
plans,  
Policy attempted to ensure the 
regeneration of forest resources by 
plantations, but no comprehensive 
plan was put in place for this end  
Partial mismatch 
A clear definition of the roles and 
rights of key stakeholders, 
including local people, in forest 
exploitation and management 
No specific roles and rights ascribed 
clearly to stakeholders and local 
peoples with respect to forest 
management 
Mismatch 
Basing commercial use of forests 
on adequate social, environmental, 
and economic assessments 
 Encouraged trade in forest 
products, but did not put in place 
adequate social, environmental and 
economic assessment mechanisms 
for forests’ exploitation 
Partial match 
Making adequate provisions to 
maintain biodiversity  
Sought the preservation of 
biodiversity 
Match 
Safeguard the interests of local 
people, including forest dwellers 
and indigenous peoples 
Did not safeguard the interests of 
indigenous peoples and forest 
dwellers in forest exploitation 
Mismatch 
Establishing adequate enforcement 
mechanism 
No regulatory mechanism was put 
in place for planning land use , 
forest protection and production 
Mismatch 
 
                                                          
18. For a list of these conditions used in this table, see Uma Lele et al.. The World Bank Forest Strategy: 
Striking the Right Balance (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), Box 1.2. The conditions are detailed in the Bank’s 
The Forest Sector: A World Bank Policy Paper that the Bank produced in September 1991, and in the Bank’s 1993 
Operation Policy 4.39 (was revised in April 2013), which Lele et al. document as Appendix A in their work cited 
above. 
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With up to 44.7% mismatch, over 33.3% partial match, and only 22% match between the 
Bank’s conditions and the forest management policies that the Cameroon government “owned” 
in 1993, the World Bank resorted to fiduciary and process conditionalities in order to cause the 
Cameroon government to reform its forest sector. In fiduciary conditionality, the Bank distrusted 
Cameroon’s forest policies, and it halted the disbursement of SAC-II. However, in the 1993 
forest policy, the government underwent dynamic conservatism and social learning in a 
simultaneous conservation and change of values as shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Values conservation and changes in Cameroon’s 1993 forest management policy  
Values of Forest 
Management from 
Independence to 199219 
Values of Forest Management 
According to Agenda 21 and 
World Bank20 
Values of Forest Management in 
the 1993 Forest Policy of 
Cameroon21 
Top-down state centered 
forest management 
Decentralized, multisectoral 
approach to forest management 
State-centered approach to forest 
management 
All lands under the 
guardian of the state22 
Lands owned by both 
governments, local communities 
and private individuals 
Lands owned by governments and 
private individuals 
Local communities 
excluded from forests 
management23 
Local peoples included in forest 
management 
Local peoples limitedly included in 
forest management 
Maximization of forest 
resource exploitation 
Sustainability privileged over 
maximization of forest 
exploitation 
Exploitation of forest with some 
concern for sustainability 
Forest valued in terms of 
profits making 
Forest has ecological, economic, 
social, spiritual, scientific, and 
cultural values 
Forest has ecological, economic, 
and political values 
                                                          
19. For an expanded discussion on Cameroon’s forest policy in the era from independence in the early 
1960s to Rio in 1992, see Richard Mbatu, “Forest Exploitation in Cameroon (1884-1994): An Oxymoron of Top-
Down and Bottom-up Forest Management Policy Approaches,” International Journal of Environmental Studies 66, 
no. 6 (December 2009): 753-755. 
20. For selected values of forest management according to Agenda 21 and the World Bank used in this 
table, see United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development,” 3, 8-9, 11 and 16. Also see Lele et al.. The World Bank Forest Strategy, 6-7. 
21. For values of the 1993 Forest policy used in this table, see  
22. Ordinance No. 74/01 of 6 July 1974 states: “The State shall be the guardian of all lands. It may, in this 
capacity, intervene to ensure the rational uses of lands in the imperative defense of the interest and the economic 
policies of the nation.” See Republic of Cameroon, Land Tenure and State Lands (Yaoundé: Les Editions de 
I’Imprimerie Nationale, 1974): 4.  
23. See Phil Oyono, 2005. “The Foundations of the Conflit de Langage over Land and Forests in Southern 
Cameroon,” African Study Monographs 26 n.3 (2005): 116. 
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The 1993 forest policy preserved some of the values of forest management that were 
active in the country from post-independence to the Rio Earth Summit, and the government 
learned new forest management principles from its social interaction with the Bank. 24 According 
to Marvin D. Krohn et al., social interaction is often characterized by differential reinforcement. 
Differential reinforcement is the aspect of social learning theory in which rewards and 
punishment condition the appropriation of knowledge and the behavior of groups and individuals 
in daily interactions.25 In discussing motivation theory as constitutive of the cause-effect 
relationship, Thomas E. Wren suggests that this appropriation can be understood in terms of 
psychological attraction and deviation from desires and pain caused by both perceived and actual 
rewards and punishment.  Inasmuch as prosocial actions are coextensive with psychological 
aspirations and value-based actions, both desire and pain are motivations for knowledge 
acquisition and actions.26  In fact, Charles Darwin in his evolution theory and other deductive 
theorists such as Karl Popper and Eric Beinhocker posit that perceived hurt or threat is a cause 
for entering the mode of aversion wherein one of the determinants of survival is the ability of the 
threatened to adapt by conservation of what it possesses within itself for survival and/or by 
acquisition of new knowledge and values from the entities with which it interacts in its 
                                                          
24. Social interaction in this statement has the same meaning as Guy E. Swanson understands it. It refers to 
the “process in which individuals relate to their own minds or the minds of others; the process, that is, in which  
individuals take account of their own or their fellows' motives, needs, desires, means and ends, knowledge, and the 
like.” Guy E. Swanson, “On Explanations of Social Interaction,” Sociometry 28, no. 2 (June 1965): 102. Accessed 
February 13, 2914. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2785645   
25. Marvin D. Krohn et al., “Social Learning Theory and Adolescent Cigarette Smoking: A Longitudinal 
Study,” Social Problems, 32, no. 5 (June 1985): 456. Accessed February 4, 2014. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/800775   
26. Thomas E. Wren, “Social Learning Theory, Self-Regulation, and Morality,” Ethics 92, no. 3 (April 
1982): 410-412. Accessed December 29, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380729  . 
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environment.27 This insight provides a framework to understand the behavior of governments in 
general and the Cameroon government in particular with respect to the forest management 
reforms of 1994 in the country. 
The assertion of Darwin, Popper, and Beinhocker implies that when governments 
perceive adversarial conditions, they adjust themselves to avoid circumstances that can hurt their 
wellbeing. In this adjustment, governments resort to their capabilities and/or acquire new 
knowledge from its milieu of interaction with other governments and institutions. If one of such 
institutions constitutes the threat to the government’s wellbeing, the adjustment by knowledge 
acquisition can simply involve the government’s adoption or acceptance of the standpoint that 
the institution favors.  
With respect to forest management in Cameroon, the Cameroon government perceived 
the World Bank as an institution that could significantly hurt the government by making the 
provision of Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC) dependent on Cameroon’s reform of its forest 
sector. John Tazifor Tajoche narrates that in early 1990, Cameroon suffered terribly from 
economic crisis under World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs that paralyzed the 
government. Most urban places in the country became sites of popular protest that were known 
as “operation ghost towns,” which involved citizens’ engagement in violent demonstrations that 
seriously destroyed government’s infrastructure. The weak economy put the government of 
President Paul Biya at the risk of political collapse.28 SAC-III was absolutely necessary for the 
government to avoid this fall and to recover the economy. Therefore, when the Bank made the 
                                                          
27. For a discussion that inserts knowledge conservation and acquisition into the formulation of public 
policies so as to understand institutional dynamics in the light of Darwin, Popper and Beinhocker’s ideas of 
evolution, see Orion A. Lewis and Sven Steinmo, “How Institutions Evolve: Evolutionary Theory and Institutional 
Change,” Polity 44, no.3 (July 2012): 316-318.Accessed February 1, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41684491 
28. John Tazifor Tajoche, Cameroon History in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Buea: Education Book Center, 
2003), 248. 
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disbursement of SAC-III dependent on Cameroon government’s reform of the forest sector, the 
later perceived this Bank’s conditionality measure as politically hurtful. The government averted 
the adversity by learning and adopting some new forest management values in its interaction 
with the Bank. This learning and adoption led to the grand forest reforms that resulted in the 
promulgation of the 1994 forest law – a law that contains both the World Bank’s forest 
management values and Cameroon government’s conservation of some of its pre-1994 forest 
management approaches. 
The Forest Law of 1994 
 The forest law of 1994 is a good example of the product of the combination of country 
ownership and conditionality that results in a modification of what both policies stand for in 
particular context. Taken in its entirety, this law is neither what the government wanted in 
country ownership nor what the Bank wanted in conditionality measures. Rather, it is a model of 
the simultaneous union and exclusion of conditionality and ownership in the sense that it 
includes certain elements that the government wanted in the law while excluding others, and it 
includes some elements that the Bank wanted while excluding others. In this regard, the law is an 
exemplar of the COH in action. These elements can be examined under the strength of the legal 
framework for forest management, the allocation of logging concessions, requirement of the 
forest management plan, forest zones, and highly politically debated incentives for forest 
sustainability and economic enrichment from forest exploitation. 
One can hardly deny Seymour and Dubash’s contention that the 1981 Forest Law that 
constituted Cameroon’s “ownership” of its legal framework for forest management was weak, 
and as such could not serve as a strong regulatory tool for planning land use, protecting the 
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forest, and guiding forest resource exploitation in Cameroon.29 One evidence of Seymour and 
Dubash’s assertion can be gleaned from Jolanda van den Berg’s disappointment that “this law 
provided for a system of local taxes to be paid in a national fund, which in theory should have 
financed development activities throughout Cameroon, but in practice hardly served as such.”30   
It was a law that failed to consider eminent corruption in the country by making stipulations 
without consideration for enforcement mechanisms. The law also abolished direct negotiations 
between logging companies and local peoples,31 and provided for the creation of national forest 
reserve that served for economic enrichment of the nation and as a tool for political maneuvers 
(see earlier discussion on prebendalism).32 M. P. E. Parren et al. note further evidence of this 
lack of enforcement provisions in the law. The 1981 law allocated 20% of the national territory 
to gazette forest, the equivalent pf 1.9 million ha of forest reserve. However, annual production 
from unreserved forest alone stood at 3.7 million m3.33  These weaknesses were the results of a 
sovereign nation’s formulation of its forest management regulations as it deems fir for itself – the 
spirit of country ownership. 
 Through conditionality, the Bank sought to roll-back the state from this high involvement 
in forest management. It called for the restoration of direct negotiation links between forest 
companies and local peoples, and this was inserted in the 1994 forest law. It insisted on legal 
                                                          
29. Seymour and Dubash, “The Right Conditions,” 63. 
30. Jolanda van den Berg, “Promotion, Recognition and Respect of Customary Claims on Forest 
Resources,” Seminar Proceedings “Sustainable Management of African Rain Forest,” held in Kribi, Cameroon, 
November 1999. Part I. Workshops, eds. Jonkers B. Foahom et al., (Wageningen: The Tropenbos Foundation, 
2001), 227. 
31. Ibid, 227. 
32. Ibid., 224. 
33. M.P.E. Parren et al., “A Collaborative Approach to Forest Management: The Case of Production 
Forests in South Cameroon,” Seminar Proceedings “Sustainable Management of African Rain Forest,” held in 
Kribi, Cameroon, November 1999. Part I. Workshops, eds. Jonkers B. Foahom et al., (Wageningen: The Tropenbos 
Foundation, 2001), 18. 
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provisions for enforcing the law.34 However, the Law retained the creation of national forest 
reserve (30% of national surface area), and it re-positioned the government at the center of all 
forest management as the state valued in the 1981 forest Law.35 Although the law put in place 
mechanisms for enforcement of the forest management regulations,36 it ended up being neither as 
strong as the Bank wanted through conditionality nor as weak as the government wanted through 
ownership that sought to preserve the status quo. Therefore, although the World Resources 
Institute and Biodiversity Support Program attempt to make one believe that the law introduced 
“far reaching changes,”37 Gregore Sieböck is also somewhat right in describing the law as “a 
significantly watered-down forestry law [that] was eventually passed in 1994.”38 The allocation 
of forest concessions is one area that embodies this strength and weakness. 
 Seymour and Dubash note that prior to the promulgation of the 1994 Forest Law, the 
Prime Minister of Cameroon had the sole discretion over the allocation of logging concessions in 
the country. The Minister of Agriculture, and later the Minister of Environment and Forestry, 
was responsible for granting small “Sales of Standing Volume” (Ventes de Coupe), which are 
logging permits issued only to Cameroonians for forest exploitation within 2,500 ha. Licenses 
were awarded for larger concessions. These licenses were renewable when logging companies 
wanted.39  
                                                          
34. World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project: Report No: 29996 (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2004), no. 4.1.12(i). Accessed February 1, 2014. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/11/5541915/cameroon-third-structural-adjustment-credit-project 
35. Government of Cameroon, Law No. 94/01 of 20 January 1994, Section 8(2) and Section 20, and 
Section 40 (1) and (3). 
36. Ibid., Section 1, and Part VI (Prosecution of Offenses).  
37. World Resource Institute and Biodiversity Support Program, “The World Bank, Conditionalities, and 
Forest Sector Reform,” 1. 
38. Gregore Sieböck, “A Political, Legal and Economic Framework for Sustainable Forest Management in 
Cameroon: Concerted Initiatives to Save the Rainforests,” A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Master in Science, Lund University (November 2002), 15. 
39. Seymour and Dubash, The Right Conditions, 63. 
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Topa et al. write that the Bank sought through the process conditionality measures in 
SAC-III to take away this discretionary power from the Prime Minister. Precisely, the Bank 
called for the “adoption of new, detailed regulations for awarding harvesting rights, including 
revised selection criteria and an external validation mechanism involving an independent 
observer.”40 The law ended up introducing public auction as the method of allocating forest 
concessions. This approach found favor with the Bank as the institution considered the method to 
be based on transparent, more revenue generating, and less corruption-susceptible.41 It also 
received the favor of the government on two grounds. Firstly, the approach enables the 
government to capture more income from the sales of standing volumes.42 Secondly, although 
the 1994 forest law takes away discretionary concession allocation powers from the Prime 
Minister by introducing public auction, the government maintains the right to overrule allocation 
committee’s recommendations in cases where it thinks that the national interest is under threat.43 
Topa et al. also observe that the Bank saw the law as a step forward but not satisfactory because 
despite the introduction of auctions that the government resisted, there were potential 
transparency crisis because the government still had a role that the Bank perceived as excessive 
in the allocation of concessions and guarantee of sustainable forest management .44 Yet, 
Cameroon owned the law as the President signed it into effect, and the Bank eventually approved 
SAC-III.   
Sustainable forest management was one of the key issues in the 1994 forest law. Prior to 
1994, the government enforced sustainability under the system of licenses that were issued 
                                                          
40. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 28. 
41. World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
1998), Box 10. Accessed February 1, 2014. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/06/731427/cameroon-
third-structural-adjustment-credit-project   
42. Ibid., no.94. 
43. Government of Cameroon, Law No. 94/01 of 20 January, 1994, Section 47 (3). 
44. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 22-24. 
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following agreement between forest exploiters and the government. The Independent Observer, 
Global Witness, iterates that under this system, holders of licenses had the right to log 
exclusively for export or for local processing with restrictions on some species.45 According to 
Seymour and Dubash, there were no management requirements for ventes de coupe and 
licenses.46 Against this oxymoron of sustainability measures that the Cameroonian government 
“owned,” The World Bank in SAC-III required that there should be procedures for preparing, 
approving, and monitoring forest management. The role of monitoring and assessing the 
implementation of forest management plans would be performed by international 
nongovernmental organizations. Furthermore, there should be a guarantee system to ensure 
compliance with forest management plans.47 The net effect of the interactions between country 
ownership and conditionality with respect to sustainability was the introduction of forest 
management plans, with the Forest Administrator (state services in charge of the forest) 
reserving the right to determine whether a plan is observed or not.48 The requirement of 
management plans in the law satisfied a government interested in capturing revenue from its 
approval of such plans, and it pleased the Bank in its hope that the implementation of such plans 
“will make more transparent a process [of forest zones management] which in the past contained 
serious abuses.”49 
Forest zones in the 1994 forest law were also different from previous land use plan. 
Cyprian Jum et al. remark that from the colonial days to the promulgation of this law, the top-to-
bottom directed structure and process of forest management characterized by the state-centered 
                                                          
45. Global Witness, Project of Independent Observation in Support of Forest Law Enforcement in 
Cameroon, Report No. 017 En (July 2002), 2. Global Witness. Accessed January 19, 2014.  
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/017En-F.pdf  
46. Seymour and Dubash, The Right Conditions, 63. 
47. Topa et al., The Rainforest of Cameroon, 28. 
48. Government of Cameroon, Law No. 94/01 of 20 January 1994, Sections 22(2), 29(5), 31(1) and 37(2). 
49. World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project. nos. 15 and 16. 
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expropriation of natural wealth in Cameroon excluded local communities from rights to 
controlling specific forest spaces. Villages as collective entities could not access and benefit 
economically from forest resources.50 The national context that called for this exclusion was the 
consolidation of post-colonial affiliation of citizens to the unifying identity of the state. In the 
first two decades after independence, 51  most African states were nations in transition from 
fidelity to colonial masters to faithfulness to a collective identity as a state. Consequently, most 
regulations and modus operandi of African governments privileged the role of the state in 
ensuring national prosperity – a role that had the psychological effect of causing citizens to 
identify themselves with the state.  
No wonder then, as Mbatus observes, that the 1972 constitution of Cameroon amplified 
the politico-material vision of the state as an organism that is intended to “exploit its natural 
wealth in order to ensure the well-being of every citizen by raising living standards.”52 The 
mention of “every citizen” implied the minimization of the exploitation of natural resources by 
local communities for their own benefits. Consequently, the government in Law No. 81-13 of 27 
November 1981 zoned forests as state, local councils, private and communal (communes) 
forests.53 Oyono makes it clear that communes simply implies basic territorial units of the 
decentralization of the national government. Therefore, “communes” forest gazette does not 
imply any loss of forest control by the state.54 
                                                          
50. Cyprian Jum et al., “Building Broad-Based Partnership for Sustainable Forest Management: The Forest 
Experience in Cameroon,” International Journal of Environmental Studies 64, no.5 (October 2007): 626. Accessed 
November 23, 2013. doi: 10.1080/00207230701645503   
51. Most African states achieved independence from colonial and mandated masters’ rule in the 1960s. 
52. Mbatu, “Forest Exploitation in Cameroon (1884-1994),” 755. 
53. World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Protected Areas of the World, 33. 
54. Phil R. Oyono, “One Step orward, Two Steps Back? Paradoxes of Natural Resources Management 
Decentralisation in Cameroon,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 42, no. 1 (March 2004): 94 and 100. 
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In this esprit de l'état, local peoples had little or no bargaining rights with logging 
companies over the use of the forest that “belonged” to the former. Geschiere invokes sympathy 
for the local communities when he dramatizes their fate under this system: 
Under the former rules [before the 1994 law], a company was held to come to some sort 
of agreement with the population that took mostly the form of a cahier des charges (a 
written list of obligations). In practice these amounted to a series of ad hoc cadeaux 
(food, palm-wine, shirts for the local soccer team, etc) and sometimes assistance for 
constructing a school or a bridge. However, the villagers could hardly exercise pressure 
on the company in case of differences of opinion regarding these charges. When a 
conflict threatened, the administration invariably sided with the company, and in those 
days the gendarmes knew how to quench any resistance. After all, a fixed principle of all 
the legislation concerning the forest, ever since the colonial state imposed its authority on 
the area was that all forest, as far as it was not cleared and cultivated, belonged to the 
state. . . . 55  
 
The World Bank, having considered these exclusion and drama as a hindrance to 
“rational and sustainable management of the forests,”56 sought to end the crisis by using the 
approval of SAC-III as a process conditionality measure to demand the “the designation of areas 
in nonpermanent forests for future community forests.”57 Following this conditionality request, 
the government modified its stand on the forest zone and began looking at community forest as 
economically beneficial to local peoples. Consequently, “forestry blocks” became attributable to 
local peoples based on simplified management plans.58 However, the management of such forest 
continues to respect the centrality of the state. This is because according to the reference that 
Section 37 (6) makes to Section 16 of Law No.94-1 of January 20, 1994, community forest 
management remains bounded by the state’s master plan for regional development.  On another 
note, in the said Law, the government did not entirely abrogate the old forest classification; 
                                                          
55. Geschiere, “The 1994 Forest Law in Cameroon,” 479. 
56. World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project: Report No: 29996, no. 3.3.12. 
57. Ibid., no. 3.3.13. 
58. Republic of Cameroon, Law No. 94-01, Section 37. Also see Republic of Cameroon, “Letter of 
Development Policy,” in World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project: Report No. P-7244-
CM (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998), no.94. Accessed February 1, 2014. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1998/06/731427/cameroon-third-structural-adjustment-credit-project   
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rather, community forest was simply added as one other forest zone into the old politically 
crafted classification.  The effect of this integration is multiple forest zones as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Forest zones of Cameroon 
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Political Bandwagonism for Forest Reforms 
 From the rationale of conditionality, one can say that conditionality is characterized by 
the bandwagon effect. Scott G. Dacko describes the bandwagon effect as a social science 
behavior theory that asserts that as the number of people who embrace a view increases, others 
will jump onto the bandwagon. This theory assumes that the acceptance of ideas diffuses as 
previous success in spreading the idea creates group pressure.59 In political terms, more political 
actors will accept propositions as the number of people who have already done so increases. In 
the context of forest reforms in Cameroon, , the theory implies that as the Bank politically asserts 
its reform vision and galvanizes support around it, politicians in Cameroon will eventually 
become unable to resist the Bank’s vision; rather, they will succumb to what the Bank wants.  
However, absolute sovereignty theory suggests that nations tenaciously defend 
themselves against external compulsions in order to uphold their legitimacy. One thing that is 
common between the assumption of the bandwagon effect theory and the absolute sovereignty 
theory is balance theory. As Dacko notes, this theory affirms that the strength of the relationship 
between marketers and customers is directly proportional to the extent to which marketing actors 
satisfy deep-rooted individual desires and motives.60 With respect to the place of the COH in 
reforms associated with political support, this theory implies that national politicians will hop 
unto the bandwagon only when the bandwagon, in one way or another, favors their personal 
interest. This is the theoretical foundation of the legal and policy based national political support 
for the Bank’s view of efficiency, transparency, accountability, and productivity in forest 
management in Cameroon. 
                                                          
59. Scott G. Dacko, “Bandwagon Effect,” in The Advanced Dictionary of Marketing: Putting Theory to Use 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 44.  
60. Ibid., 42. 
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Support for Productivity with Sustainability 
One of the novelties of the 1994 Forest Law is the introduction of concession or Forestry 
Management Unit (FMU), popularly known by the French acronym UFA (unités forestières 
d’aménagement). A concession is essentially a forest land in which a license-holder “is granted 
the right to collect a specific volume of wood . . . for the long-term supply of his wood-
processing industry or industries.”61 Concessions are granted to both Cameroon nationals and 
foreigners. The Bank argues that before concessions came into existence, companies had no 
incentives to manage forest sustainably because no benefits were allocated as reward for good 
forest management. This is because the pre-1994 legislation did not allow the transfer of 
contracted exploitable forest spaces, and access to these maximum 200,000 ha concessions was 
only limited to five years. Consequently, companies could not benefit from previous practices 
during subsequent felling cycles.  According to Rob Glastra, the effect of this was that 
companies engaged in quick deforestation to maximize profits within the allowable short-term.62 
Sieböck iterates that as a solution to this sustainability problem, the Bank conditioned the 
approval of SAC-III on the government’s legalization of forty years concession life-span.63 
Furthermore, as Seymour and Dubash observe, the Bank also requested that the concessions size 
should cover a maximum area of 500,000 ha.64 
Cameroonian politicians at the National Assembly vehemently objected to both 
conditions.  According to Seymour and Dubash, the forty years concession life span would have 
limited the amount of bribe-money that the politicians made from frequent approval of the 
                                                          
61. Government of Cameroon, Law No. 94-01, Section 46. 
62. Rob Glastra, Cut and Run: Illegal Logging and Timber Trade in the Tropics (Ottawa: Friends of the 
Earth International, 1999), 49. 
63. Sieböck, “A Political, Legal and Economic Framework for Sustainable Forest Management in 
Cameroon,” footnote 20. 
64. Seymour and Dubash, Right Conditions, 66. 
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renewal of concessions. They also argued to the public that the 500,000 ha concession size 
would open vast areas of Cameroon forests to plundering. However, some of these politicians 
owned shares in concessions.65 Thus, their personal pecuniary interest could not permit a total 
ban on concessions. Therefore, owning its own reforms amidst conditionality pressure from the 
Bank, the National Assembly promulgated a law, which allows that concessions in the 
permanent domain shall last for fifteen years renewable (also assessed every three years), and the 
maximum concession size remains 200,000 ha.66 Within the active concession timeframe, 
companies still could not export logs. 
Another productivity measure that brought conditionality into contact with the political 
dimension of country ownership was the issue of log export ban. It was the one issue in which 
the prescriptive character of conditionality became reactive, and the reactive nature of ownership 
in these reforms became prescriptive. Boniface Essama-Nssah and James Jerome Gockowski are 
of the opinion that Cameroon has always believed that it benefits from its natural resources when 
they are processed locally. This is the reason why in 1981 the government limited the exportation 
of timber to 40% of the entire production. During the forest reforms debates of the 1990s, the 
Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM) submitted a bill to the National Assembly 
                                                          
65. Seymour and Dubash, Right Conditions, 66. 
66. Government of Cameroon, Law No.94-01, Section 46 (2) and Section 49. 
It is worthy to note that although the Bank approved of this middle ground as a step in the satisfaction of its 
conditionality measures, the Bank now pushes for a complete elimination of any limits to the life span of a 
concession. It now wants concessions to be granted for life. However, the Bank laments that both the Presidency of 
the Republic of Cameroon (in a February 2011 meeting) and the Minister of Finance (during the 2011 spring 
meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and on other occasions) are not totally resistant to 
such allocation of concessions for an indefinite period. Their stand is that they do not see the permanent allocation 
of land to timber companies as a move that will bring sufficient economic benefits to the state (versus other options 
such as renewal of concession exploitation-contracts or permits. See World Bank. Cameroon - Forest and 
Environment Development Program Project: Report No: ICR2223 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), no. 27. 
Accessed February 1, 2014. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/01/16388332/cameroon-forest-
environment-development-program-project-cameroon-forest-environment-development-program-project    
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that called for a complete ban on log exportation – a 100% local processing of all logs prior to 
export. The party viewed a total ban as a clear-cut policy that is easier to implement.67 
As David Harvey indicates, the principle of comparative advantage on which 
neoliberalists base their glorification of the market favors not just the liberalization of trade, but 
also the elimination of export controls.68 It is obvious, therefore, that the neoliberal World Bank 
reacted by opposing this total log ban view of the government. The Bank argues that this idea 
fosters “the establishment of industries that can survive only because they have access to raw 
timber at preferential prices, resulting in significant lower forestry revenue.”69  
Considering that real life policy decision and application neither always follows country 
ownership nor conditionality, but the COH, a compromise position was found in the forestry law. 
This position requires that 70% of all production of each species of log shall be processed locally 
for a transitional period of five years (1994 to 1999), after which a total ban on log exportation 
will take effect as the government wanted.70 After June 30, 1999, when a complete ban on log 
exportation was imposed on rare hardwoods such as iroko (Milicia excels), moabi (Baillonella 
toxisperma), and bubinga species (Guibourtia demeusei, Guibourtia pellegriniana, and 
Guibourtia tessmannii), the law continuously opens a loophole to accommodate subsequent log 
export by giving room for the payment of graduated surtax on unprocessed forest exports.71 This 
loophole generates revenue for the state and partially falls in line with the export economics 
argument of the Bank. The Bank’s valuation of forest resources in Cameroon is not limited to 
                                                          
67. Boniface Essama-Nssah and James Jerome Gockowski, Cameroon Forest Sector in a Difficult Political 
Economy: Evaluation Country Case Study (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), 26-27. 
68. Charles Harvey, “Recovery from Macro-economic Disaster in Sub-Saharan Africa,” States or Markets? 
Neoliberalism and the Development Policy Debate eds. Christopher Coclough and James Manor (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 9-10.  
69. World Bank, Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project: Report No. P-7244-CM , no. 58. 
70. Government of Cameroon, Law No.94-01, Section 71 (1) and (2). 
71. Ibid., Section 66. 
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revenue from log export but also to a wider variety of economic practices such as market based 
auction of concessions and the tax system.  
Support for Neoliberal Efficiency and Transparency: Auction and Independent Observer  
 
 It had earlier been stated that the current economic model of the World Bank is 
neoliberalism. Rosario Espinal avows that neoliberals bet economic efficiency on the free market 
and their exalted market is “the optimal space for the production and distribution of wealth and . 
. . the optimal vehicle for social mobility.”72 Therefore, to them the subjection of forest resources 
to market forces guarantees the efficient use of the resources for economic progress. Espinal 
further insinuates that in as much as privileging the market challenges state led 
developmentalism, neoliberal economics often finds itself at daggers drawn with the political 
centralization of the state in national governance.73  
Despite this contrast between valorized free market and state interventionist development 
vilified as inefficient, the possibility of converting political capital into economic capital and 
vice-versa unite the two frontiers. Richard H. Robbins says that a J.P. Morgan currency strategist 
faced with the question of what political system (authoritarian or democratic) better fostered 
economic growth suggested that “rules that encourage the centralization of power and the 
depletion of political capital also allow for greater accumulation of economic capital”74 because 
such rules can be easily applied to measures that generate revenue. It is through this conversion 
dynamism between political and economic capitals that auction became the method of awarding 
                                                          
72. Rosario Espinal, “Development, Neoliberalism and Electoral Politics in Latin America,” Development 
and Change 23, no.4 (1992): 32. 
73. Ibid., 33. 
74. Richard H. Robbins, Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2002), 
373. 
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concessions, and independent observer became part of the forest management process to 
guarantee transparency, and a system of taxation was introduced into the forestry sector. 
 The government had always preferred to award concession unilaterally to companies, 
because it provides the opportunity for politicians to benefit from large sums of money from the 
corporations. Seymour and Dubash narrate that such was the case in 1997 when the government 
defied the public bidding system introduced in the 1994 forest law and granted two concessions 
to French logging companies. Although the World Bank at the time had a fragile dialogue 
relationship with the government over economic conditionality issues such as privatization, the 
Bank reacted strongly against this move by stacking the approval of SAC-III on the annulment of 
the provisional concessions. Proper market-based auction, the Bank argued, would generate more 
revenue for the state as the highest bidder will receive the concession award. Furthermore, the 
Bank required that the government put in place an independent observer (IO) of the forest 
management process as condition for the disbursement of the second tranche of SAC-III. 75 The 
international IO will adjudicate the attribution of concessions, monitor and publish on activities 
in the forest sector so as to prevent unlawful award of concessions, illegal logging, and to foster 
transparency in forest management.76   
 Following interactions between conditionality and ownership, the competitive bidding 
approach became lawful, although the free-market is really not “free” in this process. This is 
because as Topa et al. indicate, there is an Interministerial Commission for Awarding Forest 
Concessions that also examines the technical capacity of the bidder to determine eligibility. An 
IO is part of this Commission and it reports to the Minister of Forest on the integrity of the 
                                                          
75. World Bank. Cameroon - Third Structural Adjustment Credit Project: Report No. P-7244-CM, no.60. 
76. Ibid., Annex C: 82. 
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auction process.77 In the person of the IO, the government loses political capital, but it gains 
economic capital in the auction process. From this economic capital, the government regains its 
political capital by sponsoring its own State Forest Service that the IO advises. This Service 
monitors forest activities at the levels of FMU, regional and national forests. Within the Ministry 
of Environment and Forest (MINEF), there is a Central Control Unit (CCU) linked to the 
Minister’s office. As Philippe Auzel et al. list, the CCU collects and centralizes data from its 
provincial offices, undertakes control missions, compares field date with the National Forestry 
Database System (SIGIF), and proposes sanctions against defaulters in the management of 
concessions by different stakeholders.78 
Stakeholders Involvement in Forest Management 
 Stakeholders’ involvement in forest management in Cameroon can be looked at from two 
perspectives: the participation of stakeholders in the formulation of regulations and policies and 
the inclusion of stakeholders in the forest activities such as logging, clearing, and afforestation. 
In the first case, stakeholders are agent causal-beneficiaries in the sense that they create or put in 
place underlying frameworks such as regulations from which they can derive certain benefits. In 
the second perspective, stakeholders are direct causal actors in the sense that their actions have 
direct effects on recipients. In the first case, for example, stakeholders make or influence the 
making of forest laws; in the second, stakeholders act within the physical limits of forests, and 
their actions have effects on the forests.79  
                                                          
77. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 39-40. 
78. Philippe Auzel, “Social and Environmental Costs of Illegal Logging in a Forest Management Unit in 
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79. This dual cases approach at looking at stakeholders’ involvement in the management of forest resources 
in Africa is suggested by Katrina Brown and David William Pearce. See Katrina Brown and David William Pearce, 
The Causes of Tropical Deforestation: The Economic and Statistical Analysis of Factors giving Rise to the Loss of 
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Agency theory in sociology emphasizes the first perspective by focusing on the causal 
agent, while the transaction cost theory in economics capitalizes on the second by insisting on 
the effects of action. However, these two perspective are related by the fact that the effect is 
really the result of a trans-action (from one actor to another) posited by agents. As one can 
comprehend from reading Jill Solomon, this link is the standpoint of stakeholder theory.80 It is 
also the theoretical foundation for stakeholders’ involvement as perceived by the Bank and the 
government in shaping forest management in Cameroon. Liviu Amariei provides a long list of 
these stakeholders. He writes: 
At national level, the most important stakeholder groups are the Government, as 
the owner of the forest resource base; the private sector, represented through three 
Professional Associations of Forest Extraction Companies, (representing international, 
national, and national young entrepreneurs’ interests, respectively: Groupement de la 
Filière de Bois Camerounaise, Syndicat des Exploitants Forestiers du Cameroun and le 
Syndicat des Jeunes Exploitants forestiers du Cameroun); the local communities that are 
represented in the National Assembly; and the civil society, including NGOs and 
universities. An additional stakeholder group that has been very active in shaping the 
policy and legal framework during the last decade is the international donor community, 
acting through organisations such as the World Bank, the European Union, FAO, UNDP, 
IMF; NGOs such as IUCN, WWF and Global Witness, and national overseas 
development agencies such as DFID, GTZ, AFD, CIDA/ACDI and SNV.  
  At the local level the most important stakeholder groups are the administrations at 
district and sub-district level, while the business sector is represented through individual 
processing companies, concessionaires and loggers. Local communities are also active at 
this level through Local administrations and village chiefs. The civil society is not well 
organised at the local level, for example, NGOs do not play an important role at this 
level. The international community is present also at local level through individual donor-
driven projects and their management teams.81  
 
                                                          
80. Jill Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (West Sussex: John Willey and Sons Ltd., 
2010), 16. 
81. Liviu Amariei, “Legal Compliance in the Forestry Sector: Case study – Cameroon,” Final Report  (7 
January 2005), 8. Accessed February 1, 2014. 
http://www.fao.org/forestry/195800b266e69b6880da012e1a1875f2319a15.pdf  
The full names of the abbreviated stakeholders are as follows: FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization of the 
United Nations), UNDP (United Nations Development Program), IUCN (International Union of the Conservation of 
Nature), WWF (World Wildlife Fund), AFD (Agence Française de Développment, known in English as French 
Development Agency), GTZ (German Technical Cooperation), CIDA/ACDI (Canadian International Development 
Agency) and SNV (Netherlands Development Organization). To the donor community that included the World 
Bank, the FAO, UNDP, WWF, SNV, and IUCN, Topa et al. add the ADA (African Development Bank) and the 
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 From the above list, a few points need to be pointed out. The first concerns the Bank’s 
stakeholder selection. In the causal-beneficiaries micro-cycle, the Bank conditioned the approval 
of SAC-III on the involvement of both public and private stakeholders in the consultations, 
information gathering, and debates that characterized the process of designing the 1994 forest 
law.82 It involved its technical expert team, other international organizations, and the private 
sector in this process. The government was present through its MINEF, and the presence of 
NGOs fortified country ownership. The effect of these multiple stakeholders with varied self-
interest was a tense situation. Boniface Essama-Nssah and James J. Gockowski observe that the 
government of Cameroon (Presidency, Prime Ministry, and MINEF) was not genuinely 
committed to the forest reforms. Key stakeholders such as foreign logging companies and the 
Cameroon parliament were in opposition to the reform. The Bank itself failed to formulate an 
implementation strategy compatible with the political, social, and economic realities of 
Cameroon. One other issue was that although the discussions of these different stakeholders – 
especially from the Bank – led to the inclusion of local communities as agents of forest 
sustainability and economic beneficiaries of forest products, local communities were not 
included in the law drafting process.83 
                                                          
governments of Canada, Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK), and the European Union 
(EU). This donor community signed a code of conduct in January 2006 to ensure joint financing, monitoring, 
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Cameroon, 23-26.   
82. Amariei, “Legal Compliance in the Forestry Sector,” 7.  
83. Boniface Essama-Nssah and James J. Gockowski, Cameroon Forest Sector Development in a Difficult 
Political Economy: Evaluation Country Case Study Series (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), xx. 
With the exclusion of local communities from the debates that led to the enactment of the 1994 forestry law, the 
Bank cannot, therefore, be totally right in claiming that its development objective in Cameroon’s forest has not only 
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Nevertheless, the inclusion of local communities as direct causal actors in the forest 
management law is a very significant novelty that contrasts with the old provisions of the 
government. It is really the product of the COH. The 1994 forest law speaks of such a 
community as a “village”.84 To procure a community forest, the village has to prepare a simple 
management plan, and sign a convention with the Ministry of Forest and Wildlife (MINFOF).85 
The procurement is based on a pre-emption right – a legal reference by which local communities 
can request ownership of a forest within their village from the government.86 According to the 
Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement (CED), this right encourages local 
communities to own forests.87 Thomas K. Erdmann notes that although the acquisition is by 
right, the exploitation of the local community forest has to be small-scale logging as prescribed 
by MINFOF.88 Vabi et al. add that the benefits from this logging go to the village.89 
Furthermore, as Jean-Christopher Carret observes, local communities receive forestry fees in 
accordance with the decentralized forestry taxation system. The two types of taxes paid by 
timber companies to local communities as direct or indirect transfers are annual forestry fees and 
                                                          
been to promote sustainability, ecological stability and economic efficiency, but also to encourage the involvement 
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a sort of royalty or “ecotax” of CFA 1,000 (U.S $1.50) per cubic meter of timber exploited in a 
vente de coupe that a village claims customary right over.90 
 The discussion in this chapter has focused on the application of the COH in Cameroon’s 
forest sector. Two points are worthy of note from the discussion. First, there was negotiation 
between the Bank and the government of Cameroon in the reform of Cameroon’s forest sector. 
Second, reform ideas and policies put forth by the Bank came into contact with those expressed 
by the Cameroon government. The totality of the outcome of this contact was neither what the 
Bank put forth, nor what the Cameroon government suggested. Rather, in the interactions, the 
policies attained a life of their own as the COH. The next chapter focuses on how this COH has 
impacted forest management in Cameroon. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONDITIONALITY-
OWNERSHIP HYBRID ON FOREST MANAGEMNT IN CAMEROON 
 This study seeks an answer to one question: in what way has the relationship between 
World Bank’s conditionality and ownership affected forest management in Cameroon within the 
context of the international dependency development model? Having detailed the nature of 
conditionality and ownership as distinct policies, established the hybridized relationship between 
the two policies, and exposed the implementation of this hybrid in Cameroon’s forest sector 
within the context of the Cameroon’s dependence on World Bank’s international development 
assistance, it is appropriate at this point to turn to an analysis of how this implementation has 
affected the management of forests in Cameroon. This management, as earlier mentioned 
according to Brown and Ekoko’s studies on Cameroon’s forest sector, involves the maintenance, 
use, control, and monitoring of forest. Therefore, it is in analyzing how the COH affects these 
four dimensions in Cameroon’s forest management that one can attempt to answer the status 
questionis of this study. In doing this, one will be examining essentially how the COH affects 
what Carl Alwin calls “la possibilité” of forests – the forests’ resource yield, resource 
exploitation, exploitation direction or control, and necessary checks to ensure that the regulatory 
framework on the forest is respected by stakeholders. 
From the previous chapters of this work, especially chapter four on the implementation of 
the COH in Cameroon’s forest sector, this study is concerned with forest possibilities. As 
indicated earlier, the determination and regulation of forest possibilities in Cameroon involves 
firm decisions and regulations to achieve certain forest-based objectives, and to monitor the 
attainment of these objectives specified in the national forest policy. These objectives, from the 
research of Brown and Ekoko earlier mentioned, usually fall into four main categories: 
 120 
 
maintenance, use, control, and monitoring of forest resource exploitation. The administrative, 
economic, legal, and social components of the planning and regulation of forests are integrated 
into these categories. Formulating the objective categories and integrating the planning and 
regulation of forests into them imply that the planning and regulation affect the objective 
categories. This is the standpoint of the alternative hypothesis formulated in chapter one of this 
work, as opposed to the null hypothesis that negates this relational impact. 
One can conceptualize this impact in terms of what Alwin speaks of as “la possibilité”. 
Forest possibilities are not restricted to what the forest can generate from a material perspective; 
rather, they also include in the broad sense the different ways in which the forest can be shaped 
by the administrative, economic, legal, and social actions of human agents. This shaping is at the 
center of forest management; it is the focal point in the implementation of the COH in 
Cameroon’s forest sector. This chapter is concerned with the precise way in which this 
implementation has configured Cameroon’s forest sector by shaping the maintenance, use, 
control, and monitoring of forest resources in the country. This is the last of the four questions 
into which the problematic of this study was divided. 
To answer this sub-question of the problematic, one needs to keep track of the COH and 
its implementation in Cameroon’s forest sector (the x factor, or independent variable). One also 
has to use necessary methodology (statistics, GIS, cost-benefit analyses, and juxtaposition of 
hidden and public transcripts) to link this x factor to the maintenance, use, control, and 
monitoring of forests in the country (the y factor, or dependent variable).  
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Implementation of the COH in the Forest Sector: Disparity of Emphasis in Forest Management 
Categories 
 
From the discussion in chapter four herein, there are thirteen main features of the COH as 
realized in Cameroon’s forest sector. These thirteen elements can be classified into the categories 
of maintenance, use, monitoring and control of forests. 
As shall be discussed below, forest maintenance is the core of sustainable forest 
management. The three features of the COH in Cameroon’s forest sector that fit into the 
maintenance category are the introduction of forest management plans, the zoning of the national 
forest estate into permanent and non-permanent forests, and the inclusion of local communities 
as stakeholders that will presumably not use high capacity machines to exploit forest vastly, and 
as such guarantee forest sustainability.  
Six features of the COH in the nation’s forest sector are directed at the use of forest 
resources for different purposes. These include public auction by which interested entities 
procure concessions to exploit for economic purpose; the requirement of  forest management 
plans to be submitted to the government within the first three years of forest allocation, the right 
given to holders of concessions licenses to exploit resources from the concession for a period of 
15 years renewable (with assessment of the concession at three years interval), restrictions on the 
exportation of logs, the inclusion of foreign logging corporations as stakeholders although they 
resisted the forest reforms of the mid 1990s, and the granting of community forest to villages so 
that they can exploit for their own economic, social and anthropological enrichment. Table 5 
displays these and other features in their respective forest management categories 
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Table 5. Implementation of the COH in Cameroon’s forest sector 
Feature Feature in the COH Feature of the COH in Cameroon’s Forest Sector 
Policies 
designer 
World Bank and Country 1)World Bank and Cameroon government put forth a policy and legal forest 
management framework (1994 forest law and its implementation degrees) that 
safeguards the interests and values of the Bank through conditionality and the 
Cameroon government through ownership 
Intellectual 
Conviction 
Dynamic conservatism and 
social learning moves Bank 
and national governments to 
have some trust in each other’s 
knowledge and values related 
to forest management policies 
and laws in Cameroon 
2) A watered down forest law that, yet, sought to achieve a balance between the 
maintenance, utilization, monitoring and control of forests in Cameroon 
3) Public auction as method of allocating forest concessions to logging companies 
4) Government maintains right to rule on the final allocation of forests to 
applicants, and to reclaim forest from manager if government deems necessary 
5) Introduction of forest management plans  
6) Zoning of national forest estate into permanent forests (state forest and council 
forest) and non-permanent forests (communal, community, and private forests) 
Political 
Support 
Political support is aimed at 
uniting political factions over 
laws and policies to ensure 
transparency, accountability, 
and neoliberal efficiency and 
productivity in the 
management of resources  
7) Introduction of concessions with license-holder having the right to collect 
specified volume of wood for long-term (15 years renewable, and assessed every 
three years) supply of his or her processing industry or industries 
8) 70% of log production processed locally from 1994 to 1999; increased export 
restriction after 1999 with some species exported after payment of graduated surtax 
9) Introduction of independent observer and monitor to ensure transparency and 
accountability in forest management 
Stakeholders 
Involvement  
Selective inclusion of 
stakeholders who are in 
consensus with country 
governments’ vision and 
interest and without hindrance 
to the interest and vision of the 
Bank 
10) MINEF present, not genuinely committed to reforms, but maintains (with 
MINATD) control of reforms implementation 
11) Foreign logging companies oppose reforms, but included as stakeholders  
12) Bank present as stakeholder, but does not formulate an implementation strategy 
compatible with the political, social and economic realities of Cameroon 
13) Local communities absent in reforms design process, but included as agents of 
forest sustainability, and economic and social beneficiaries of forests’ resources. 
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 Five features of the COH in the country’s forest sector focus on the administrative control 
of forest resource exploitation in Cameroon. These include: Feature 1 on the negotiations 
between the Bank and the Cameroon government as two main actors in formulating the forest 
sector policy and regulatory framework that embraced and excluded simultaneously some of 
their interests and values; Feature 2 that touches on the categorization of the forest law as a law 
that although it sought a balance between the maintenance, use, control and monitoring of forests 
in Cameroon, nevertheless, remains weak with respect to its implementation; Feature 5 that 
concerns the inclusion of forest management plans as a compulsory element of the forest 
management process; Feature 10 on the lack of commitment from government institutional 
representatives as stakeholders in the forest reforms; and Feature 12 related to the failure of the 
World Bank to come out with the 1994 forest law implementation strategy compatible with the 
political, social and economic realities of Cameroon. 
 Monitoring includes two features. These are Feature 4 on the right that the Cameroon 
government’s maintains to rule on the final allocation of forests to concession applicants and to 
reclaim forest from managers if the government judges that the body to whom the forest is 
allocated is poorly managing the forest; and Feature 9 that concerns the introduction of 
independent observers and monitors to ensure transparency and accountability in forest 
management. 
 Before examining the impact of these features on the maintenance, use, control, and 
monitoring of forests in Cameroon, a significant analysis deserves close attention. The thirteen 
features are not equally distributed among the four categories of forest maintenance, use, control, 
and monitoring. Table 6 summarizes the numerical classification of these features.  
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Table 6. Classification of forest management elements and corresponding features 
Forest Management Categories Associated Features Points  
Maintenance Features 5, 6 and 13 3 
Utilization Features 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, and 13 6 
Control Features 1, 2, 5, 10, and 12 5 
Monitoring Features 4 and 9 2 
 
Table 6 also indicates the weighted points of features to corresponding forest 
management categories. This weighted point is simply the total number of features associated 
with a category.  Figure 5 is a chart that displays the emphasis that the COH gives to each of the 
forest management elements. 
  
Figure 5. Disparity in emphasis that COH gives to categories of forest management 
 Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 reveal that the areas of emphasis in the COH vis-à-vis forest 
management in Cameroon are exploitative use of the forest resources (37%) and the control of 
access and exploitation of forest by stakeholders (31%). Neoliberal economic policies 
conditionality from the World Bank stressed the use of forest management for economic 
enrichment. Political support dimension of ownership emphasized forest access control by the 
government of Cameroon. Maintenance focused on the wellbeing of the object of attention, 
19%
37%
31%
13%
Maintenance
Use
Control
Monitoring
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namely, the forest. Monitoring that deals with what the public deserves, namely, transparency 
and accountability on forest management, constitutes 13%.  
With 25% weighted average as the level of equal significance of the four categories, 
maintenance of the forest and monitoring have little significance compared to use and control in 
the direction of the COH to forest management in Cameroon. There is, therefore, a disparity in 
the impact of the COH on forest management in Cameroon with respect to the categories of 
maintenance or sustainability of forests, use or exploitation of forest resources for 
anthropocentric purposes, the control that the Cameroon government has over the access to 
forests and exploitation of forest resources, and monitoring forest related activities to ensure 
accountability and transparency that the public deserves vis-à-vis the forest as wealth of the 
Cameroon nation and global environmental welfare. Having considered the forest management 
categories comparatively, it is necessary to pay closer attention to each of them. 
COH and the Maintenance of Forests 
 As mentioned above, the maintenance of forest is the central concern of sustainable forest 
management. In the same year (1993) that the government of Cameroon and the World Bank 
were engaged in negotiations to formulate forest management laws and policies for the country, 
and when suggested policies and laws were interacting with each other, the Helsinki Ministerial 
Conference for the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE) was discussing the multifunctional 
sustainability of forests at local, national, and global levels. This conference defined sustainable 
forest management as “the stewardship and use of forest in a way, and at a rate, that maintains 
their biodiversity, productivity, regeneration capacity, vitality, and their potential to fulfill, now 
and in the future, relevant ecological, economic and social functions, at local, national, and 
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global levels, and that does not cause damage to other ecosystems.”1 The COH has affected 
sustainable forest management in Cameroon in the light of this definition. Key related elements 
in this definition are biodiversity and productivity, generational capacity and vitality, and the 
“now and in the future” or intergenerational element of forest management. The impact of the 
COH on the maintenance category of forest management shall be examined with respect to this 
grouping. Just as the definition suggest, this analysis shall insight from earth sciences, 
economics, and sociology. 
Biodiversity and Productivity 
 One of the great impacts of the COH on forest management in Cameroon is the zoning of 
the Cameroon forest estate. This zoning allocates forest spaces to specific uses. Logging 
companies explore forest management units, which they log for their economic gains. Councils 
can, and do, secure forest spaces for the use and enrichment of the councils. Local communities 
can, and also own forests for their religious, social, economic, and cultural welfare. Through this 
zoning, biodiversity is conserved in forest reserves, and stakeholders can access non-permanent 
forests such as FMUs, community forests, and council forests for their own benefits. Figure 6 
displays the current different zones of Cameroon’s forest estate. 
                                                          
1. Richard E. Saunier and Richard A. Meganck, “Sustainable Forest Management,” in Dictionary and 
Introduction to Global Environmental Governance, 2nd ed. (London: Earthscreen, 2007), 243. 
Liisa Saarenmaa criticizes the use of the word “maintains” in MCPFE’s definition of sustainable forest management. 
In her argument, “maintain” fails to capture the dynamic nature of ecosystems and of resource management that 
needs satisfy human needs in today’s world. She suggests that this dynamic management embodies the “(i) 
exploitation that leads to reduction in the renewable resource, (ii) sustainable management that aims at maintaining 
the renewable resource, (iii) progressive management that aims at increasing the renewable resource.” Liisa 
Saarenma, “Sustainable Forest Management: Research Priorities and Coordination in Finland,” in Sustainable 
Forest Management, ed. J. Bo Larsen (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 1996), 196. 
Saarenmaa’s argument, however, fails to consider that “to maintain” does not exclusively mean not to change. When 
technicians do maintenance work on a house, they do not seek to preserve the house in its original condition. Rather, 
they remove some components associated with the functioning and integrity of the house, preserve what still 
deserves to be preserved, and they add what will keep the house in the possible optimal condition. Analogically, 
maintenance as a function of sustainable forest management can embody simultaneously exploitation (removal) of 
renewable resources, preservation of forest resources, and additions (increase) to the renewable resource.  
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Figure 6. Map of the zones of Cameroon’s forest estate 
Source: Generated with Cameroon Forest GIS Data (World Resource Institute, 2013) 
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The 2012 GIS Data on Cameroon Forest makes a significant revelation: for almost a 
century (1905 to 1995), Cameroon had just fifteen protected forest spaces that encouraged 
biodiversity growth. Through conditionality measures that called for the creation of more 
reserved forests and Cameroon government’s ownership of the need to protect its national 
biodiversity, eighteen protected forest areas were created and classified by the government in just 
two decades. Figure 7 represents this progress in chart from. 
 
Figure 7. Forests created and classified as protected areas from 1905 to 2012 in Cameroon 
Source: Created with data from Attribute Table of “Aire Protégé” in Cameroon Forest GIS Data 
(World Resource Institute, 2012) 
 
 Amidst this positive milestone, the COH has also caused significant biodiversity crisis in 
the country. The high cost of producing forest management plans coupled with a 50% 
devaluation of the CFA in 1994 as a function of the COH have forced local communities that 
intended to own community forests to seek, through a system of trade by batter, the assistance of 
logging companies with necessary financial and technical capacities to design the plan. In this 
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system, logging companies produce forest management plans for local communities in exchange 
for logging rights within the forest spaces of the communities. Intersection of the 2013 World 
Resource Institute’s GIS data for Cameroon’s FMU and community forests reveals that logging 
companies exploit resources in 268,953.019km2 of community forests that has a total area of 
12,973,885.352km2. Let the area of intersection be ∑𝐴 𝑖𝑛𝑡, and let the total area of community 
forests be ∑𝐴 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑓𝑟𝑠𝑡. The percentage of community forests exploited by logging companies 
will be  
 
Charlie Pye-Smith envisions this phenomenon of logging companies exploiting resources 
within community forests as a serious threat to biodiversity conservation because community 
forests fall within the non-permanent forest zones that are not intended for biodiversity 
maintenance but for economic, social, and spiritual uses. On average, Cameroon loses 13.3% of 
its forest cover annually due to deforestation, in a country with an average of 2,400 species in a 
forest area of 2,700km2.2 Logging companies are deforesting 2.07% of community forests. This 
percentage value may seem insignificant. However, Nouhou Ndam et al. document that the 
forest in the Mount Cameroon area habits an average of 2,400 species in an area of 2,700km2.3 
This is a good representation of the biodiversity richness of forest in Cameroon – a richness that 
has caused the World Bank and the Cameroon government to engage in the creation of more 
protected forest areas in the country. If one extends the figures of Ndam et al to the national 
scene, one would find by simple proportion that an average of 239,069 species individuals are at 
risk in Cameroon forests because of logging by corporations. The situation is aggravated when 
                                                          
2. Charlie Pye-Smith, Cameroon’s Hidden Harvest (Bogor: CIFOR, 2010), 15. 
3. Nohou Ndam et al., “Plant Diversity Assessment on Mount Cameroon: Surveys from 1990 to 2000,” 
Systematics and Geography of Plants 71, no.2 (2001): 1017. Accessed January 30, 2014. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3668735  
∑𝐴 𝑖𝑛𝑡.
∑𝐴 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑓𝑟𝑠𝑡
 x 100 = 2.07% 
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one considers that this deforestation also goes in the FMU concessions of the giant logging 
companies directly procured from government. How right then must Philippe Auxel be to lament 
that in the country, “species composition [in the forests] has changed due to the over exploitation 
of high value timber species.”4  
The COH led to the legalization of non-permanent forest that can be exploited without 
concern for biodiversity conservation. The net effect of this laissez-faire regulation has been the 
increasing loss of Cameroon’s biodiversity under a myriad of factors sustained by the COH – 
factors that logging is only one of. Table 7 displays these factors. 
Table 7. Biodiversity Threat under Policies and Laws upheld by the Bank and the Cameroon 
Government under the COH 
 
Activities Provoking  
Habitat Change  
Nature of Change Loss of Biodiversity 
Forest Clearing for  
Agriculture 
Flora and fauna vegetation 
lost, introduction of new 
species, e.g. cocoa,  
rubber, oil palm, etc 
Loss of biodiversity in quality 
and quantity  
Many species under threat 
Logging Upset of ecological balance 
wildlife habitat removed  
Reduced flora composition  
Threat to wildlife population  
Uncontrolled Hunting  
Poaching 
Disturbance of wildlife 
management  
programme 
Reduction of wild life 
population, ecosystem  
modification  
Fuel wood Habitat destruction Destruction of vegetation, 
erosion 
 
Source: Adapted from Republic of Cameroon, Cameroon Fourth Annual National Report to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Table 9. Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Accessed March 1, 2014. https://www.cbd.int/doc/world/cm/cm-nr-04-en.pdf  
 
The reason for this biodiversity crisis is that in the COH with respect to forest 
management in Cameroon, the stakeholders seek to enforce biodiversity maintenance as an 
environmental virtue by legal means but fail to interconnect this maintenance with economic and 
                                                          
4. Philippe Auzel et al., “Social and Environmental Costs of Illegal Logging in a Forest Management Unit 
in Eastern Cameroon,” Journal of Sustainable Forestry 19, no.1/2/3 (2004): 157. 
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social insights. As Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edward, and Johanna Mang contend, 
neoliberal free trade introduced by conditionality measures into the COH encourages the 
exploitation of flora and fauna.5 For over four hundred years, neoclassical economic theorists 
upheld the domination of nature by human beings based on the ability of human beings to 
dominate and configure nature in a way that other animals and plans cannot do. The theories of 
hierarchies in ecology (for example, the superior complexity of tissues over cells, of populations 
over tissues, and of ecosystems over populations) corroborated the hierarchical structural system 
that neoclassical economists upheld. In this hierarchy, economic systems restrict and alter natural 
systems through based on a conception of time that does not follow the rules of nature. Tomde 
Schiichier iterates that in the neoclassical economics system time is a duration in which the 
“now” is most important. To natural systems, time is an unfolding of moments, and what is most 
important is that nature stabilizes itself in the unfolding process. Thus, “the economical system 
generates a malfunction and threatens the superior system with destruction and, by the same 
token, its own destruction.”6  The impact of privatization is an example of this malfunction.    
Although privatization has promoted the involvement of different stakeholders in forest 
management, and thereby attempted to end profligate activities such as high bribery and 
corruption within the high ranks of government, David Humphrey argues that “privatization 
reduces the access rights of local communities and caters to the demands of markets for 
immediate financial returns. Market mechanisms tend to generate only those forests goods with 
monetary value that can be traded for profit. They cannot capture the full public goods value of 
                                                          
5. Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edward, and Johanna Mang, The Root Causes of Biodiversity Loss 
(London: Earthscan, 2000), 149. 
6. Tommas Schlichter, “Relationships between Economics and Ecology,” in International Workshop on 
Economics and Ecology: Proceedings, held in  Caties, Turrialba, Costa Rica, 29-30 January, 1991 (Turriabba: 
OLAFO/CATIE, 1991), 5.  
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forests and thus promote a reductionist view of forests.”7 This reductionist view is also present in 
some local peoples’ approach to forest regeneration and vitality. 
Forest Regeneration and Vitality 
 The COH is an example of neoliberals’ betting on local communities to manage forest 
spaces sustainably because the communities do not have heavy machines used by corporations to 
log vast areas of forest. Through collective action, local communities could resist threats to 
unsustainability within their forest spaces. Furthermore, the Bank’s sustainability argument in 
the COH was that the fallow cropping system of agriculture practiced by local peoples will give 
room for forest to regenerate before they cultivate in the same spaces again. Through ownership, 
these arguments led to the legalization of community forests. 
 An unfortunate element of this reasoning is its failure to define “community” within the 
context of Cameroon. The 1994 forest law uses the word “village” as synonymous to 
community. However, while it is possible to have a community spirit or sense of social bonding 
to others in a village, it is not always the case that such a spirit will reign. When one speaks of 
his or her village in Cameroon, one is talking of where one hails from in the line of ancestral 
descent. Immigrants who live in some villages do not identify where they currently reside as 
their village. The cases of the “came-no-go” in the South West Region and of the Baka pygmies 
in the East Province are evidence of this assertion that belonging to a community in Cameroon is 
based on ancestral ties and not residence in a place with geographical boundaries. 
                                                          
7. David Humphrey, “Public Goods, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Deforestation,” 9 (Paper presented in 
Panel 2.3 on “The High Politics of the Environment” at the Annual Conference of the British International Studies 
Association, University of Cork, December 18-20, 2006). Accessed February 26, 2014. 
http://www.ibcperu.org/doc/isis/7575.pdf   
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 The political sociologists and anthropologists, Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh, 
note that descendants of persons from the French and Northwest Grassfield lands of Cameroon 
who were sent by their chiefs to labor in the plantations in the Bakweri villages at the South 
West Atlantic Coast of Cameroon are constantly referred to by the villages as “came-no-go” – a 
derogatory expression for immigrants to the Bakweri geographical village; an expression that 
refers to one without a home because one came from some other place into a new land, but one 
has not returned to one’s place of origin. This opposition between the descendants of settlers who 
are viewed by the “sons of the soil” (autochthones) as allogénes or strangers, feel rejected in the 
Bakweri lands. Thus, they do not work together with the Bakweri towards forest regeneration. 
Rather, with the leverage that their economic viability provides them, they buy lands in the South 
West Region, cut down the forest, and build houses. Such cut forest cannot regenerate.8 
 Geschiere sees the fate of the Baka pygmies as similar to the “came-no-gos.” Under the 
wave of political liberalization, the Baka who speak of themselves as people of the forest risk 
losing their citizen rights. To the CPDM government, one is valued in these days on multiparty 
politics in terms of what one can contribute to the victory of the CPDM in elections. To vote, one 
needs a national identification document. Vote power is the currency to buy government officials 
with vested interest in the forest and stop them from interfering in the forest spaces of local 
peoples. Without identification documents, the Baka pygmies lack this currency. Thus, their 
forests have been invaded by logging companies in which government officials own shares.9  
                                                          
8. Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh, “Capitalism and Autochthony: The Seesaw of Mobility and 
Belonging,” in Millenial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism, ed. Jean Camaroff and John L. Camaroff 
(Raleigh: Duke University Press, 2001), 182. 
9. Peter Geschiere, The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 67-78 and 124-127. 
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According to Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, the effect of this invasion has been displacement 
of the pygmies, many of who now crowd the hunting, cultivating, and living spaces of the Bantus 
in the East Region. With the contestation of social and food security spaces between the pygmies 
and the Bantus, some pygmies move into living in other forest spaces. The consequence of this 
political liberalization, social contest, and resettlement is that logging companies that have 
chased the Baka pygmies out of the forest are deforesting areas once occupied by the pygmies, 
and the pygmies and destroying forest in new areas where they settle.10 Figure 8 shows the 
location of one such forest, namely CADENVI Ngoyla community forest (latitude 2.62278 and 
longitude 14.02666). 
 
Figure 8. CADENVI Ngoyla as one of five community forests (marked cyan) in Ngoyla Area 
Source: Created Using GIS Cameroon Forest Data (World Resource Institute, 2013. 
 
Figure 9 is a pixel view of the same forest location in 2000. It is a magnified view 
(1:523,978) of the vegetation map of Africa, which was published by the same Institute in 2004.  
                                                          
10. Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, “Capitalism and Autochthony,” 183-185. 
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Figure 9. Pixel view of the mosaic forest and cropland of CADENVI Ngoya Forest in 2000. 
Source: Created using Africa Vegetation GIS Data of 2000 (World Resource Institute, 2004). 
 
Figure 10 is a pixel view of the vegetation of the same forest space in 2013. 
 
Figure 10. Pixel view of CADENVI Ngoya community forest area as rural complex in 2013. 
Source: Created using GIS Cameroon Forest Data (World Resource Institute, 2013) 
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The GIS data in Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5, and Figure 5.6 reveal the danger that the 
sociopolitical and anthropological phenomenon described by Geschiere and Nyamnjoh presents 
to forest regeneration and viability in Ngoyla community forest area. Comparing Figures 5.5 and 
5.6, one sees that in 2000, the forest allocated to the community was mosaic/cropland forest. In 
2013, this deforestation has occurred, and the forest has been transformed from forest land into 
rural complexes. This transformation implies a loss of biodiversity that inhabited the forest space 
in 2000. 
 One theory proposed by Phil Rene Oyono that accounts for the cause of this deforestation 
is the survival instinct under poverty theory, which says that local peoples easily, and intensively 
recourse to forest resources as a means of survival in a time of serious poverty as the sort that the 
devaluation of the CFA under World Bank and IMF conditionality measures caused in 
Cameroon. Devaluation brought about a fall in the purchasing power of consumers. For example, 
among the Bantu, the average annual income per family dropped from USD 83.5 to 20, and 
among the Baka pygmies from USD 25 to USD 6.5. Unfortunately, the SAP economic 
conditionality package of the Bank also caused increases in the prices of commodities in 
Cameroon. To survive, many families turned to the forest for food. Forests were cleared for 
planting of food crops and animals were hunted for food, thus depleting the forest biodiversity.11 
Sustainable natural resource management is an interdisciplinary phenomenon. If local 
peoples’ economic welfare is neglected, they will turn to the environment for their means of 
survival. Oyono’s theory suggests that it is simply in the nature of poor humankind to act in this 
                                                          
11.Phil Rene Oyono, “Cameroon Rainforest: Economic Crisis, Rural Poverty,Biodiversity: Local 
Communities in the Lomie Region,” Ambio 27, no.7 (November 1998): 558. Accessed March 8, 2014. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4314790  
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way for the purpose of self-preservation in existence. Economic welfare and environmental 
wellbeing cannot be alienated across the human life span. 
“Now and in the Future”: Intergenerational Considerations of Forest Maintenance 
Although decree no.0518/MINEF/CAB implementing the 1994 forest law as a product of 
the COH prioritizes community forests, this high cost of producing a forest management plan 
causes many communities to forfeit their rights to own forest lands. A GIS analysis of 
Cameroon’s forest data in 2013 shows that only 151 local communities out of the 375 that have 
submitted applications for community forests ownership (40.26%) have been able to produce the 
plan.12 Communities without forest management plans are at the risk of forfeiting ownership 
rights to their forest lands. These are lands that the communities had possessed in the traditional 
and historical contexts in which land in Africa was perceived a property of the commons. Fondo 
Sikod iterates that this cultural perception “ensured the conservation of certain plant and animal 
species through the system of taboos.”13 Furthermore, forest land under this perception was not 
viewed in the capitalist sense of commodities to be sold and bought, but in the anthropological 
sense of intergenerational assert. 
                                                          
12. For this GIS analysis, I used the GIS forest data for Cameroon published by the World Resource 
Institute in 2013. The shapefile used was CMR_Fcom_2013 that contains data on community forest in Cameroon. In 
this analysis, I inserted a data frame in ArcMap, and labelled it Com_FMP (for Community Forest Management 
Plan). I then opened the attribute table of CMR_Fcom_2013. The field named “DATE_PSG” has the dates the forest 
management plan associated with a particular community forest was approved. After clicking on “Select by 
Attributes” and ensuring the method is to create a new selection, I double clicked “DATE_PSG”. I then clicked >, 
then clicked Get Unique Values, followed by a double click of  ' '. Therefore, the expression box read: 
"DATE_PSG" > ' ' I ended the query operation by clicking Apply.  Looking under the field labeled 
“ATTRIBUTAI,” I noticed, for example, that the management plans of the forest attributed to Cobadem have not 
been approved, while that of Tinto has been approved. I then calculated the selected data in cyan (151) as a 
percentage of the total number of community forests (375) visible at the bottom of the attribute table with selected 
data.  
13. Fondo Sikod, “Poverty and Environmental Degradation in Cameroon,” 1. Accessed March 1, 2014. 
EOLSS. http://www.eolss.net/sample-chapters/c11/e1-15-03-03.pdf   
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As Ambe J. Njoh explains, this sense means that distant past generations in Cameroon 
considered themselves custodians of lands for future generations. Ownership of forest lands was 
preserved within family and village circles. 14 Mike A. Yanou and Patience Sone iterate that 
proprietorship of forest lands was not lost because lands were not valued in economic terms and 
sold to raise money for family and village needs.15 Rather, as Yanou and Sone add, forest lands 
were involuntarily surrendered as spoils in cases of war.16 Temngah Joseph Nyambo notes that 
forest lands were also possessed by inheritance along with family lands, thereby ensuring that 
families always owned their lands.17  According to Emmanuel Neba Ndenacho, these family and 
community owned forest lands were preserved, voluntarily offered by owners to migrants for 
house construction and small scale agricultural purpose, and forest resource exploitation was 
moderate for religious rites, medicinal objectives, and basic family agricultural subsistence 
purposes.18  
The COH has changed this ancestral perception of the integration of anthropocentric 
necessities and the stewardship of the environment for the needs of future generations. Phil Rene 
Oyono, Charlotte Kouna, and William Mala carried out an ecological anthropology study in the 
local communities of Akok, Kaya, and Koli-Ngoumou in Cameroon to access how the present 
generation in the COH era of forest management in the country perceives nowadays’ access to 
                                                          
14. Ambe J. Njoh, “Indigenous Peoples and Ancestral Lands: Implications of the Bakweri Case in 
Cameroon,” in Essays in African Land Law, ed. Robert K. Home (Cape Town: Pretoria University Law Press, 
2011), 71. 
15. Mike A. Yanou and Patience Sone, “Women and Land Registration in Anglophone Cameroon: Lessons 
from South Africa,” in Issues in Women’s Land Rights in Cameroon, ed. Lotsmart N. Fonjong (Bamenda, Langaa 
RPCIG, 2012), 99. 
16. Ibid., 88. 
17. Temngah Joseph Nyambo, “Female Inheritance between Customary Law and Modern Jurisprudence in 
Cameroon,” in Gender Relations in Cameroon: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Emmanuel Yenshu Vubo 
(Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG, 2012), 104. 
18. Emmanuel Neba Ndenecho, Decentralization and Spatial Development Planning in Cameroon 
(Bamenda, Langaa RPCIG, 2011), 119-121. 
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forest resource benefits in the country in an intergenerational timeline. Their findings are 
represented in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11. Disparities in Intergenerational Access to Forest Resources as Perceived by the Akok, 
Kaya, and Koli-Ngoumou Local Communities in Cameroon. 
Source: Stakeholders’ perception of intergenerational access to forest resources data used in 
constructing this chart was obtained from Phil Rene Oyono, Charlotte Kouana, and William 
Mala, “Benefits of Forests in Cameroon: Global Structure, Issues Involving Access and 
Decision-Making Hiccoughs,” Forest Policy and Economics 7 (2005): 360. 
  
 Figure 10 shows that although local communities risk dispossessing their ancestral forest 
lands under the current forest management system constructed by the COH (as in the case of the 
World Bank’s project in Ngoyla Mintom19), present generations over exploit forest resources 
                                                          
19. The World Bank project in Ngoyla Mintom involved the erection of a new protected area and logging 
and mining concessions, which overlapped with resource areas customarily used by indigenous and local 
communities. The project included plans for land use and land tenure studies. However, there were no measures 
explicitly stated to foster the inclusion of indigenous peoples and local communities in the project design and 
implementation process that would have ensured that the local communities continuously possessed their lands. The 
Bank operationalized as “sensitization” workshops its own OP4.10 that calls for “Free Prior and Informed 
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compared to past generations, and this exploitation will limit the access that future generations 
will have to forest resources.  
COH and the Use of Forest Resources 
 The COH associated reforms introduced auction -  a competitive bidding system – as the 
method of awarding a 15-year renewable harvesting right to the forest, with the claim that this 
long duration (compared to the previous five year system) will allow concessionaires to reinvest 
their capital in the forest, instead of engaging in quick cut-and-run that clears the forest. The 
winner of the bid has to show proof of adequate technical expertise and investment capacity, and 
comply with the technical, social and environmental obligations spelt out in the management 
plan. Topa et al. note that Cameroon became the first country in the world to adopt this method 
of opening the door for interested parties to use the forest, and it has had significant impact: “less 
than 10 years after this system was implemented in Cameroon, harvesting rights went from being 
administratively distributed, short-term concessions, free from any forest management 
obligations, to being long-term, competitively awarded concessions, accompanied by forest 
management obligations spanning the duration of the contract.”20 The auctioning system has 
opened the doors for the government to generate more revenue from the forest. The 
administratively set base in the form of forest annual tax in 1990 was $0.60 per hectare. Under 
the market mechanism, the area tax to an average of $5.60 per hectare for FMUs and to $13.70 
per hectare for ventes de coupe in 2005.21  
                                                          
Consultation” of local peoples before the start of any Bank projects.  World Bank, “PPG CBSP: Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of the Ngoyla Mintom Forest,” (June 20, 2010): 5. Failure to include the indigenes in the project 
design and implementation sidelines and denies local peoples of their customary rights to their forest lands. 
20. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 39. 
21. Ibid. 
 141 
 
 Economically advantageous as this free market system is, Topa et al. observe that the 
efficiency of this neoliberal forest procurement model depends both on confidentiality and 
competition.22 Confidentiality means that information provided by the bidders on their identity 
and capacity has to be treated as secret by the awarding body in order to protect them from unfair 
competition from other bidders. This is an ethical stand that raises two issues. First, 
confidentiality hides information from the public on who intends to exploit the wealth of the 
nation; second, it contradicts the necessity of free access to information by which competition in 
the market is enhanced. 
From the discussion on transparency in chapter one, this unavailability of information is a 
non-transparent measure that may present unpleasant surprises to the public. Such is the case of 
the American palm oil company, Herakles Farm. The people of Nguti were surprised to find that 
their source of livelihood, namely, the forest, had been procured by this company following a 
confidential auction deal with the government, without any prior notification of the local peoples 
who were henceforth excluded from accessing the forest that they had relied on for many years 
for their food and energy supplies and spiritual needs. Greenpeace vividly documents this 
unpleasant phenomenon:  
The area [acquired through confidential auction] includes 62,433 hectares (154,209 acres) 
of dense natural forest as well as farmland and agroforestry smallholdings. . . . A 
Greenpeace team documented that the setting up of one of the project’s nurseries at Fabe 
deprived people of access to a valuable collecting area for forest products, and that cocoa 
farms have been taken without farmers’ consent. Locals were not properly consulted 
before the establishment convention was signed. The convention gives Herakles Farms 
the exclusive right to farm in the area and includes no provisions for compensation of 
residents. The company claims “a huge outpouring of support from communities”, and 
says its project will not displace people, yet simultaneously communities have 
consistently objected to the plans by complaining to the government, signing petitions 
and organizing peaceful demonstrations. 
 In 2010, Herakles began illegally clearing forest to establish oil palm nurseries, in 
the absence of a presidential decree authorizing the concession, which is required by law. 
                                                          
22. Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, 40. 
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Herakles has also violated a court decision, made in the town of Mundemba, to suspend 
all activity of its plantation following a complaint filed by local people. Furthermore, the 
company was found guilty of illegal logging; forestry officials issued a report detailing 
these activities in April 2012.23 
 
 Although the actions of Herakles Farms constitute a take-over of lands on which men 
farm their cocoa, women are the most affected in this land grab confidential auction system.  
Women gather forest products such as bush mango (Irvingia gabonensis), monkey cola (Cola 
lepidota), and bush pepper (Piper guineensis) with which they provide food to families. They 
also sell these products locally and in the Nigerian international market to improve their 
economic status. Greenpeace documents that these “forest products provide around 30% of 
women’s cash income in the region.”24 Robert Dibie highlights the contention of Marxist 
feminist theory that gender inequality has its roots in class inequalities created by the capitalist 
political economy.25  In line with this theory, one notes that the procurement of the Nguti forest 
by Herakles Farms, and the fact that local women cannot access this forest as they did in the past, 
therefore, constitute acts of the disempowerment and control of women with respect to forest 
management. This ceasing of women’s spaces in forest management and the associated 
economic impoverishment limits their space of control in the local decision-making process 
because they lack the financial strength to bargain their influence in the Cameroon society: 
“where women have economic power,” writes Akwalefo Bernadette Djeudo, “they are able to 
control their lives better than elsewhere.”26  
                                                          
23. Greenpeace, Herakles Farms in Cameroon: A Showcase of Bad Palm Oil Production (Washington, DC: 
Greenpeace USA, 2013), 4 and 6. Greenpeace. Accessed March 8, 2014. 
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/planet3/PDFs/Forests/HeraklesCrimeFile.pdf  
24.Ibid., 8 
25. Robert Dibie, “Globalization and Women’s Empowerment in Africa,” in Globalization and the Third 
World Women: Exploiting, Coping and Resistance, ed. Ligaya Lindio-McGovern and Isidor Wallimann (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2009), 162.  
26. Akwalefo Bernadette Djeudo, Concepts that Shape Politics and Government in Cameroon: A 
Handbook of Political Theories for Stakeholders (Bloomington, IN: Author House, 2013), 70.  
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 At the heart of this disempowerment of women is a problem in the 1994 forest law that 
rarifies the COH. It is a problem that can be articulated in two ways. First, the law assumes that 
there is equal rights in local communities with respect to resource management. Consequently, 
and second, the law is silent on gender inequality with respect to natural resource management in 
the country.27 Driss Ezzine de Blas, Manuel Ruiz-Pérez, and Cédric Vermeulen capture the first 
perspective in these words: “Finally, the 1994 Forestry Law interprets ‘community’ as a 
homogeneous group of forest users relating to power and land tenure, bypassing the reality of 
local forest tenure, which is mainly composed of adjacent spaces owned by different families 
with unequal historical rights.”28 Historically, unequal rights with respect to forest tenure and 
forest resource use are most visible in the inequality that exists between women and men vis-à-
vis forest resource management in Cameroon. It is because of such inequality that, as Joyce 
Endeley found in her research on women empowerment in the country, Bafaw women, led by the 
women’s traditional council (Wupunda), have demanded that the Bafaw traditional council 
should give and recognize the right of Bafaw women to possess, control, and dispose of all lands 
– forest and otherwise – just as men do.29 Frank F. K. Byamughisha iterates that “legal 
recognition of women’s land rights is the first step toward reversing the discrimination against 
women.”30 Thus, a legal framework of forest management that fails to recognize and highlight 
                                                          
27. Patience U. Ajonina et al. claim that “gender-sensitive policies” were a “concern in the reformed 1994 
forest, wildlife and fisheries legislation.” See Patience U. Ujonina et al., “Gender Roles and Economics of 
Exploitation, Processing and Marketing of Bivalves and Impacts on Forest Resources in the Senaga Delta Region of 
Douala-Edea Wildlife Reserve, Cameroon,” International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology 
12 (2005): 170. However, there is no mention of gender issues anywhere in the 1994 Forest Law. It seems, 
therefore, that if the claim of Ajonina et al. is true, then the sensitivity resulted in a deliberate avoidance of any 
statement that has gender connotations in the law.  
28. Driss Ezzine de Blas, Manuel Ruiz-Pérez, and Cédric Vermeulen, “Managing Conflicts in Cameroonian 
Community Forest,” Ecology and Society 16, no.1 (2011): 8. Accessed April 3, 2014. 
file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/ES-2010-3845.pdf  
29. Joyce Endeley, “Conceptualizing Women’s Empowerment in Societies in Cameroon: How Does 
Money Fit In?” Gender and Development 9, no. 1 (March 2001): 37. 
30. Frank F. K. Byamugisha, Securing Africa’s Land for Shared Prosperity (Washington, DC: Agence 
Françias de Développement and World Bank, 2013), 15. 
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the role of women in forest management, in a society in which there is gender inequality, is 
based on a COH dimension of selective inclusion of stakeholders that fails to include clearly 
women in the management of forest resources. 
 It is worth noting that the relationship between forest and women is not only one way; 
that is, just as women (and the families to which they provide food) benefit economically and 
nutritionally from the forest, the forest also benefits from the approaches that women adopt in the 
use of forest land and resources. In the division of labor that characterizes traditional societies in 
Cameroon and many other African countries, men cut-clear permanently forest spaces to grow 
cash crops such as coffee and cocoa for the economic wellbeing of families. Women, however, 
engage in a form of agro-forestry that preserves many trees on plots to serve the clamber growth 
needs of climbing crops such yams (Dioscorea species of the family Dioscoreaceae). 
Furthermore, as Peter K. Karani observes using the traditional Ugandan society as an example of 
forest management practices in traditional Africa, “cultivation of food crops . . . did not involve 
the destruction of all trees on the plot . . . because they were too large to fell.”31 Nowadays, 
neoliberalism gives room for logging companies such as Herakles Farm to dominate forest lands 
by using technologically sophisticated machines to destroy more trees than women do in 
traditional farming methods. If these are the sort of equipment that the Bank argued would lead 
to sustainable forest management, then ironically for the good of the forest, women, as Esther 
Mwangi, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and Yan Sun found in their study of forest management in Latin 
America and Africa, do not have access to these machines.32 
                                                          
31. Peter K. Karani, Sustainable Management of Tropical Forest in Uganda (London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1994), 4. 
32. Esther Mwangi, Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Yan Sun, “Gender and Sustainable Forest Management in East 
Africa and Latin America,” Ecology and Society 16, no.1 (2011): 17. Accessed April 5, 2014.  
file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/ES-2010-3873.pdf  
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Three other characteristics of women’s agro-forestry are crop rotation, mixed cropping, 
and fallow farming. Cameroonian women do not exploit forest in large scale as logging 
companies do. Women are interested in cultivating forest lands for food production and low 
scale production of crops that they often sell in the local markets for their economic welfare. 
Therefore, they have to equilibrate farming for economic enrichment and ensuring that forest 
lands remain fertile for food crops cultivation. Based on indigenous knowledge, women adopt 
mixed cropping and crop rotation to attain this balance. Jane I Guyer observes that in mixed 
cropping Cameroonian women, for example, plant leguminous plants such as groundnuts and 
maize in the same forest space. Nitrogen fixing bacteria such as Rhizobium leguminosarum 
attach to the roots of leguminous plants. By fixing nitrogen in the soil, they improve soil fertility, 
thereby improving crop yield and fostering the growth of forest plants in fallow times when 
women leave the forest to regenerate.33   
Concerning crop rotation, women plant crops such as maize on a forest plot in one 
season, then plant beans on the same plot in the next farming season. The FAO acknowledges 
that “crop rotation is a key principle of conservation agriculture because it improves the soil 
structure and fertility, and because it helps control weeds, pests and diseases.”34 These are 
sustainable forest management approaches that women use in their exploitation of forest lands. 
The COH, by minimizing the role of women as stakeholders in forest management and 
upholding logging by giant corporations, and by denying women access to forest lands that they 
have cultivated sustainably for many decades, as in the above mentioned case of Herakles Farm, 
ends up withholding from the forest these elements of soil fertility and resource regeneration. 
                                                          
33. Jane I Guyer, Family and Farm in Southern Cameroon (Boston: African Studies Center, 1984), 86. 
34. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), “Crops and Cropping Systems,” 104. Accessed April 4, 
2014. http://www.fao.org/ag/ca/AfricaTrainingManualCD/PDF%20Files/06CROP1.PDF  
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With respect to competition, the politics of “to the victor belongs the spoil” suggests that 
competitive approaches to acquiring natural resources have the risk of turning those resources 
into objects that are dominated by the victor, and “spoiled” in this phenomenon of dominion. The 
victor turns to value the resources only as objects to be exploited and used for the victor’s own 
gains. Focusing on the case of logging, one finds that the volume of timber species harvested in 
Cameroon has significantly increased since the 1994 forest law was enacted by the Cameroon 
government after negotiations with the World Bank and the hybridization of forest management 
policies and regulations from both parties. This volume of timber harvest in Cameroon’s forest is 
represented in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12. Timber volume harvested in Cameroon forest from 1987 to 2010 
Source: Data for 1987 to 1996 came from Richard Eba’a Atyi’s “Cameroon’s Logging Industry: 
Structure, Economic Importance and Effects of Devaluation,” Center for International Forestry 
Research Occasional Paper No. 14 (August 1998): Figure 6. Data for 1997 to 2002 came from 
Foahom, “Biodiversity Planning Support Programme,” 16-17. Data for 2002 to 2010 came from 
the earlier cited Republic of Cameroon, “Cameroon Fourth National Report to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity,” Appendix III. 
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The graph shows that timber harvest quickly rose after the enactment of the 1994 forest 
law; thus, expressing a negative effect of the COH in terms of biodiversity conservation, and a 
positive impact of the COH with respect to the exploitation of the forest for economic gains. The 
fall in timber exploitation after the year 2000 is thanks to Cameroon government “owning” the 
forest reforms by imposing a log export ban, although the World Bank’s conditionality measures 
opposed this action of the government. Due to this opposition, the government did not totally 
stop the ban, rather it modified the ban rules in 2003 by restricting the exportation of only some 
species of timber. This, again, caused more timber exploitation. This increase in timber 
exploitation at the availability of the least regulatory opportunity can be explained in terms of 
firm theory. To lay a foundation to provide a firm-theory based explanation for the increase in 
timber harvesting, it is necessary do carry out a cost-benefit analysis so as to determine the 
financial gains that logging companies ideally make.  
If one assumes constant cost and benefits for a three years period of forest resource 
exploitation within a concession, then one can carry out a cost-benefit analysis to determine 
when logging companies break-even, and what cumulated discount cash flow they have at the 
time that they break even.  Using data from multiple sources,35 one finds that logging companies 
that exploit concessions hypothetically break-even within the first year of procuring a concession 
                                                          
35. The cost of legality compliance, cost of forest certification, baseline timber harvesting annual operation 
costs (based on one annual coupe), and cost estimates for meeting legality and/or sustainability for timber producers 
values came from Table 10.2, Table 10.3, Table 5.1, and Table 10.4 respectively in Atyi’s “Study on Development 
and Progress in Timber Procurement Policies. Country Case Study: Cameroon.” I calculated the value of timber 
export products to European markets using 2007 average. In the above mentioned article, precisely in Table 6.5, 
Atyi provides the US dollar value of all concession products sold in the European market in 2007. Paolo Omar 
Cerutti, Robert Nasi and Luca Tacconi on page 36 of their article titled, “Sustainable Forest Management in 
Cameroon Needs more than Approved Forest Management Plans,” Ecology and Society 13, no.2, state that there 
were 101 concessions in Cameroon in 2007. I divided the total number of each product as Atyi provides by 101 to 
determine the average number of each product from a concession. Considering that Atyi also provides the market 
value of the total of each product, I then used simple proportion mathematics to determine the market value of each 
product from a concession. Finally, I summed up the European market value of each product from a concession.     
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in Cameroon. Table 8 displays the ideal cumulative cash flows of these companies within three 
years of timber harvesting.  
Table 8. Cost-Benefit Analysis/ Capital Budgeting in US $ for Logging within Concessions in 
Cameroon 
 Discount Rate  =   0  
 Year 0 1 2 3 
Cash Flows     
 
Cost of Legality 
Compliance ($308,418.330)    
 Cost of Forest Certification ($98,481.570)    
 
Baseline timber harvesting 
annual operation costs 
(based on one annual coupe)   
($489,184.000) ($489,184.000) ($489,184.000) 
 
Value of Timber Export 
Products to European 
markets using 2007 average  
$3,520,905.040  $3,520,905.040  $3,520,905.040  
 
 
Cost Estimates for Meeting 
Legality and/or 
sustainability for Timber 
Producers   
($41,911.030) ($41,911.030) ($41,911.030) 
          
 Total Cash Flow ($406,899.900) $2,989,810.010  $2,989,810.010  $2,989,810.010  
 Cumulative Cash Flow ($406,899.900) $2,582,910.110  $5,572,720.120  $8,562,530.130  
 
The economic theory of the growth of the firm as elaborated upon by Edith Tilton 
Penrose asserts that this quick break-even is an incentive for companies to aim at profit 
maximization by taking advantage of every opportunity to expand production for the growth of 
the firm.36 Robinson Djeukam iterates that with this sort of incentive, companies increase log 
harvesting in order to generate more revenue from sales of logs from their concessions.  
Logging companies consider the forest only in its economic dimension and their single 
objective is to maximize financial benefit. Their “grab-it-and-run” logic – a good 
example of what early 20th-century European geographers called Raubwirtschaft – 
consists in extracting the maximum of rich timber species in very little time, without 
                                                          
36. Edith Tilton Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
29.  
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concern for sustainability. These practices are based on high discount rates, indicating an 
undervaluation of the future. Companies want to get profits to pay back debt to banks 
(that charge interest rates), to pay dividends to shareholders, and to make further 
investments. Profits are obtained by discounting future sustainability. Accordingly, 
companies perceive sustainable management as a constraint to overcome.37  
 
 Selective logging, which is the approach towards sustainability fostered by stakeholders 
through the COH, may be less hazardous to canopies than clearing. However, Djeukam argues 
that this approach encourages companies to search for the best trees by constructing roads deep 
into the forest, thereby failing to appreciate the socio-ecological complexity associated with 
forest management in the hands of corporations. Selective logging has had the effect of 
destroying peasant fields, opening up the forest to human settlements and farming, and to 
commercial hunting. The effect of these practices on forest management in Cameroon has been 
unaccountability in the forest sector. Human settlements within forest spaces inevitably render 
forest resources such as Loxodonta africana cyclotis and Gorilla gorilla accessible to people 
who are hardly accountable to the government on how they extract resources from the forest for 
their social, religious, economic, and medicinal interests.38 Djeukam also argues: 
Although promoters of timber exploitation argue that selective logging on large 
concessions is required in order to reach sustainable management, none of this, in actual 
practice, is proven to be true . . . . Present logging methods [promoted by the COH that 
encourages logging with heavy and more effective machinery] are very destructive since 
the extraction of each cubic meter of wood implies the destruction of larger volumes, 
resulting in a significant change of the initial ecosystem diversity. Harvested volumes can 
be as low as 5–6 m3/ha out of a potential volume of 35 m3/ha. This is because only a few 
high value timber species (8% of known species) are extracted from the forest for 
commercial purposes . . . . 
In addition, it is important to note that there is much waste of the valuable wood – 
up to 25% of raw logs – at the logging sites in the forest as well as at the sawmill . . . .39   
 
                                                          
37. Robinson Djeukam, “Forestry and Communities in Cameroon,” 10. Accessed March 04, 2014. Friends 
of the Earth International. http://www.ceecec.net/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/Forestry_in_Cameroon_19-05.pdf   
38. Ibid., 10. 
39. Ibid. 
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These socioeconomic phenomena and forest resource wastage factors are not considered 
by the Bank and the Cameroon government in the formulation of sustainable forest management 
legal framework. Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edward, and Johanna Mang emphasize that these 
factors contradict the assertion that the legal enforcement of biodiversity maintenance measures is 
sufficient to the control of standing volumes that can be logged annually.40 Therefore, the 
suggestion that allowing logging companies to continue extraction within a concession for longer 
periods of time is a sustainable forest management approach that incentivizes companies to stop 
cut-and-run forest resource exploitation is a faulty argument. Private ownership, Lawrence C. 
Christy et al. argue, does not always give the incentive to care for forest land considering that 
individuals and business entities give less value to long-term benefits because of the time-value 
of money.41  
One can also ask to extent to which the use of forest resources is providing economic 
benefits to local communities. Apart from the state that does not need to produce a plan on how 
it will manage its own protected forest lands before the government itself can approve the 
reservation, all other potential forest land owners must submit a forest management plan to the 
government within the first three years transition period of concession allocation. Within this 
period, the manager is allowed to exploit a thirtieth of the concession each year. This need of a 
management plan does not envision any difference between the capacities of local communities, 
councils, logging companies, and private individuals to produce the required plans.  
 In a study on development and progress in the timber procurement policies of Cameroon, 
Richard Eba’a Atyi found that for an average concession size of 58,971 ha that would 
                                                          
40. Alexander Wood, Pamela Stedman-Edward and Johanna Mang, The Root Causes of Biodiversity Loss 
(London: Earthscan, 2000), 149. 
41. Lawrence C. Christy, Forest Law and Sustainable Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 
66. 
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theoretically involve a harvest on 1,966 ha per year to produce approximately 13,762m3 of 
commercial logs annually, the company managing the forest has to invest an average of 
147.4million CFA (294,158 US$) to produce a management plan. It cost an additional 3.9 
million CFA (7,666 US $) annually to obtain and manage a legality certificate.42 C. Julve et al. in 
a study of community forests in the country found that the development of a simple forest 
management plan costs 8,195,000 CFA (16,390 US$) and the operational cost will be 89,640 /m³ 
(179.3 US$/m3).43 One cannot expect that villagers in a country with a United Nation’s Human 
Development Index value of 0.495 and a multidimensional poverty index of 0.287%44 will easily 
raise at least 8 million CFA to produce a forest management plan. Comparatively, logging 
companies that have sufficient capital can bear the cost of producing a forest management plan, 
and thereby fully possessing forest spaces more easily than local communities or villages. 
COH and Forest Management Control 
 Forest Management control in the light of the COH in Cameroon can be analyzed from 
multiple perspectives. Here, one shall consider the zoning of forest in Cameroon as a way to 
create small forest units that can be controlled, and decentralization in forest management. The 
case of the coopting council forests into the national political alliance of the ruling CPDM is 
peculiar in the realities of the zoning of forest in the country.  
                                                          
42. Richard Eba’a Atyi, “Study on Development and Progress in Timber Procurement Policies. Case Study: 
Cameroon,” (8 August, 2009): 7 and 8. Accessed February 1, 2014. International Tropical Timber Organization. 
file:///C:/Users/admin/Downloads/Cameroon_[en].pdf  
43. C. Julve et al., “Séduisante, Théorie, Douloureuse Pratique: La Foresterie Communautaire 
Camerounaise en Butte à sa Propre Législation,” Parcs et Réserves 62, no.2 (2007): 21-22.  
44. United Nations Development Program, “Human Development Reports, Cameroon.” Accessed March 
15, 2014. United Nations. http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/CMR  
The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) examines the nature and intensity of poverty at the individual level, with 
poor people being those who are multiply deprived and the extent of their poverty being measured by the extent of 
their deprivations. The MPI creates a vivid picture of people living in poverty within and across countries, regions 
and the world. The MPI is calculated by multiplying the incidence of poverty (percentage of people who are poor) 
and the average intensity of MPI poverty across the poor (%). 
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Coopting Council Forests  
According to the 1994 forest law and the implementation degree of 1995 that translates 
the COH into a legal framework, 50% of forest lands in the country have to be national forests, 
40% have to be council forests, and 10% have to be community forests. A GIS based calculation 
(from attribute table) shows that the total area covered by national forest in 2013 was 
71,151,751.017km2; the total area of council forest was 9,340,062.938km2; and the total area of   
community forests was 12,973,885.352km2. Table 9 displays these areas in terms of percentages. 
Table 9. A Comparison of the legal and actual percentages of the Cameroon’s National, Council, 
and Community forest zones in 2013. 
 
Forest Zone 1994 Forest Law (% Area) Actual (% 
Area) 
National 50% 76.13% 
Council 40% 9.99% 
Community 10% 13.88% 
Source: The data herein were calculated using Cameroon’s GIS forest sector data published by 
the World Resource Institute in 2013. 
 
These data suggest that Cameroon prioritizes national forests over council forests. This is 
not unexpected, considering the political relationship between councils and the state or national 
government. In Cameroon, councils and national governments are headed executively by 
political parties, and the ruling CPDM party governs most councils. Jean-Paul Kouega suggests 
that under party allegiance, municipal councilors often forsake their rights of independent 
administration of council affairs to party hierarchy elites within the national executive.45 This 
                                                          
45. Jean-Paul Kouega, A Dictionary of Cameroon English Usage (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2007), 23. 
 153 
 
allegiance can be explained in terms of the elite theory of political science and the matching 
hypothesis proposed by social psychologists. 
According to the elite theory that Gaetano Mosca posits, political classes or elites have “a 
certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority” over those they govern.46 Bringing 
together insights from psychology and sociology, Vilfredo Pareto observes that elites are adept at 
using such superiority in two modes of political rule, namely, force and persuasion.47 Juan Linz 
points out Robert Michels’s contention that as elites use these modes to gain control of funds, 
promotion, and the flow of information, they concentrate organizational functioning power in 
their hands.48 When this occurs, lower institutions of power within managerial structures become 
stooges who lose their power and rights to independent management of collective resources such 
as council forest lands. This elite theory can be corroborated by the matching hypothesis of 
social psychology. Spencer A. Rathus expressed this hypothesis in the proverb, birds of one 
feather flock together.49 As “birds” do so “flock,” it is easy for the municipal councils under the 
ruling CPDM to ally with the national CPDM party and interests of high party officials within 
the state executive branch. This alliance puts potential council forests at the risk of being taken 
over easily by national interest without contest from the CPDM councilors. This deprives the 
councils of large scale ownership of forests.  
On another note, there is a significant confusion in the forest zone designations. Council 
forests fall under the permanent forest zone. Under the non-permanent zone, one finds 
“commune”. What does this “commune” refer to, especially because it does not appear in 
                                                          
46. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), 51. 
47. Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology (New York: Dover, 1935), 
paras.2031-2034 and 2051. 
48. Juan Linz, Robert Michels, Political Sociology, and the Future of Democracy, ed. H.E. Chehabi (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006), 86. 
49. Spencer A. Rathus, Psychology: Concepts and Connections, Brief Version, 8th ed. (Belmont, CA: 
Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), 515. 
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Cameroon’s territorial administration structure?50 A “commune,” writes Carol J. Pierce Colfer, is 
“a district, municipality, council, an administrative unit.”51 In this regard, it is redundant to make 
a commune a distinct forest zone because it can also be a council forest. This redundancy breeds 
uncertainty and confusion in the management of forest in Cameroon.  
Decentralization  
 The 1993 forest policy, by including limitedly local populations in forest management, 
suggested that the Cameroon government to some extent valued the decentralization of forest 
management. The 1994 forest law laid out the legal framework for this decentralization by 
creating permanent forest controlled by the government and non-permanent forest controlled by 
different stakeholders such as councils, communities, “communes,” and private individuals. On a 
positive note, as has been indicated above, decentralization has increased the formal access 
(recognized under Cameroon law) of local peoples to forest resources. It has also weakened the 
prebendalistic clientelism in forest management, thereby saving forest management – to some 
extent – from the dominion of political elites. 
 Decentralization of forest management with respect to the COH needs to be understood 
within the context of the World Bank’s concept of “good governance”. Matthias Finger, 
Ludivine Tamiotti, and Jeremy Allouche avow that this is a concept that gives the World Bank 
the theoretical foundation to interfere in the political and social conditions of a country in a way 
that avoids confrontation with the government. 52 In this concept, the Bank rejects misconceived 
                                                          
50. Cameroon’s formal territorial administrative structure includes, in descending units order, state, 
regions, divisions, subdivisions, and councils. Villages are communities that identify themselves as cultural and 
traditional tribal units. 
51. Carol J. Pierce Colfer, The Complex Forest: Communities, Uncertainty, and Adaptive Collaborative 
Management (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2005), 361. 
52. Matthias Finger, Ludivine Tamiotti, and Jeremy Allouche, “Introduction: Conceptual Elements,” in The 
Multi-Governance of Water, eds. Matthias Finger, Ludivine Tamiotti, and Jeremy Allouche (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2006), 8. 
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post-independence development models in Africa that “have failed” because they emphasized 
rapid-state led industrialization as modernization in Africa  without insisting that African nations 
have to adapt Western type democracy.53 This is the sort of democracy, which in Abraham 
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, asserts that “government of the people, by the people, for the 
people, shall not perish from the earth.”54 The Bank suggests that this conceptualization of 
Western style democratic governance is not alien to traditional African society as the colonial 
development paradigm that sort the elimination of traditional African values from public life 
claimed on the basis that the beliefs and practices of African society were incompatible with 
Weberian bureaucracy.55 According to Max Weber’s bureaucracy, governments are 
representations of moral orders understood as “sets of authoritative rules and institutional 
arrangements – that impose certain obligations on their members, including the obligation to 
obey.”56  
Contrary to this colonial development paradigm that embraced absolute top-to-bottom 
administrative approach, good governance, says Pierre Landell-Mills, the Bank’s former Senior 
Policy Advisor for the African Region, affirms that there are “close links between governance, 
cultural relevance and the components of civil society.”57 Accordingly, the Bank posits that 
                                                          
53. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (Washinton, DC: World 
Bank,1989), 3 and 83. 
54. Majid Behrouzi, Democracy as the Political Empowerment of the People: The Betrayal of an Ideal 
(Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2005), 16. 
55. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 60 
In the Bangwa tribe of Cameroon, there is a cultural dance in which the populace define their influence in the affairs 
of tribal governance. The dancers, in the musical act known as leke, proclaim that there are twelve chiefs of the 
Bangwa land led by the Fon of the land; although the Fon is head, power is devolved to the different communities of 
the tribe headed by the chiefs who the Fon consults and listens to in matters of tribal administration. This 
sociological ontological narrative indicates that African traditional society involved popular participation in the 
affairs of villages, tribes and clans through small community institutions that had the powers to influence village, 
tribal and clan affairs through representatives who the tribal head consulted, and did not merely govern by a top-to-
bottom approach. 
56. Tompkins, Organization Theory and Public Management, 43. 
57. Pierre Landell-Mills, “Governance, Cultural Change and Empowerment,” Journal of Modern African 
Studies,” 30 no.4 (1992): 567. 
 156 
 
“each country has to devise institutions which are consonant with its social values.”58 Managerial 
institutions, adds the Bank, therefore, must “reflect national characteristics and be consistent 
with the country’s cultural values.”59  
These good governance affirmations are expressions of the Bank’s policy of ownership. 
The Bank also insists that good governance is the bedrock for positive outcome of aid 
conditionality for economic growth.60 Good governance, therefore, can be said to be a metaphor 
of the COH. The Bank’s thoughts in this metaphor ultimately imply that in a country as 
Cameroon in which the existence and legal recognition of traditional institutions that govern 
village life is part of the hidden transcript of the management of societal affairs, villages cannot 
be excluded from forest management. In as much as these institutions exist alongside a more 
publicly recognized state, the state cannot also be excluded from forest management. In this 
existential juxtaposition of the state and local communities, the power to manage forest has to be 
shared between state structures and local institutions. This participatory approach constitutes the 
decentralization of forest management in Cameroon. Decentralization has structural impact on 
forest management. 
Norman Jones posits from an engineering viewpoint that structural impact looks at how 
structures and components behave within a large dynamic system that yields inelastic 
deformations.61 Inelastic deformations involve the stressing of materials beyond yield point or 
limits of permanent alterations. Analogically, and in managerial institutional terms, structural 
impact examines the behavior of structures and components of institutions within a dynamic 
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managerial system characterized by abnormalities that have attained permanent status. An 
example of such abnormalities is ingrained corruption. 
In 1998, Transparency International, which ranks countries according to the way citizens 
perceive corruption in their public sector, ranked Cameroon as the most corrupt country in the 
world.  In 2007, the same agency list the forest sector of Cameroon as one of the highest “poles 
of corruption” in the country.62  How has the COH contributed in putting the forest sector (thus, 
forest management) in this pole? 
The COH assumed that by putting in place independent observers who focus on 
transparency in the legal institutions and economic transactions associated with forest 
management, corruption in forest management will be eliminated. This assumption fails to 
consider an important point that has been raised by William Q. Judge, D. Brian McNatt and 
Weichu Xi. Corruption is not merely an economic phenomenon. It is also a moral problem that 
affects the socio-cultural norms and political outlook of a society. Considering that the bribery 
and corruption “scratch my back, I scratch your own”63 proverbial maxim of the ruling 
government in Cameroon expresses these norms and outlook, forest management in the country 
cannot be free from corruption based on a narrow economic and legal scope. In as much as the 
COH allows government officials with questionable moral integrity to make final decisions on 
the allocation of concessions, approval of forest management plans, collection and management 
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Patrick Hanks,    
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of forest financial resources, and justice for defaulters on the forest management law, 
decentralized forest management remains under what Phil Rene Oyono terms, “captivity.”64 
Oyono provides a phenomenon that exemplifies this captivity: administrative slowness. 
There is a long and slow path from the demarcation of community forest to when the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests approves the application.65 There is a disparity in the number of 
applications submitted for the demarcation of community forest in a year, and the number of 
applications that actually get approved for a management agreement to be signed. This long 
period of waiting results from a difference in the perception of time that characterizes the COH. 
The COH seeks through conditionality to use classical economic models to manage forest 
resources so as to encourage investments and savings. These models involve a positive rate of 
time preference William A. McEarchen notes that in this per-second perception of time, the 
“now” is more valuable than the “then.”66 In the conception of time that the Cameroon 
government brings into the COH through the policy of ownership, however, time is not chronos, 
or, to use the words of “duration that affects the faith of the individual. It is the rhythm of the 
breathing of the social group.”67 In the African conception of time as social, what matters is not 
when one arrives for an event; value is rather in presence that exceeds – no matter when one 
arrived. In philosophical terms, chronos emphasizes when something happened, while social 
time centers on whether something happened. One focuses on the “when,” and the other stresses 
the “what”. To government officials in the Ministry, therefore, what is significant is approval or 
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rejection of the management plan and not when the approval or rejection decision is made. This 
social time value of the COH, therefore, introduces slowness and delays in the forest 
management process. 
When the application is approved, there has to be the signing of the management 
agreement between the applicant and the government represented by the senior divisional 
officers and divisional officers who head the divisions  and sub-divisions administrative levels of 
the Cameroon territorial governance structure. “This signature,” writes Oyono, “is generally 
marked by deep delays, primarily because administrative authorities . . .  and officials of the 
Ministry of Forests ask for money.”68 In this corrupt system administrative authorities and the 
“external elite” of the villages maintain control of forest management. The dark face of the 
structural impact of decentralization, however, is tempered by transparency measures. 
COH and Forest Management Monitoring 
The COH has significantly fostered transparency and accountability in the management 
of forests in Cameroon. This has mainly been through independent observers and monitors that 
became part of the forest sector on account of the COH, because the disclosure and 
dissemination of public information were among the dramatic changes in the country’s forest 
sector between 1998 and 2008. Topa et al. observe that as information has become more 
available to the public, the political and financial risk associated with the old clientele system has 
been heightened. Forestry officials no longer allocate forest concessions according to their 
whims and caprices.69 Figure 13 shows the fines that have been paid to MINFOF by 
concessionaires because the IO pointed out their illegal logging acts to the government.   
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Figure 13. Fines paid for illegal forest activities between 2001 and 2007  
Source: Created using data from Topa et al., The Rainforests of Cameroon, Figure5.2 
 
 Years with low fines payment do not imply that there was a reduction in illegal logging 
within that year or that the independent observer failed in its duties. Rather, as Giuseppe et al 
point out, MINFEF’s decision to settle some of the illegal logging cases out of court whenever 
the defaulter accepts responsibility causes the government to loss much money.70 In 2003, 
MINEF caused the National Assembly to pass a financial law by which the former enforces 
forest management regulation on the basis of negotiation with defaulters such as forest 
enterprises that have national elites as shareholders. In this negotiation process, MINEF is often 
interested in generating state revenue (as the Bank desired), rather than enforcing punishment by 
measures such as imprisonment of the defaulters. In this option for money, MINEF secures the 
political interest of the ruling government with these elites. Thus, with regard to this option, 
Amariei says that “the provisions of the Financial Law of 2003 applied to illegal activities by 
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MINEF neglect the provisions of the Forest Law concerning illegal activities, which stipulate the 
involvement of the judiciary system.”71 Liviu Amariei observes that because of this neglect, 
which is a failure in the monitoring responsibility of MINEF and MINFOF with respect to forest 
management, Cameroon losses between five to ten million US Dollars annually from illegal 
logging. In 2004, when transparency measures from the IO caused the government to act 
seriously against illegal logging, the government collected CFA 916,000,000 in fines.72  
Conditionality measures would have prevented this neglect because it insisted on 
enforcement of the forest management law; however, ownership opened up possibilities for the 
neglect of the law by refusing to give to an independent judiciary the powers to discipline 
stakeholders who engage in illegal logging. The COH, therefore, embraced an environmental 
management law that can be laid aside and not implemented by the Cameroon government 
whenever the executive branch of government prioritizes political and financial interests above 
environmental regulation. Thus, one can say that the COH creates a forest management system 
that can put environmental wellbeing at odds with government’s political and financial interests. 
This is also a system in which decentralization and transparent forest management can only be 
realized amidst bureaucratic bottlenecks. 
Furthermore, Time Fomete and Paolo Cerutti observe that “the responsibility for the 
functioning and maintenance of control and verification systems still seems to lie excessively 
with external donors, and ownership by concerned ministries is still very limited.”73 The 
government does not allocate enough money for the Provincial Brigades who monitor forest 
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resource exploitation. Consequently, the Brigades rely on resources from logging companies to 
cover some of their cost. Poor staffing and lack of equipment continue to plague the monitors 
who often do not have access to basic data and transportation vehicles to monitor the forest.  
 These problems facing transparency and accountability in forest management in 
Cameroon reflect the complexity of and the interwoven nature of issues facing forest 
management in Cameroon. Garry Rodan and Caroline Hughes underline that in a nation where 
democratic institutions are weak and the economy is not very strong, transparency and 
accountability are not simply ethical virtues that can be fostered simply by some institutions 
labelled “independent”. These virtues, rather, become interwoven in the political, social, and 
economic fabrics of the nation. In fact transparency in public administration cannot even be 
fostered by mass media action alone that attempts to make information available to the public. 74  
There also needs to be political will, economic resources, and capacity building in order to equip 
those who are assigned to ensure transparency and accountability in the administration of 
national and natural resource
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 This study has focused on the way that the relationship between the World Bank’s 
policies of conditionality and ownership impacts forest management in Cameroon within the 
context of the international dependence development model. It began with a number of remarks: 
first, that the neocolonial, false-paradigm, and dualistic theses cannot fully explain the nature of 
the relationship between powerful international development institutions such as the World Bank 
and the countries that rely on the Bank for development assistance; second, inasmuch as this 
reliance exist, one cannot deny that there is international dependence development; rather, and 
third, one has to seek a different thesis to account for this model. World Bank’s development 
work in Cameroon was taken a case study to investigate what thesis today can explain the 
international dependence development model nowadays. After establishing that development 
today cannot be separated from environmental issues, this research sought to find and validate 
this thesis by investigating the way that conditionality and ownership has affected forest 
management in Cameroon. The implicit assumption here was that forest management in 
Cameroon has the signatures of both the World Bank and the Cameroonian government under 
the banners of conditionality and ownership wherein the two parties interact and their policies 
interact. The logical assumption to formulate this theory was: 
- Inasmuch as there is international dependence development, there must be a theory to 
explain its nature today. 
- Because one is dealing with international development, one needs to find a body that is 
concerned with international development and a country that receives the body’s assistance. 
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- The World Bank is an international development institution, and it assists the Cameroon 
government that relies on the Bank for development aid. 
After selecting the subjects of attention, one needed a link or a case that will show how the 
subjects relate within the context of international development. The Cameroon’s forest sector 
provided this case. The recent nature of the reforms in the forest – reforms that are still ongoing 
– was a good foundation to understand international dependence development today. The study, 
therefore, had to focus on this case that exemplifies the nature of the international dependence 
development model today.   
 The complexity of the status questionis, and the nature of the chosen case pushed this 
study to adopt an interdisciplinary research approach that made use of theoretical insights and 
methodologies from disciplines such as geosciences, environmental studies, political science, 
economics, and sociology. The study could not aptly focus on the problematic without a 
theoretical framework. The nature of the reliance of developing countries on development aid 
and loans from international development institutions such as the World Bank creates a system 
of interactions between the provider and receiver of aid and loans. In this system, there are 
agreements and conflicts of both ideologies and power. The simultaneous existence of these 
agreements and conflicts leads to policy hybridization. Hybrids as resultants of this phenomenon 
of hybridization have synergized impacts on whatever they influence. Consequently, interaction, 
hybridity, and synergy constituted the triad in the framework of this study.  
Focusing on this case study without an x-ray of the policies that frame the case would 
have been an attempt to walk without a foundation. Consequently, the study exposed the nature 
of conditionality and ownership. Considering the assumption that the case study has the hand of 
the Bank and the Cameroon government, the research had to investigate how these hands shake 
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each other within the case. This investigation showed that conditionality and ownership are 
related as hybrids in the international development model. This finding would have sufficed: the 
study could have simply stated that in the international dependence development model, there is 
a hybrid relationship between stakeholders and their policies. However, this statement needed 
validation. This led the research into the operationalization of the conditionality-ownership 
hybrid in Cameroon’s forest. To verify the truth of this thesis, the research needed to show that 
Cameroon’s forest today is affected by this hybrid. This is the path that this study has taken. 
Therefore, by way of conclusion, there is a hybrid relationship between policies in the 
international dependence development model today, as exemplified in the real effects that this 
hybrid has on resource management in countries such as Cameroon.  
 These effects are multifold. For example, the conditionality-ownership hybrid has caused 
the politicization and formalization of forest in Cameroon, fostered costly forest management 
practices, promoted both sustainable and unsustainable forest management, given room for 
logging companies to enrich themselves, ushered the reign of decentralized forest management 
that, nevertheless, still leaves much to be desired, allowed the government to retain some grip 
over forest management in the country amidst neoliberal political economy reforms, and 
improved transparency and accountability despite bureaucratic constraints. Some of these effects 
arise from conditionality and others from ownership. However, because these policies affect 
forest management ensemble, they are really the synergized effects of the COH.  
 This research finds and validates the hybrid relationship between the World Bank’s 
policies of conditionality and ownership in the international dependence development paradigm.. 
This finding and validation positions policy hybridity within the international dependence 
development model. The study, therefore, proposes policy hybridity as a thesis that accounts for 
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international dependence development model. The neocolonial thesis over emphasizes power 
disparity in international dependence development, ultimately considering less-developed 
countries as powerless in this model, without considering the inherent and tactical power that 
developing countries have and exercise in international development issues.  The policy 
hybridity thesis acknowledges that there is power disparity in the international dependence 
development model, but it emphasizes that this disparity does negate the power that less-
developed countries have and exercise in ways that range from modification to outright rejection 
of development insights from western-based international development institutions. The false-
paradigm thesis suffers from an untrue generalized categorization of development paradigms 
formulated in western countries as unsuitable for the development of less-developed countries. 
The policy hybridity thesis objects this generalization by contending that whereas some 
development policies from western countries are blind to local realities in less-developed 
countries and are therefore unsuitable for the development of these countries, other policies 
actually produce some good development results in less-developed nations. The dualistic model 
is limping because it fails to see that development policies in developed nations and in less-
developed countries cannot be absolutely polarized in a globalized world today. The policy 
hybridity thesis resolves this problem by capitalizing the interaction between institutions and 
countries and their policies in today’s globalized world. 
The research contributes to the deposit of knowledge in international development and it 
opens up two paths. The first is the need for further research to investigate whether there is 
policy hybridity in a large pool of international development activities. The second is a nouvelle 
way of beginning to frame policy hybridity as a thesis of the international dependence 
development model in an age of global interconnections. 
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